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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a systematic in-depth analysis of social democracy in Turkey, with 
particular reference to Western Europe. The research develops a framework for the 
analysis of social democracy in Western Europe and Turkey in a comparative setting. 
Whereas the origins and development of the social democratic parties in Western 
Europe have been explored in the formative phase of the Industrial society in Europe, 
the birth and the evolution of Ciimhiiriyet Hoik Partisi (CHP) have been scrutinised in 
the First Turkish Republic, as grounding to the structural conjuncture prevailing within 
the relevant cases.
Accordingly, the analysis of the social democratic parties in these polities have been 
carried out on the basis of ideology, social basis of support, strategy and organisation 
respectively. Therefrom, the status of social democracy in Turkey is evaluated while 
holding the Western European case as the reference. In this context, the extent to which 
Turkish social democracy diverges from the homeland of social democracy has been 
elucidated.
IV
ÖZET
Bu tez, Türk sosyal demokrasisinin özellikle Batı Avrupa'yı referans alan derinlemesine 
sistematik bir analizidir. Bu araştırmada, Batı Avrupa ve Türkiye'deki sosyal 
demokrasinin karşılaştırmalı bir ortamda incelenebilmesi amacıyla analitik bir çerçeve 
geliştirilmektedir. Bu kapsamda bir yandan Batı Avrupa'daki sosyal demokrat partilerin 
kökeni ve gelişimi sanayileşme sürecinde ele alınırken; diğer taraftan. Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi'nin (CHP) doğuşu ve gelişimi Birinci Cumhuriyet Dönemi içerisinde 
İncelenmekle, mevcut yapısal konjonktür ortaya konmaktadır.
Öte yandan, Türkiye ve Batı Avrupa'daki sosyal demokrat partiler ideoloji, sosyal taban, 
strateji ve organizasyon açısından bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutulmaktadır.
Yukarıda değinilen analizlere dayanılarak, Türkiye'deki sosyal demokrasinin durumu 
Batı Avrupa örneği referans alınarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Türk sosyal 
demokrasisinin, bu hareketin anavatanı konumunda olan Batı Avrupa'dan ne kadar 
ayrıştığı da ayrıntılı olarak açıklanmıştır.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Several people have contributed in various ways to the completion of this dissertation.
Thanks to my supervisor, Dr.Burak Ekin Arikan, without whose valuable suggestions 
and encouraging guidance, this thesis would not have been consummated.
I am particularly indebted to my friend Alaeddin Eğribaş, who has carried out the 
burdensome task of the entire technical work on the manuscript.
I owe special gratitude to Zeynep Ada Eroglu, Ayşenur Gönül and Necla Uğurlu for 
their dedicated friendship.
The information provided from Istanbul by my sister Asu Akşit and the books sent by 
my cousin Metin Mangir from the United States has been invaluable.
Last but by no means the least, I should like to mention the inspiration of Faruk, Selin 
and Aykut, for the materialisation of this endeavour.
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................
ÖZET........................................................................................................................
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................................
TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................
CHAPTER I : WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS....................................................................
1.1. The Conceptual Approach...............................................................................
1.2. Structural Analysis............................................................................................
1.2.1. Industrial Revolution as the Keystone..........................................................
1.2.2. Cleavage Formation as the Backdrop of Party Systems in Europe.............
1.3. The Theoretical Framework..........................................................................
1.3.1. Structuring of the Party System....................................................................
1.3.2. Class Analysis...............................................................................................
1.3.3. Social Movements and the New Axes of Political Competition.................
1.3.4. An Actor Oriented Approach.......................................................................
CHAPTER II: POST-1945 SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE
2.1. The Electoral Trajectory of Social Democracy................................................
2.2. Ideology: From Class-Conflict to the Welfare State........................................
2.3. Social Base: Working Class as Father of Social Democracy.......................
2.4. Strategy: Towards Volkspartei......................................................................
2.5. Organisation: Trade-Unionism and Intra-Party Democracy............................
IV
VI
vii
1
11
11
21
21
25
30
30
34
42
46
52
52
58
67
79
95
Vll
2.6. Main Profile of Western European Social Democracy: Evolution from
Revolution..........................................................................................................  105
CHAPTER III: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY.........................................  112
3.1. Structuring of the Main Cleavages...................................................................  113
3.2. Socialist Currents in the pre-Republican Period..............................................  121
3.2.1. The Second Constitutianalist Period.............................................................  121
3.2.2. Miidafaa-i Hukuk Period................................................................................  123
3.3. CHP in the First Turkish Republic..................................................................  131
3.4. The Second Turkish Republic : Transformation in the C H P.........................  137
3.5. The Third Turkish Republic : Personalised Factionalism................................ 145
CHAPTER IV: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK...........................................  153
4.1. Ideology.............................................................................................................. 154
4.1.1. The Concept of "Left of Centre"...................................................................  163
4.1.2. Ideological Demarcations After Division...................................................  167
4.2. Social Base.......................................................................................................  172
4.3. Strategy..............................................................................................................  181
4.4. Organisation: Leadership Hegemony.. .............................................................  193
4.5. Main Profile of Social Democracy in Turkey : Elite Driven Oligarchy..........  204
CHAPTER V : THE COMPARATIVE SETTING................................................ 215
5.1. Ideological Divergences and Strategy....................................................   221
5.2. Social Base and Organisation............................................................................  226
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................  231
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................  238
Vlll
ANNEX.
LIST OF TABLES.
LIST OF FIGURES.
259
261
262
IX
INTRODUCTION
The attempt for the institutionalisation of social democracy in Turkish politics is a 
relatively novel phenomenon, when the legacy of its sister in Western Europe is borne in 
mind. At a time of revival of left wing politics in Europe in the 1990s, the status of 
Turkish social democracy may well be of interest both to students of Turkish politics 
and to others in the social democratic milieu. Findings of this thesis are hoped to 
highlight the basic motifs behind the functioning of social democracy in our country; 
especially in the aftermath of the 1995 elections during which, apparent erosion of the 
centre-left in Turkish politics has been manifesting itself In this context, the main target 
of this research shall be to offer an in-depth systematic analysis of social democracy in 
Turkey, with particular reference to Western Europe where social democracy originates 
from. However, any study that has relevance to Western European politics requires at 
first hand, the clarification of what “Western Europe” actually refers to. With this 
regard, the concept of “Western Europe” and its implications shall briefly be explained 
below.
From 1945 onwards, the image of the European continent has been twofold, a 
’’Western” Europe on one hand and an “Eastern” one on the other: the division was not 
only geographical but political as well. Although sharing an almost common legacy, the 
individual developmental stage of each state has been different, and the post-war
developments on the Continent have been diverse. To borrow Dennis Kavanagh's 
paraphrasing, “Western Europe has been the home of many of the formative experiences 
in human history, including Greek civilisation, Roman law, Christianity, the 
Renaissance, the Reformation, the emergence of sovereign states, the French 
Revolution, and the rise of industrialism and liberalism”.*
Western Europe, as a concept, refers to all those European countries that survived the 
Stalinist expansionism of the Second World War period, thus those that ultimately 
joined a club of values such as political liberalism, democracy and the rule of law. 
Actually, the historic decision of dividing Europe into two exclusive zones was taken in 
the Teheran Conference of 27 November to 3 December 1943; in which W.Churchill, 
F.Roosevelt and J.Stalin met to decide how to launch the final offensive in Europe. In 
this respect, the Anglo-American forces were to operate in the West and the Soviet 
Army in the East, for the defeat of the Nazis. Although it was a military agreement in 
the minds of the Western Allies, for the Soviet leader, it referred to the beginning of 
dominance and of an expansionist endeavour. By 1944, Stalin was granted predominant 
positions in Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria; through the 
“Percentages Agreement” signed between him and Churchill. The procedure was 
complemented in Yalta, in which the Allies agreed to allow the Soviets to maintain 
positions in Eastern Europe.
' Dennis Kavanagh, “Introduction to European Politics and Policies”. In Politics in Western Europe, eds. 
Gerald A. Dorfman and Peter J. Duignan, 1-24. (Stanford; Hoover Institution Press, 1991),!.
The immediate post-war conjuncture, therefore, required the European states either to 
join the Atlantic Community which Western Europe was a part of, or to remain in the 
cordon sanitaire granted to Stalin by the Allies: the Soviet leader’s interests were lying 
in securing his territory (particularly the vulnerable Russian and Ukrainian heartland 
through Czechoslovakia and Poland) from further attacks during the war, and 
consolidating his regime by political and physical expansion through Central and 
Eastern Europe after the war.
With this regard, there has been hardly any controversy on the fact that the term 
“Western Europe” is a highly political one, rather than being geographical. The division 
of Europe into two opposite camps right after had both economic and ideological 
implications. Western Europe stood for capitalism economically, and for the free world 
ideologically; whereas the Eastern part of the Continent used to represent the practice of 
socialism on one hand, and political and economic dependence to the Soviet Union on 
the other. Post-war institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 
the Council of Europe and the (then) European Economic Community (EEC) have all 
contributed to the formation of “Western Europe”: it was a club whose members were 
Western not necessarily geographically, but ideologically as well, adhering to some 
basic values such as liberalism, parliamentarism, supremacy of law and respect for 
human rights. A south-eastern European country Greece for instance, was accepted to 
the Western Club only after the fall of the military junta in 1974, and it acceded to the 
European Communities in 1981.
Western Europe today comprises of states among which many has a rather turbulent 
political past, particularly in the period before the Second World War: the consolidation 
of a genuine Western Europe became possible only after 1945. The developmental stage 
of each country in the formative years of the parliamentary road in Western Europe 
differ widely across the Continent, and each region or individual country has its own 
peculiarities or say, characteristics of its own: some group of countries or regions 
display similarities, as for instance, the Nordic region or the Mediterranean basin. 
Nevertheless, contemporary Western Europe as a concept, is widely accepted to be the 
home of parliamentary democracy that bears in itself some political competition around 
a well established left-right continuum on the one hand, and a series of rather newly 
forming other political cleavages that cut across this traditional spectrum, on the other.
Western European left-right cleavage can be characterised simply as an antagonism 
between two different world views on ideology and on political economy, inherent 
within deep rooted social and economics positions that evolved through a time span of 
some hundreds of years. In this context, the dominant political preferences of the post- 
1945 Western Europe have been Christian democracy on the centre-right and social 
democracy on the left of centre, owing to a tradition of more than a century.
The Industrial revolution that took place in the past century seems to be a decisive factor 
within the outgrowth of social democracy in Western Europe. At its infant stage, 
congruous with the industrial boom of the 1800s, it emerged to represent the interests of 
the working people of Europe; a massive and a non-homogenous array ranging from
proletarians in steel, construction, mining or electro-technical industries, to house-hold 
workers and small artisans. Steadily growing in number, the working classes of Europe 
were continuously propelled to improve their lot, as most of them lived almost at 
subsistence level, even by the mid-nineteenth century. Consequential was that, while on 
the one hand various communitarian views of society were penetrating into the minds of 
working masses; on the other hand, the urban proletariat in particular were increasingly 
getting organised in trade-unions. Marx and Engels’s Manifesto o f the Communist Party 
appeared in such a conjuncture in 1848, further impelling the already politicised 
working class movement. From the Manifesto onwards, the politics of the working class 
in Western Europe divulged a gradual, but a painstaking evolution from its 
revolutionary stand in the mid-1800s, to a rational synthesis of capital and labour firmly 
anchored in the democratic order following the Second World War.
The Ottoman/Turkish polity remained outside the Industrial Revolution which was 
among the key factors that contributed to the structuration of modern party systems and 
the outgrowth of social democratic parties therein. The emergence of social democracy 
in Turkey can be spotted in the state-party, that was born from the national resistance 
movement. Social democracy in Turkey, therefore, had a role to play only after the 
ideological and strategic transformation of the state-party towards the centre-left during 
the Second Republic. In this respect, Turkish social democracy appears to have followed 
a different trajectory than observed in Western Europe.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this dissertation is to study Turkish social democracy, with reference to 
Western Europe from where social democracy originated. With this regard, a framework 
of analysis shall be devised in this research, to offer an in-depth systematic study of the 
both cases. The study attempts to elucidate the following research questions;
- To what extent social democracy in Turkey and Western Europe followed a similar 
trajectory, in terms of origins and development?
- Which factors come forth as the most explanatory if there exist essential divergences 
between the two cases?
- If dissimilar, to what extent internal and external factors have been decisive in that 
respect?
Accordingly, the following are hypothesised in this research:
Due to the structural dissimilitude within the formation of main socio-economic 
cleavages, the outgrowth and development of social democracy in Turkey and 
Western Europe reveal notable divergences. Whereas social democracy in Western 
Europe was built upon the functional cleavages in the form of “conflicts over short 
or long term allocation of resources, products and benefits in the economy, along 
with their projection into ideological movements” fundamental controversies in 
Turkish politics remained confined to the territorial-cultural type of cleavage 
formation as typified in the model set forth by Scywow DAcivtin Lipsct and Stein
Rokkan. Thence, rather than a left/right continuum as in the Western settings, the 
basic cleavages in Turkish politics appears to be revolving around non-functional 
issues, among which, the conflict between Kemalism and Islamist traditionalism 
remains salient.
Social democracy in Turkey seems to represent a dissimilar trajectory insofar as 
Western Europe is held as the reference.
Methodology
The methodology employed in this study is analytical and comparative. There are a 
number of facts contributing to the rationale behind the selection of social democratic 
parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden. First, these parties undoubtedly have 
put their stamp on the project of building a coherent centre-left on the Western political 
spectrum. Second, trade relations particularly with Germany, France and Britain during 
the constitutional period in the Ottoman Empire, have had significant implications for 
the formative years of modern Turkish politics. In this respect, cultural and ideological 
interaction with these countries implied the penetration of Western political ideas into 
the Ottoman society during modernisation. As for Sweden, which lies comfortably 
remote from the Turkish territory, what exhibits relevance is its impact on Turkey as a 
prototype o f social democracy. The Swedish model of the synthesis between capital and 
labour is widely held to have considerably influenced Turkish social democrats under 
the leadership of their charismatic leader, Bülent Ecevit, in the 1970s.
The framework of analysis in the First Chapter has been devised to cover both external 
and internal explanations for the study of social democracy in Western Europe and in 
Turkey, On one hand, ideology and social basis of support shall be employed as the 
analytical tools for the elaboration of the external variables such as the prevailing 
dominant ideologies and the inherent cleavage structures. On the other hand, strategic 
appeals and organisational capacity for intra-party policy formulation shall be 
substantiated through the analysis of strategy and organisation, as the internal variables 
contributing to the study of the social democratic parties in Western Europe and Turkey. 
As such, the Second Chapter shall deal with the case of Western Europe, to be able to 
reach a main profile in this framework. Likewise, social democracy in Turkey shall be 
analysed in the Third and the Fourth Chapters, for the eventual framing of its main 
profile in the scheme suggesed in the First Chapter. Accordingly, the Fifth Chapter is 
devoted to the comparative setting in this respect. While secondary sources have largely 
been used in the analysis of the Ottoman period; the Republican period has been 
analysed mostly by reference to primary sources such as party programs, various party 
publications, speeches, memoirs or interviews given to the press by key party 
members/leaders.
Contribution of the Study
Western Europe, in particular the countries covered in this study have been, so far, the 
most important trade partners of Turkey since modernisation. Besides, Westernisation 
efforts within the formative years of modern Turkish politics have culminated in the
adoption of West European model of political institutions in the Republican Period. 
Turkey’s westernisation vocation has been functioning at full steam which, accelerated 
further with the commitment to full integration with the Western European institutions. 
Indeed, Western European politics and especially its left wing are extensively explored 
subjects. In this context, various comparative studies between the individual countries 
have been carried out. However, a similar effort for Turkish social democracy and the 
generic Western European experience has not been put forth so far, at least to the best 
knowledge of the researcher. There are numerous studies conducted especially on the 
philosophical origins of the divergences between Western European and Turkish social 
democracy. Nevertheless, a far-reaching systematic analysis within the relevant 
structural conjunctures, seems to be lacking. This dissertation, therefore, aims at filling 
this gap. Its contribution shall be to highlight the essential convergences and 
divergences of Turkish social democracy with reference to the Western settings.
Limitations of the Study
The main contribution of this research may appear as its fundamental limitation at the 
same time. As the background and the developmental process of modern politics in 
Western Europe is notably a challenging task that requires the analysis of a broad range 
of differing historical, political, sociological or economical aspects within countries; 
there are, no doubt, enormous difficulties inherent in any study of Western European 
polities. Although they seem to be built up on common legacies such as Roman Law, 
the Renaissance or the Reformation; there are indeed, significant divergences. Besides,
it is of no controversy that comparative studies of parties are highly challenging tasks, 
when the complex diversity of the demarcations even between parties of sister traditions 
is borne in mind. Therefrom, whilst a comprehensive study of Western Europe should 
best have covered the Continental Europe, the Mediterranean Region, the Nordic States 
and the Benelux countries; nevertheless, it is believed that an in-depth structural analysis 
of the social democratic parties could only be realised with concentration on a number 
of countries where social democracy has been an integral part of constitutional 
development and whose bilateral relations with Turkey have had notable implications 
for the formative years of modern Turkish politics, as mentioned above. Therefore, the 
rest are excluded from the scope of this research.
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CHAPTER I
WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
1.1. The Conceptual Approach
As already noted in the introductory sections of this study, the origins and the 
developmental patterns of modern politics in Western Europe is a colossal 
phenomenon that should cover a range of scholarly aspects such as history, 
sociology or economics; as well as political thought, religion and philosophy. It must 
also be reiterated that the variety of political models on the Continent poses 
enormous challenges to the studies in this context. The very fact that even the 
societies in individual countries reveal significant cultural, religious or ethnic 
divergences, may further help to highlight the difficulties inherent within the 
subject. Therefore, any claim of contribution to the cases of political development in 
Europe remains well beyond the limits of this dissertation. Rather, the social 
democratic parties in the selected four countries shall be studied, with a view to 
reach a reference for the analysis of social democracy in Turkey in the forthcoming 
chapters.
During the analysis of the social democratic parties of Western Europe, the terms 
such as “social democratic”, “centre-left” or “socialist” shall be used, from time to
11
time, interchangeably in this research. This approach stems from the fact that, many 
parties on the left of centre have been functioning under labels such as socialist, 
social democratic, democratic left or labour. These party names are not always 
determinant in revealing precisely the convergences or divergences in the parties’ 
ideologies, programs or strategies. In this respect, this thesis does neither attempt to 
conceptualise the various titles that the left parties in Western Europe have been 
running under; nor claims to hihghlight such differences theoretically. With this 
regard, any discussion on whether it appears legitimate to label social democracy 
under the surge of all the political positions stretching from non-revolutionary 
Marxism to the libertarian new-left, all with their differing sub-versions, has not 
been included in the research questions of this dissertation.
Nonetheless, the common bond that joined the non-revolutionary left parties of 
Western Europe in the post-1945 period has been the “distributional problem”. The 
basic structure of their political programs have been closely associated with the quest 
for the fairer distribution of the economic cake, rather than its ingredents and size. 
The belief that material and social deprivation in indusrial society is unacceptable, 
has prompted social democratic party programs to assign a key role to state 
institutions for the redistribution of resources towards the deprived. As such, social 
democratic parties placed emphasis on state intervention for assistance to the 
unemployed and the low paid. In this respect, these parties can be said to have 
remained prudential towards the abilities of the markets for improving the economic 
conditions of these groups. Therefrom, establishment of comprehensive taxation 
systems and their utilisation with regard to the general social interest has become a 
key policy instrument for social democrats. ^
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Hence, regardless of the different titles such as social democrat, labour, democratic 
left or socialist; the Western European social democratic parties as publicly 
understood today, diverge from those advocating the radical socialist proposal that 
the distributional problem could only be solved by abolishing private property; either 
through revolutionary or parliamentary means. Indeed, the path that contemporary 
social democracy evolved from radical socialism towards Keynesian welfare state, 
commences in the Marxist tradition of the past century.
Political socialism constituted the means by which Marx and Engels in the mid- 
1800s, had formulated their most radical vision of the existing order of things. 
Marxism appeared to be not only highly critical of capitalist system, but aimed at 
overthrowing it as well, through revolutionary action. Offering a systematic analysis 
of the established system, Marxism held that economic reality and society at large 
were inseparable from each other. In this respect, it was postulated that every society 
in history inherently possessed some form of relations o f production, a body of 
social organisation of production; which provided the clue to the understanding of 
the mechanism of the control that certain groups in that society exercised over 
others. As such, the basic novelty within Marxism was that, production was not 
retained as a relationship between the natural environment and human knowledge 
only; as the Classical School of economics held. Instead, the application of particular 
technologies to meet the society’s demands, the forces ofproduction, was the key to 
comprehending the functioning of the economic and the social; in Marxist 
terminology, the mode o f production. The latter was justified through a political and 
ideological organisation, literally the superstructure, which was assigned the task of
13
watching over the interests of the dominant (or the ruling) groups within that society. 
In a nutshell, the production process within a given society was placed at the heart of 
the Marxist analysis of that society; a process that had been preserved by the 
classical school merely as a technical matter independent from the social.
Having produced an extensive critique of political economy and of capitalism in the 
three volumes of the '’'Capital”, Marx put his stamp on essentials of economics such 
as the production and circulation processes of capital, the relations of production in 
capitalist system and the history of political economy. Elaborating, therefore, on a 
range of issues stretching from “demand” and “production”, to “money” and 
“value”’ Marx formulated his theory of surplus value, a fundamental novelty in 
political economy. The latter was derived from the postulate that labour power was 
itself a commodity within the production process, and that it possessed dual values 
like any other commodity sold and purchased in the markets. The difference between 
the “use value” and the “exchange value” of the labour power, made the “surplus 
value” inherent in this particular commodity. That the exchange value was lower 
than the use value of labour many times, constituted the individual capitalist’s means 
by which the surplus value was extracted from the worker. One of the basic tenets of 
Marxist analysis, the concept of “exploitation”, was based on this theoretical 
assumption. Thereupon, political mobilisation of the working masses in Europe was 
largely prompted on the fundamentals of the Marxist doctrine that constituted the 
ideological thrust for worker movements in the nineteenth century.
The ideology of the working class in Western Europe gradually evolved from 
revolutionary Marxism in the mid-1800s to contemporary social democracy firmly
14
anchored in parliamentary politics from the Second World War onward. It seems 
worthwhile to note here that social democracy, as a concept, acquired different 
meanings in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During the turbulent years at the 
turn of the century, a series of debates continued on the desirable means by which 
the socialist transformation was to be realised. At that time, the concept of “social 
democracy” was perceived as democratic socialism, that unequivocally implied the 
organisation of society on a socialist basis. Fundamental contentions within the 
socialist tradition, hence, used to be confined to the means, instead of the ends. As 
Wilhelm Liebknecht, a political activist of the German social democrats stated in
1869:
“Socialism and democracy are not identical, but they are simply 
different expressions of the same principle; they belong together, 
supplement each other and one can never be incompatible with the other. 
Socialism without democracy is pseudo-socialism, just as democracy 
without socialism is pseudo-democracy. The democratic state is the only 
feasible form for a society organised on a socialist basis...We call 
ourselves social democrats, because we have understood that democracy 
and socialism are inseparable.”*
Germany, the homeland of Marxism, brought up within the socialist tradition another 
key figure; namely Eduard Bernstein, who fought almost a battle for making of modern 
social democracy within the upper echelons of the SAD {Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei 
Deutschlands·, the former German Social Democratic Party). The implications of 
Bernstein, and later on the British economist John Maynard Keynes, for the turbulent 
history of contemporary social democracy have been invaluable. While the former 
appeared as the main figure within the debates on revisionism and opened the door 
, eventually for the parliamentary road to socialism; the latter provided the necessary 
policy prescriptions as regards social democratic macro-economic management.
William A. Pelz, ed, Wilhelm Liebknecht and German Social Democracy: A Documentary History. 
(London: Greenwood Press, 1994), 38.
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Actually, it seems almost impossible to separate the evolution of the social democratic 
project from the history of the SAD; in that this Party’s ideological evolution from 
orthodox Marxism to modern social democracy has been but the history of rendering 
the socialist tradition an indispensable element of parliamentary politics, instead of a 
revolutionary endeavour.
In this context, it may be worthwhile to note the fact that, the 1891 Erfiirt Program of 
the SAD was drafted mainly by Karl Kaiitsky and Eduard Bernstein, to which Engels 
also contributed. The theoretical assumptions of 1891 Program, indeed, remained loyal 
to the orthodoxy of Marxism; in that it was still advocating a revolutionary strategy. 
Controversies over revisionism, nevertheless, remained persistent in the higher reaches 
of the Party, at the turn of the century. At that conjuncture, Bernstein protruded as the 
forerunner of reformist strategy; with a view to “revise” entirely his Party’s ideological 
stance and strategy. Whilst bitterly opposed at the Dresden Conference of 1903, the 
electoral defeat of SAD in the Reichstag elections of 1920 provided the “revisionists” 
an impetus for the drafting of a new party program, largely to replace the legacy of 
Erfurt.
Bernstein's intrinsic contribution in this context had been to refute the deterministic 
prediction of historical materialism on the inevitable impoverishing of the proletariat, 
and on the inescapable downfall of capitalism. Bernstein and friends declared that 
“unless social democracy won over the peasantry, the lower and middle strata of the 
'civil service, as well as a large part of the intelligentsia, the achievement of socialism 
will be impossible because things had not developed in the direction which Marx had
16
predicted.”  ^ According to Bernstein, the number of the entrepreneurs did not decrease, 
and class antagonisms did not necessarily focus on between the latter and the 
proletariat, as orthodox Marxism claimed; and that the SAD had to attract a wider 
section of people such as small farmers and independent craftsmen. Appearing as 
representatives of the industrial proletariat only, Bernstein held, was neither realistic 
nor desirable. The SAD, therefore, had to present itself as “the party of the working 
people”.^
Bernstein, in fact, had been arguing since 1890s, through empirical evidence, that the 
expectations of Marx and Engels did not come true, and that there could be no question 
of a general proletarianisation of the independent middle class. Socialist strategy, 
therefore, had to pursue the parliamentary road, covering the wider section of the 
society.“*  Bernstein, accordingly, remained a severe critique of the Russian revolution of 
1917, and attempted to warn the party aides against repetition of the Bolshevik attempt, 
by stating at the Berne International Socialist Congress that “The Bolshevists have 
combined an amateurishly experimental economic policy with a system of the most 
brutal violence contemptuous of all civilised development, and by throttling necessary 
economic drives caused production to decline”.® Equally important was the fact that, 
another key SAP figure, namely Karl Kaiitsky, also became an open critique of the 
Russian regime, and allied with Bernstein, following the Bolshevik Revolution. 
Nevertheless, disputes within the party have been continuing as to whether social 
democrats should appeal to larger masses, or to remain firmly a class party for the
 ^ Roger Fletcher, Bernstein to Brandt: A Short History o f German Social Democracy. (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1987), 168.
" ibid., 169
* Eduard Bernstein, The Preconditions o f Socialism. Irans. Henry Tudor. (Ciunbridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993).
® Fletcher, Bernstein to Brandt. 100.
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proletariat. That implied, in essence, “an official revision” of the party’s ideological 
stance and strategy, ever since Marx’s time.
All in all, revisionist proposals for the parliamentary means for socialism were finally 
adopted in the 1921 Görlilz Conference of the SAD. The Görlitz Program, as such, 
announced a historic break with revolutionary Marxism. Strongly influenced from 
Bernstein, this Program reflected a social democratic stance that was explicitly 
committed to parliamentary competition; and socialism was accepted as a question of 
political will and of participation, instead of an inevitable economic development. 
While the concept of class struggle was retained in the draft due to ideological reaction, 
it referred to a "class struggle of the working class and social strata in solidarity with 
if’.^  The SAD, consequently seemed to gravitate towards reformism from the Görlitz 
Congress onward, owing much to the legacy of Bernstein.
The non-revolutionary impulse given to socialism by Bernstein was carried further as 
John Maynard Keynes appeared in British political economy with his radical insights. 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money published in 1936, boldly 
challenged the rationale of the classical school, arguing forcefully that the best measure 
of value for the economy as a whole was the number of people in employment. The 
basic novelty within Keynesianism was that it provided an alternative to the general 
equilibrium model of the classical school with the same variables (money and interest), 
and within the same society (industrial and monetised). Unlike Marxism which was 
confined basically to the incurable vice and to the inescapable collapse of capitalism,
' Keynes has been well aware of the fact that it was almost impossible to turn the clock of 
capitalism back. Believing however, that unemployment and social deprivation are
' Bernstein, The Preconditions. 169.
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neither necessary nor excusable in industrial society, Keynesianism gave a new twist to 
laissez-faire economics, and prepared the middle way between capital and labour in the 
form of a historic compromise.
While political economy before Keynes aimed at discovering universal and timeless 
laws as regards the economic problematic, Keynes adhered to a contextual and a 
realistic stand. Though fundamentally different in nature, both Marxism and the 
Classical School offered recipes for all people all time, to whom Keynes showed the 
way in the already established capitalistic relations of production: He wished to 
preserve private property, but went on to demonstrate that an unregulated market 
system was likely to be chronically unstable and incapable of assuring the full 
utilisation of productive resources’, as the Great Depression of 1929 showed. The 
virtues of laissez-faire, therefore, could be preserved merely if the social unrest 
generated by mass unemployment could be eliminated through appropriate measures. 
The measure was demand management to reach full employment according to Keynes, 
who argued to the bewilderment of the Classical School that the economy could come 
to rest in an unequilibrium position.
At that point, he was attacking the classical mentality that full employment was an 
economy's long run equilibrium position and that deviations from it would be 
negligible, as the self-adjusting properties of the market would induce the desired 
solutions. Highly sceptic on the ability of markets to gravitate towards equilibrium at 
full employment without government action, Keynes held that the state had to intervene 
 ^to achieve equilibrium between goods market and the money market. In this context
Williiun J. Barber. A History o f Economic Thought. (London: Penguin Books, 1967), 250.
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Keynes was also questioning the classical belief that markets were interdependent, in
8that another radical insight lies.
The Bernstein attempt, and the following Keynesian underpinnings elaborated briefly 
above, rendered contemporary social democracy an adherent of the industrialised and 
monetised capitalist state; albeit the intervensionist version of it. The first two decades 
following the Second World War can be thought of as the heydey of social democracy, 
during which Keynesian policy prescriptions contributed significantly to the war- 
stricken economies of the Western part of the Continent.
Although social democratic parties had differing fortunes in Western Europe, they 
became key political actors in the post-1945 period. While social democrats were less 
successful in Southern Europe in the 1970s, their counterparts either governed or 
participated in coalitions in the Northwest. By the 1980s, however, the trend was 
almost reversed, and social democratic parties in France, Spain, Greece and Italy have 
scored some considerable electoral performance. The past decade witnessed the decline 
of social democracy in the Northwestern countries, which seems to be attributable to 
factors such as shifting class structures, rise of a new political agenda and the 
incompetence of party programs’ responses to societal and economic changes of the 
last decades. These factors have had significant implications for the traditional left- 
right continuum in Western Europe. *
* for a detailed analysis of the subject, see: Barber, A History, 223-251, and also: Ken Cole, John 
Cameron, and Chris Edwards. Why Economists Disagree: The Political Economy o f Economics. 
Longman Inc,, 1983. 2"‘‘ ed. (New York: Longman Inc., 1992), 119-168.
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1.2, Structural Analysis
1.2.1. Industrial Revolution as the Keystone
The social democratic parties of Western Europe have, by and large, developed 
within the industrialisation process in Europe. Whilst the Steam Revolution has 
given the impetus for fundamental changes in production patterns during the 
eighteenth century; the collateral societal transformations were further propelled by 
the Second Industrial Revolution that took place in the 1800s.^ As the pre-capitalistic 
relations of production varied widely across the Continent, the dissolution of feudal 
structures and transition to capitalism were realised in different countries at different 
time spans. The British experience in early industrialisation, which appears almost 
inseparable from the road to parliamentary democracy, is often held as a reference in 
this context, while for instance the cases of France and Germany reveal rather 
different patterns than that of the former.
Some distinctive factors were at work behind the story of the relatively early 
industrialisation of the English society,· among which was firstly the strong 
commercial impulse that appeared in the country from the fourteenth century 
onwards.^“ The decisive role of wool trade in England, the main supplier of fine 
wool to Europe in the Middle Ages, was to the growth of trading towns and to the
, ® The introduction of electrical energy and the fast developments particularly in the coal, steel imd 
manufacturing industries aimounced in Europe tlie “Second Industrial Revolution”. Achievements 
such as the production of the modem automobile in Britain in 1895, the construction o f the all-steel 
Eiffel Tower in Paris in 1889 and tlie high-voltage electrification of Western Germany in 1891 can 
be cited as tlie landmarks of the second industrial revolution.
Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 
4.
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rise of commercialisation in the countryside. Second, and due largely to the 
commercial influences penetrating into the pastoral economic structure, was the 
weakening of the feudal framework by the fifteenth century.*^ Third, and not 
independent from the former was, unlike the French case, the relatively weaker 
status of royal absolutism with a less effective central bureaucracy in control of the 
countryside, that in turn prepared the ground for the landed upper classes to 
gradually seize power in governmental affairs. These circumstances combined to 
undermine the feudal relations of production and eventually to bring about the 
conditions on which capitalism both in the countryside and in the towns was to rise. 
Equally important was the elimination of peasant problem from British politics as the 
result of a process which started with the enclosure movement and which culminated 
in the consolidation of the landed classes’ positions and in the rise of industry.’^
The process of industrialisation in France reveals some divergences from that 
Britain; in the sense that, particularly the continuation of a peasant economy and the 
salience of feudal relations into modern times are held as the main contrasts between 
the two cases. As the labour intensive viniculture required large masses of skilled 
labour-force, the French landed gentry is seen as to have kept the peasants at land 
and to have maintained firm relations with the monarchy. The relative delay with 
regard to the commercialisation of agriculture in France, the close ties of the landed
“  The locus o f medieval land system in England had been “custom and tradition”, dirough which 
peasants were free to cultivate on long, narrow pieces of land with their boundaries set in tlie open 
field. They were also allowed to use the open land commonly for tlie pasture o f their cattle and for 
the collection o f wood for fuel.
The enclosure movement is a process that started as a result of rapidly rising land prices in the 
second half of the sixteenth century and which continued till the 1700s. It refers basically to the 
deprivation of peasants of their rights on die common use and cultivation in tlie open fields by tlic 
lords of manors, with a view to make profit from the lease of land. Acquisition o f open lands by the 
landed gentry by various means, had been the main drive behind tlie proletarianisation of tlie 
peasimts and of the consequential urbcm overcrowding. For a detailed analysis o f the subject, see: 
Moore, Social Origins, 3-39.
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aristocracy with the ancien régime and the strong royal absolutism with a powerful 
agrarian bureaucracy are believed to have retarded the momentum in which 
industrialisation and the accompanying societal changes were to flourish.
In like manner, peasant economy was prolonged also in Germany. The counterpart of 
the labour-intensive French viniculture had been a continuously expanding export 
market for grain in feudal Germany, which required, \n Moore's terms, “the German 
Junkers to keep men attached to the land in order to grow the grain which they 
exported”, in sharp contrast to England where the landed upper classes wanted “not 
men, but land for sheep raising.”*^  In a nutshell, though serfdom had disappeared in 
Britain and parts of Scandinavia in the late middle ages, the residues of feudalism 
persisted till the Revolution in France, and the 1848 uprising in Germany.
Nevertheless, although peasants still made roughly half of the population in Western 
Europe by the early twentieth century,*·  ^ political opposition to the established 
bourgeoisie governments emerged, by and large, among the industrial proletariat. 
The core of the revolutionary theory, literally Marxism, based its expectations on the 
urban working class, and socialist theory evolved largely neglecting to organise the 
peasantry into active politics, with the exception of China and Leninist Russia; Thus, 
as a student of European history has pointed out, “Rural interests throughout Europe 
were represented in national parliaments by the bourgeoisie of the countryside, not
the peasantry’ 15
Ibid., 460.
Frank B.Tipton and Robert Aldrich. An Economic and Social History o f Europe, 1830-1939. 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 86.
Ibid., 87.
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Despite such divergences in the individual countries’ experiences, it seems possible 
to work out a roughly generic picture of the Western European case of transition to 
industrial society; hence, to constitutional development, and to the accompanying 
emergence of worker movements. By the turn of the twentieth century, proletarians 
in some basic industries such as manufacturing, mining and construction dominated 
the working class of Europe. Seeking to improve their conditions, European workers 
had already formed the basic institutions through which they attempted to take part 
in the political machinery. The size of workers in the industrialised Western Europe, 
therefore, had already constituted a potential for a cohesive political force.
Table 1.
Size of the Urban Working Class in Western Europe in the Early 1900s
Manufacturing
Industry
Mining Construction
Britain 4.000.000 5.000.000 1.200.000
France 3.000.000 250.000 500.000
Germany 6.000.000 1.000.000 2.000.000
Sweden (Total) 440.000
Source: - Friuik B.Tipton and Robert Aldrich. An Economic and Social History o f Europe, 
1830- 1939. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 80.
- Adam Przevvorski and Jolm Sprague, Capitalism and Social Democracy. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 34.
Workers of industrialised Europe, as such, progressivelly organised in trade unions. 
Accordingly, ''Allgemeine Deutsche Arbeitverein: The German Workers’ Association” 
was founded in 1862; that in turn gave birth to the "Sozialdemokratische 
Arbeiterpartei'. Social Democratic Workers’ Party” by 1869. In France, trade unions 
became active in politics during the Third Republic, and the various socialist
Figures for Sweden are drawn from Przeworski and Sprague. According to tlieir data, there were 
442 thousand workers and 22 tliousand office and tccluiical personnel in 1900.
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endeavours of that time merged in ''Parti Socialiste: The Socialist Party in 1870. In 
Britain, the Labour Party has its origins in the “Independent Labour Party” founded in 
1893; that later on allied with trade unions to form the “the Labour Representation 
Committee in 1900. That alliance formed a parliamentary group in 1906 with the title 
of “Labour Party”. In Sweden, the worker movements became organised in 1880s, and 
the "Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti. Swedish Social Democratic Workers” 
Party was founded in 1889.
1.2.2. Cleavage Formation as the Backdrop of Party Systems in Europe
The preceding analysis suggests that the Industrial Revolution and its impacts appear 
as key factors for the structural analysis of social democratic parties in Western Europe. 
In this respect, the outgrowth of particular socio-economic cleavages within political 
development in modern Europe has had significant implications for the 
institutionalisation of the party systems in the West. With that regard, Barrington 
Moore has sketched a general framework for the developmental route towards 
democratic society in Western Europe, and underlined a number of patterns that 
contibuted to the formation of modern European politics. Similarly, Seymour Martin 
Upset and Stein Rokkan, in their far-reaching work on the formative phase of 
European cleavage structures and their translation into party systems, have also 
identified a number of critical junctures in European history, that corresponded to the 
emergence of particular social and political cleavages*’. In this framework, the 
industrial revolution protrudes forward as a key variable in both analyses.
Seymour Martin Lipsct imd Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter 
Alignments: An Introduction”. In Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National 
Perspectives, eds. Seymour Martin Lipset imd Stein Rokkan, 1-64. (New York: The Free Press, 
1967).
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So far as political development in modernity is concerned, Barrington Moore has 
shown three routes (as he preferred to call them) to the fabrication of the modern world; 
the routes through (l)the bourgeois revolution, (2)fascism and (3)communism. 
Combining capitalism and parliamentary democracy in essence, the first of these routes 
came into existence following the Puritan Revolution, the French Revolution and the 
American Civil War. This series of critical incidents gave, by and large, the impetus for 
the outburst of the Bourgeois Revolution that was realised in different societies in 
different times. Thence, emerging at succeeding historical junctures in England, France 
and the United States, the Bourgeois revolution has culminated in the Western form of 
democracy.
The second crucial route was also a capitalistic one, yet without an effective 
revolutionary drift to circumvent reactionary political faculties. The intrinsic feature of 
that route was a propensity towards the outbreak of fascism in Germany and in Japan. 
Indeed, industrial society was achieved through a conservative revolution from above 
in these polities, according to Moore. Communism, the third and the non-capitalist 
route to the modern world, flourished in the very existence of peasant societies; namely, 
in Russia and China. Having their origins in different historical and social 
preconditions, the common denominator of the three major routes has been, in the final 
analysis, the construction of the industrial society.
In Upset and Rokkan’s account, the decisive dimensions of antagonistic formations 
depended firstly, on religious issues at the historical sequence of “Reformation” 
attempts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This first critical juncture
18 Ibid., 413-414
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witnessed conflicts over the issues of national and supranational religion wherefrom; 
contentions on national language and Latin also prevailed. Upset and Rokkan have 
drawn attention, in this context, to the implications of the eventful partition of 
Europe brought about through Reformation and Counter-Reformation, by stating that 
the upshot of the strife between State and the Catholic Church settled the 
fundamentals of modern European politics.
Significant for the purposes of this study is also the fact that Counter-Reformation in 
Southern and Central Europe had consolidated the status of the Catholic Church, 
with the privileged strata of the ancien régime allying with it. Inasmuch as nation­
state builders in Central and Southern Europe had to struggle with the Catholic- 
traditionalist bloc in their secularisation attempts, the national churches did not 
impede the nation-builders in Britain and in Scandinavia. Besides, while in Catholic 
countries the middle-class opposition to the established old order remained at ease 
with the Church; in North-West Europe, the broad left coalitions against the 
traditional powers secured resolute support from the Protestant churches, from the 
periphery and from the rising urban bourgeoisie. Particularly important in this 
context were the cases of the religiously most divided countries, such as the German 
Reich, Netherlands and Switzerland; in which, conflicts over the nature of the 
political regime propelled by the confrontation between nation-builders and strong 
Roman Catholic minorities, set the backdrop of the party system.*^
The second momentous juncture in the course of the development of cleavages in 
Europe was 1789 and after, literally the “National Revolution”. During the process 
of centralisation efforts spurred after the French Revolution, the locus of divisions in
19 Ibid., 38-39
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Europe lay, by and large, between central nation-building elites and traditions of the 
periphery. These disputes, however, appeared in different forms in individual 
countries; that in turn gave the impetus for enduring territorial and cultural tensions.
For instance, the centre-periphery cleavage in France should by no means be 
perceived as a geographical phenomenon, but rather as a clash between 
Revolutionary and Counter-Revolutionary fronts, according to Lipset and Rokkan. 
Within this framework, rivalry for the control over the potential centres of political 
power, conflicts between the capital and the provincial areas, and finally the 
disparities between the more advanced and the less-favoured regions of a given 
country have all outfitted the emergence of the centre-periphery cleavage in Europe. 
Another fundamental issue arising from the territorial-cultural dimension of the 
cleavage structure was on the control of community morals and norms, as well as on
the control of education. 20
At the wake of the “National Revolution”, therefore, local oppositions to the 
centralisation efforts of the national elites, and reactions of the periphery or of ethnic 
and linguistic minorities were all incorporated into the general setting of the cleavage 
structure in the nation state; which accordingly, have underlined the fundamentals of 
nationwide party organisation during the phase of political enfranchisement.^*
The third critical juncture in the history of cleavage formation and the consequential 
generation of party systems is the “Industrial Revolution” of the 1800s. The rise of 
industry which was propelled in Britain, gave the impulse for the coming into 
existence of a dichotomy between the landed interests in the countryside and the
20ibid., 9-15
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rising urban industrial entrepreneurs. A further line of cleavage, therefrom, emerged 
between capital owning employers and those employed by them; literally the wage 
labourers. In this respect, Lipset and Rokkan'% emphasis on the prominence of the 
industrial revolution as the main drive behind the emergence of modern political 
patterns, converges with A/oore’s assertion that construction of the industrial society 
was a key variable within the process leading to modernity as mentioned above.
Arising from the divisions put forth by the industrialisation process, and significant 
for the purposes of this study, Lipset and Rokkan have incorporated the “Russian 
Revolution” as the fourth historical juncture to their framework of cleavage 
formation in E urope.O w ing to that, and to the former crucial junctures in the 
course of history, they stressed the relative importance of the “strength” and 
“solidarity” of the working class movements, to the “timing” of these endeavours. 
On that account, the capacity of working class movements to “mobilise the 
underprivileged classes for action” and their “ability to maintain unity in the face of 
the many forces making for division and fragmentation”, was more important than 
whether they had appeared before or after the extension of the suffrage.^"*
ibid, 40-41
Moore, Social Origins, 414.
Lipset and Rokkan, Cleavage Structures, 47 
ibid., 46
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1.3. The Theoretical Framework
1.3.1. Structuring of the Party System
It has been widely accepted by scholars of Western European politics that the 
emergence of modern political parties has taken place over time, covering the past 
century as well. The generally held view in this context is that parties in the West have 
developed within the rise of parliaments and the gradual extension of democratic 
rights.^  ^Maurice Duverger, in his classical comparative study of parties and party 
systems, has also associated the development of parties to the widening of political 
enfranchisement and the rise of parliaments. Whilst there existed various forms of 
political currents, popular clubs, intellectual foundations and parliamentary groups by 
mid-1800s, it would be inaccurate to speak of modem political parties at that time, 
according to Duverger. In that respect, the outgrowth of contemporay political parties 
has been a process promted within the consolidation of the democratic order in the 
West since then.
In Duverger’s view, members of the national assemblies had to adapt to the widening 
of the parliamentary authority and its functions; hence, had to form alliances in the 
form of political groups that shared converging beliefs. Besides, as extension of 
suffrage was being institutionalised, these groups also had to endeavour at organising 
the electorate through committees that were able to publicise the parliamentary 
candidates and attract popular support. Therefore, the emergence of modern political
Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, “The Origin of Political Parties”. In The West European 
Party System, ed. Peter Mair, 25-30. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 25.
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parties was prompted by the outgrowth of the parliamentary groups and the election 
committees.
Indeed, whereas the main thrust behind the formation of these groups appeared to be a 
common political doctrine, colloquialism or geographical bonds also seemed to prompt 
the emergence of such groups, as the 1789 French Constituent Assembly showed. 
Particularly in the case of the latter, regional solidarity emerged to be the initial 
amalgamating force that tied the members of the Assembly, who later on united around 
converging political attitudes in the form of parliamentary factions. Furthermore, 
personal interests or clientelism also played critical roles in factional propulsion. With 
this regard, “office seeking” in the form of hope for achieving ministerial positions has 
been an indispensable element of faction and/or group formation.^’
Thence, institutionalisation of parliaments and the extension of suffrage have been held 
as critical variables in the outgrowth and development of political parties. On the other 
hand, it has been customary among scholars especially from intellectual history, to 
emphasise the role ideology within the evolutionary path that party politics followed. 
Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner have shown in their evaluation of the studies 
on party politics that the rise of parliaments and the outset of political parties were 
associated with the gradual development of democratic ideologies. The socialist 
tradition, for instance, evaluated parties as instruments of classes. iMPalombara and 
Weiner have drawn attention also to the fact that some parties, indeed, have served as
Maurice Duverger, Siyasi Partiler [Political Parties], trans. Ergun Özbudun. 4th ed. (Ankara: Bilgi 
Yayinevi, 1993), 15-16.
27 Ibid., 17-19.
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ideological vehicles for challenging the prevalent political belief systems of their
respective countries.28
Giovanni Sartori, on the other hand, remained prudential towards employing ideology 
as a critical variable in the analysis of party politics. Ideologies were to play significant 
roles in party politics merely if they were backed by firm organisational schemes. 
Rather, the emergence of the mass party was assumed to be the key factor in the 
transformation of a party system and its structural consolidation. A mass party, by 
definition, should have qualified at least the two essential criteria; (1) the development 
of a stable and extensive organisation throughout the country and, (2) the capacity to 
present itself to the electorate as an abstract entity that allows stable identification both 
ideologically and programmatically. It has been asserted in this connection that a 
political system became structured insofar as mass parties were integral parts of it.^  ^
With that regard, Sartori placed more emphasis on the ability of the party structures and 
suggested that collective identities became class-structured only when party 
organisations were able to pursue a manipulative class-appeal strategy.
Furthermore, attention has been drawn to the equivocality of class analysis of party 
politics, on the grounds that class-voting studies alone could not validate a class-theory 
approach to party politics. In this respect it has been argued that neither class appeal 
nor class support alone could show that class interests were represented; as parties 
might not necessarily function as genuine representatives of class interests. Besides, the 
notion of “class”, according to Sartori, appeared as highly insufficient and scientifically 
obscure; due largely to the fact that often an index of class measures tended to
LaPalombara and Weiner, The Origin, 30.
Giovanni Sartori, “Structuring the Party System”. In The West European Party System, ed. Peter 
Mair, 75-77. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
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correspond with status of self-perception, rather than genuine class identity. Thence, a 
pure class-analysis, as usually was the case within the “standard approach” to evaluate 
party politics on a “class-voting” basis, could not constitute the main tool of analysis 
on which a general theory of party politics were to be built. Indeed, as class used to be 
an ideology that materialised in the relevant political paradigms in close 
correspondance with belief systems; it needed to be reinforced by a firm organisational 
basis, in order to become an important element in politics.^ **
However, the studies focusing on class structure prevail as useful tools for the analysis 
of social democratic parties, for a number of reasons. First, the conventional view that 
the size of the blue collar working class remains a key variable for, and directly 
proportional with left party performance; renders class analysis indispensable within 
the study of social democracy. Second, is the fact that shifting class structures in 
advanced capitalism are widely perceived as the reflection of a series of complex socio­
economic and technical changes; the implication of which has been a contraction of the 
blue collar industrial working class. Third, and important for left parties is the argument 
that class varies as a determinant of voting behaviour across countries in Western
Europe.31
In this connection, the postulate that the electoral fortune of social democracy is 
attributable to the changes in the number of its core constituency, literally the working 
class, constitutes the locus of the “traditional theory of class politics”. This position on 
party politics holds that socialist parties weaken in direct correspondence to the
’ Giovanni Sartori, “The Sociology of Parties: A Critical Review”. In The West European Party 
System, ed. Peter Mair, 150-184. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
Herbert Kitschelt, 'The Transformation o f European Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 4547 .
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contraction of the blue collar industrial strata in advanced capitalism. Yet, this approach 
has been refuted from time to time; due in large part to the findings that the varying 
electoral fortunes of leff parties across Western Europe are not necessarily related to the 
size of the working class in their respective countries: For instance, while the German 
working class peaked in the 1950s and 1960s, the SPD had been electorally weaker 
than it would be in the following decades, by which the blue collar Germans began to 
shrink. Likewise, the Swedish working class has contracted considerably since the 
early 1970s; the SAP’s electoral support, yet, remaining intact.
The class analysis of left parties has been challenged also on the grounds that, while in 
Britain and in Sweden class used to be the traditionally strongest predictor of voting 
behaviour, its salience has been eroding. In the latter, the predictive value of class fell 
from 53% of the variance in voting behaviour in 1956 to 34% by 1985.^  ^ Similarly; in 
France and in Germany, class has been only a moderately powerful determinant of 
voter behaviour; and even further lost ground in the 1970s and 1980s.^‘
1.3.2. Class Analysis
One of the best examples within the tradition of class analysis of party politics has 
been Political Man, the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset.^^ Unlike Sartori, Upset 
has argued in Political Man that political parties basically represented a “democratic 
translation of the class struggle”. Although many parties refuted the principle of class 
conflict or loyalty; in reality, they represented the interests of different classes, as
"%bid, 41.
Ibid,, 45 
ibid., 46.
Seymour Martin Lipset. Political Man, The Social Bases o f Politics. (London: William Heinemann
Ltd, 1960. Reprint. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1983).
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analyses of their strategic appeals and their electoral support suggested. The basic tenet 
within Upset's analysis of parties is such that the social basis of support for political 
parties on a world scale are by and large structured on either the lower or the middle 
and upper classes. As such, he has generalised the argument to include the parties of the 
United States as well, which have traditionally been accepted to diverge from the class- 
cleavage structure of European politics. In support of this conjecture, it was suggested 
that the Democrats have been recruiting more support from the lower strata of the 
American society from the beginning of their history, whereas the Federalist and the 
Republican parties have been backed by the more privileged groups.^^
Nonetheless, Lipset has acknowledged the fact that class was indeed only one of the 
structural divisions in society which was related to party support; as there have been 
notable deviations from this trend. With this regard, it was assumed that religious, 
ethnic or nationality divisions within countries have also been reflected in group 
identification with particular parties. Religious differences, for instance, have helped to 
shape the patterns of party support in polities where significant differences between 
religious adherents and secularists have been prevailing. Likewise, ethnic or regional 
conflicts have also contributed to the formation of loyalties for specific political 
parties. Yet, religious and ehnic divisions correlated, at the same time, with socio­
economic cleavages which, in turn, have culminated in an “admixture of class and 
ethnic support” for parties. Besides, gender, age or the differences between rural and 
urban population have also constituted additional dimensions of cleavage formation in
many countries 37
Lipset, Political Man, 230. 
’^ Ibid., 231-232.
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Thereupon, the locus of the analytical framework for party systems in Political Man 
falls on the assumption that it is generally possible to locate political parties on a left to 
right continuum at any given time and place; where the issue of equality and social 
change can often be identified with the left. The rationale behind this general trend is, in 
Lipsefs view, “simple economic self-interest”. In this respect, the lower-income groups 
tend to support leftist parties that represent themselves as instruments of social change 
towards equality, simply to improve their economic situation. On the other hand, the 
higher-income groups are more directed at the right for the preservation of their 
relatively priviledged status. Yet, a crucial inconsistency within this framework, 
literally the obsrved contradictions in the relationship between class position and 
political opinion or party preference, have also been recognised by Upset. The very fact 
that many economically deprived people tend to vote for the right whlist the better-off 
may sometimes opt for the left, puzzles the general assumptions of the class-analysis 
works on parties.
The partial explanation of such divergences from the general framework devised in 
Political Man is grounded on the aforementioned additional dimensions of cleavage 
formation, such as religious or ethnic positions. Upset has also shown that the upwardly 
mobile strata revealed a propensity towards abandoning the characteristics that they 
perceive to affiliate them to their former less privileged status; as indicated within 
studies on social mobility. All in all, the deviations from the pattern of class-voting, 
which were assumed to be structured on conflicting or overlapping social positions, 
were suggested in this context, to have undermined the performance of left parties more
than those on the right 38
38 Ibid., 239-243.
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So far as class analysis of left party performance is concerned, a richer account of class 
positions as a variable within electoral socialism, has been presented by Adam 
Pneworski and John Sprague. The central thesis of their analysis, in their own words, 
is that: “the voting behaviour of individuals is an effect of the activities of political 
parties. More precisely, the relative salience of class as a determinant of individual 
voting behaviour is a cumulative consequence of the strategies pursued by political 
parties of the left.” Przeworski and Sprague, hence, recognised and incorporated an 
actor-oriented variable into the class analysis of socialist parties. Party strategy and 
class structure, accordingly, constituted the key motifs behind their study of electoral 
socialism, literally the backbone of the “trade-off thesis”.
Trade-off was stemming, according to their thesis, from the necessity that with the 
introduction of universal male suffrage, a choice had to be made between “legal” and 
“extra-parliamentary” means for achieving the socialist goal. This implied, in turn, 
that any party opting for the parliamentary means for attaining political office had to 
compromise from pure socialistic appeal; as workers never became a numerical 
majority in their respective societies.Referring to the revisionists, especially to 
Bernstein who had vigorously argued for the search of support beyond the industrial 
working class for broadening the socialist appeal; Przeworski and Spragie believed that 
socialist parties have “diluted the general ideological salience of class, and 
consequently weakened the motivational force of class among workers.” As they put it:
“To win the votes of people other than workers, particularly the petite 
bourgeoisie, to form alliances and coalitions, to administer the government 
in the short-run interest of workers, a party cannot appear irresponsible or 
give any indication of being less than wholehearted about its commitment
Adam Przevvorski, imd John Sprague, Paper Stones: A History o f Electoral Socialism. (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1986), 9. 
ibid., 20, 31-35.
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to the mles and the limits of parliamentarism. At times the party must even 
restrain its own followers from actions that would jeopardise electoral 
progress.”'**
When briefly sketched, the trade-off thesis seems to have thrown light on a number of 
key factors that affected socialist performance. Foremost among these is that, the 
critical choice of participating in parliamentary politics removed, once for all, the 
option of revolutionary struggle, thus rendered it more difficult for socialist parties to 
build class unity. Hence, it opened the door for cross-class strategies based on appeals 
to “the people”, “the masses” or “the deprived”, and accordingly for an inescapable 
trade-off between the goal of workers’ socialism and the democratic takeover of 
political power. When, therefore, socialists appealed to non-working class allies, they 
undermined the support of workers who became less motivated to vote on class 
identity, thus were more likely to abstain or vote for parties with non-class appeals.
In a nutshell, it becomes possible to suggest that the far-reaching research of 
Przeworski and Spragiie provided notable findings for the fortune of electoral socialism 
in Western Europe. First among these is that, trade-offs between workers and allies in 
the social democratic electorate are exacerbated when workers perceive some 
alternatives to support other political parties, especially when social democrats engage 
in cross-class appeals. Second, trade-off becomes stronger if labour unions lack 
unifying organisation and tight linkages to social democratic parties. Third and 
collateral is the fact that, in such cases, workers may turn especially to communists or 
to ethnically and religiously oriented parties; as have been evident particularly in 
Weimer Germany, France and Italy. ^ *^
ibid., 21. 
•* i^bid., 59-61.
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Thereupon, Paper Stones can be said to have provided the class analysis of socialist 
parties with wider theoretical insights; particularly by having incorporated an actor 
oriented approach to the studies in that tradition. Nevertheless, “class” remains intact as 
the key variable within this extensive work on socialist parties. It has become evident, 
on the other hand, that social democratic parties in Western Europe are no longer able 
to rely solely on the support of the shrinking working class. Besides, it is not taken for 
granted any more that the working class votes would necessarily go to social 
democrats. Rather, some complex and subtle changes are being observed in the 
electoral behaviour of the traditional clientele of social democratic parties in the 1990s. 
In that respect, the challenging transformation that social democratic parties of Western 
Europe have been going under, was analysed in a broader perspective by Herbert
Kitschelt. 43
Kitschelt has placed more emphasis on the question of “actors” in the study of social 
democratic parties. Whilst acknowledging the importance of structural factors within 
social democratic politics; issues such as the outgrowth of new cleavages in advanced 
industrialised countries, party strategy, policy formulation and the individual party’s 
response to the shifting socio-economic class structures and the relevant programmatic 
responses have also been addressed in detail in The Transformation. Thence, it was 
suggested that the social democratic decline observed in many countries can not be 
attributable to only structural factors such as the size of the blue collar industrial 
working class.
In this context, firstly, the party leaders’ and the activists’ abilities to cope with the 
fresh conjuncture in advanced industrialism, protrudes as a key variable within the
Kitschclt, The Transformation.
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analysis of social democratic parties. Second, is the extent to which strategic appeal to 
the masses for electoral coalitions other than the core constituency succeed in 
enhancing social democratic performance. 'Fhe Transformation has put together the role 
of such dimensions in social democratic party politics, in a detailed fashion. 
Nonetheless, attention needs to be paid to the structural changes in advanced capitalism 
on one hand, and to the rise of new social movements on the other; prior to proceeding 
on to KitscheWs framework of analysis.
With regard to the former, G<f>sta Esping-Andersen has questioned the legitimacy of the 
orthodox assumptions of class theories in the light of the massive social changes within 
the post-industrial society. In this context, the neo-Marxists remained persistent on the 
postulate that massive proletarianisation is the inevitable trend that will necessarily 
include the white-collar strata in broad terms. Differing attitudes, however, tended to 
place emphasis on the emergence of new drives for social divisions in the industrialised 
welfare state. In respect of the dominant class theories that defined classes in terms of 
their relations to the means of production; Esping-Andersen has proposed that 
continued adherence to orthodoxy in this context was largely to undermine the 
understanding of new axes of social divisions. Rather, we needed to have a novel 
understanding of class-structure in the light of the fresh dynamics of the welfare state 
and the emerging new post-industrial proletariat.
The suggestions of Esping-Andersen for the structuring of a framework of analysis for 
class based studies of party politics differs from the traditional conceptions of class 
analyses in two aspects. First, is the assumption that the “Fordisf ’ and “post-industrial”
G(|)Sta Esping-Andersen, “Post-Industrial Class Stuctures: An Analytical Framework”. In Changing 
Classes, Stratificalion and Mobility in Post-Industrial Societies, ed. G<j)Sta Esping-Andersen, 7-31. 
(London: Sage Publications, 1993), 9.
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class formation are fundamentally different.·^ * Both empolyment structures and 
possibilities for social mobility in the post-industrial state reveal quite distinct patterns 
than those of the Fordist relations of production. In the post-industrial state, whilst the 
size of the traditional working class is declining, it is gradually beng replaced by 
upgraded and more skilled workers. Collateral with the decline of Fordism, has been a 
rapid epansion of professional cadres and lower-end service occupations. Due to the 
intrinsic qualities of these jobs, life chañes and mobility patterns have become less 
predictable when compared to the conventional blue-collar working class. Besides, job 
and career opportunities that require higher levels of education, technical expertise and 
special personal skills have become increasingly more decisive in the rising service 
sectors.
Second, the Fordist model of a full-time male breadwinner, with his wife geared to his 
income and to family service, is being eroded. Instead, the post-industrial model of 
employment implies more women employed especially in the service sectors, who are 
independent from the socio-economic status of their companions. In a nutshell, such 
tendencies inherent within the post-industrial society render the social status and the 
mobility of all groups open to more variety, hence to less predictability.'** The 
significance of such evaluations lies, by and large, in the relevance of these structural 
changes in advanced industrialism to the rise of new politics and its adherents. With 
regard to that and to KitscheWs framework of analysis, therefore, a brief account of 
new politics shall be provided below. New politics has also been decisive in the sense
G(|)Sta Esping-Andersen, “Mobility Regimes and Class Formation”. In Changing Classes, 
Stratification and Mobility in Post-Industrial Societies, ed. G())Sta Esping-Andersen, 225-241. 
(London: Sage Publications, 1993), 228. Here, Esping-Andersen is referring to the concept of 
Fordism as employed by Michael Piore and Charles Sabel in The Second Industrial Divide. (New 
York: Basic Books, 1984). Main tenets of Fordist type of relations of production, as typified by 
Piore and Sahel are based on (1) standardised mass production (2) mass consumption (3) macro 
arrangement of economic activity in the industrialised countries.
Esping-Andersen, “Mobility”, 227-229.
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that the electoral challenge it posed to the social democratic parties in Western Europe 
in the eighties and nineties has had notable implications for the programmatic and 
strategic shifts observed in social democratic parties; as shall be shown in the following 
Chapter.
1,3.3. Social Movements and the New Axes of Political Competition
The appearance of new politics in the recent political agenda in Western Europe 
stretches back to the early 1970s. The new politics covered an array of various social 
groups, each with different political affiliations or preferences. Support for these new 
social movements (NSMs) like feminism, ecology, peace and others have emerged 
quite differently than those of traditional partisanship; and the last two decades in 
Western Europe have been times of massive politicisation and mobilisation. Referred 
to by as “surge of collective activity”, they seemed to have provided an increasing 
legitimacy and use of unconventional techniques of political participation.“*^ 
Generally speaking, the NSMs seemed to be arguing basically for quality of life 
issues, and emphasising individualism together with self-realisation. It has been 
observed that support for these movements came overwhelmingly from the well- 
educated, post-war born people; and it was asserted that the NSM proponents were 
drawn from a particular stratum of the middle-class, literally the non-productive 
sector including education, arts, health and social work.
While in the early 1980s the NSMs were being treated as single issue movements of 
a protest and mobilising character, by the American tradition; the European school 
on NSMs tended to correlate these movements to major societal changes and to
Suzan Berger, “Politics and Anti-Politics in Western Europe in the 1970s”. Daedulus. 108:1 
(1979), 27.
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processes of class formation. The European scholars, accordingly, suggested that 
many of such movements had grown out of the new contradictions in modernising 
capitalist social formation; and that this new political paradigm could best be 
understood as “the modern critique of further modernisation”.'**
The European spectacles on NSMs also held that the traditional axis of left and right 
alone, did no longer suffice to describe the modern patterns of political conflict; and 
that a further analysis of value priorities, beyond traditional party preferences, was 
needed. A new axis of political struggle, therefore, was becoming an equally strong 
predictor of behavioural intentions and actual behaviour, across the (then) twelve 
nations of the European Community: the materialist/post-materialist (m/pm) 
cleavage. The m/pm division, thus, cut across the traditional cleavage structure of 
politics and post-materialist values were characteristically held by people of high 
education; which, according to a class model, would render them middle class. 
Geared to this argument was that the traditional left-right continuum had been an 
approximately adequate model until the mid-1970s, in which all relevant political 
and societal collective actors could have been located; and which clearly did not 
suffice to describe the new political paradigm any longer. A new cross-ciiiiing 
dimension challenging the irrationalities of the industrial society, consequently, had 
to be added to the post-war “political paradigm of security and economic growth”.^ "
Implications of the new political paradigm (hereinafter referred to as new politics) 
for contemporary Western European political parties have been both programmatic
Chius Offc, “New Social Movements: Challenging üie Boundaries of Institutional Politics”. Social 
Research. 52:4 (Winter 1985), 817-868.
Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
1990), 371-388.
Offc, “ Challenging the Boundaries”, 857.
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and organisational. Programmatic in the sense that, it became almost impossible for 
the established parties representing the traditional left-right cleavage, to turn a deaf 
ear to new politics. Both orthodox left and right felt obliged to respond to the new 
political claims in their party programs, in particular to ecological issues. The left, 
nevertheless, turned out to be more receptive of demands such as environmentalism 
and anti-nuclearism. Consequently, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), for 
instance, had to change its policy on nuclear energy; following a series of intra-party 
conflicts. While the SPD used to favour the utilisation and expansion of nuclear 
energy in the 1970s, the pro-nuclear policy was almost reversed by 1987; calling for 
a gradual phasing out of nuclear energy in the Federal Republic. By the early 1990s, 
SPD’s orthodoxly growth-oriented program on economic policy was rendered an 
environmentally sustainable one.^  ^ It was alleged in this context that the growing 
programmatic responsiveness of the left parties, seemed to raise the possibility that 
these parties were more capable of attracting new politics proponents than the 
right."'
Whether the case has been such, leaves much room for discussion; as the voters’ 
attitudes on established parties and on new politics in Western Europe still remain 
highly volatile, as shall be elaborated in due course. Nevertheless, it became 
perceivable in the last decades that new politics has been operating parallel to the 
conventional axis of politics, the latter having conservative right on the one extreme, 
and traditional left on the other. The ideological spectrum in advanced capitalist 
democracy, hence, has been sketched on a Euclidean space:
Robert Rohrsclineider, “Impact of Social Movements on European Party Systems”. The Annals, 
U P SS. 528 (July 1993), 163.
“  ibid., 106.
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As can be viewed in Figure 1 below, whilst the conventional socialist/capitalist 
division remains on the horizontal axis, a range of political positions between 
libertarianism and authoritarianism defines the vertical dimension of the political 
space. As for the latter dimensional formation, libertarianism stands for emphasis on 
equality and freedom as ultimate values; with anarchist communitarians at the 
extreme, wishing to establish a solidaristic order that inherently possesses liberty and 
equality. At the other extreme of the vertical axis is the aiithortarian 
communitarians, refuting individual freedom and equality for the sake of a 
hierarchical and a normative order. White historically, social democracy had been 
situated on the horizontal axis of traditional cleavage formation, somewhere 
comprising between capitalism and socialism; it seems to have moved upper towards 
the ideological coordinates of new politics, incorporating much of the libertarian
values. 53
For a detailed discussion of die new cleavage formation, sec: Kitshclt, The Transformation, 254- 
279; and: 131-206.
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LIBERTARIAN POLITICS
Figure 1. The Ideological Axes of Advanced Industrialised Society
Source : Kitschelt, The Transfonnation, 254-279.
1.3.4. An Actor Oriented Approach
The social democratic parties of Western Europe have experienced notable changes 
in terms of both ideological stances and strategic appeals in the period following the 
Second World War. Besides, they had some differing electoral performences when 
compared to each other. Such issues are going to be addressed in detail in the 
following Chapter; with reference to ideology, strategy, organisation and social basis 
of support, the four analytical tools employed in this research. The study so far has 
shown that the conventional class approach to the subject do no longer suffice for a 
precise analysis of these parties in the recent years. Whilst structural explanations 
based on cleavage formation seems to hold true to a large extent; it needs to be
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enriched with an actor-oriented approach at the wake of the novel socio-political 
changes inherent in the 1990s.
The essence of the actor-oriented approach, as provided by Kitschelt, places 
emphasis on the parties’ capabilities of adaptation to the challenges posed by the 
fresh conjuncture in advanced capitalism. Although the changes in the socio­
economic class structure have been recognised as a determinant of social democratic 
performance, it is suggested that a party’s strategic appeal has also become a key 
variable for social democratic success or failure. Therefrom, some “internal 
explanations” such as strategy, organisational capacity for intra-party decision 
making and policy formulation for electoral alliances, should be incorporated into 
the prevailing “external explanations” of class structures.*·^
In this context, the direct impact of left parties’ strategic appeal on voters’ electoral 
choices have been analysed in the first instance. It has been suggested that the 
electorate are becoming more sensitive to the explicit strategic appeals by the party 
leaders and activists; as party identification and class-voting are observed to be in 
decline. In order to throw light on the formation of strategy, on the other hand, the 
critical issues of (1) cleavage structures, (2) the existing distribution of popular 
preferences within the competitive politcal space, and (3) the rise of new politics are 
held as key variables. Depending on the assertion that parties indeed are “actors”; the 
ultimate goal at this stage is to see whether social democratic strategy within 
political competition derives from a rational choice or not.
Kitschclt, The Transformation.
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As such, the relevance of rational choice approach to social democratic parties has 
been extensively discussed in KitscheWs framework of analysis. This analysis is 
devised upon the basic assumptions of rational choice that parties are vote 
maximizers which have the incentives to spread out over the competitive political 
space; and that the extent to which parties act as such, depends on the number of 
actual and potential competitors (parties) therein. The key variables within simple 
rational choice approach is, therefore, the number of actual competitors and the entry 
cost for their potential rivals. The eventual distribution of votes, in that respect, is to 
be scattered along the main ideological poles.
Nevertheless, attention has been drawn to the contradictory position within this 
approach that insofar as established parties opt for strategies towards vote 
maximisation, and as long as electoral distribution remains fixed; then there would 
be hardly any option for new parties to arrive at that particular political space. 
Besides, based on the very fact that there appears to be cross-cutting ideological axes 
other than the conventional let-right continuum; the relevance of simple rational 
choice runs into difficulties, especially when contemporary social democratic parties 
are borne in mind. Due to the left-libertarian axis of political competition that has 
been functioning as complementary to the conventional axis, the essential difficulty 
inherent in the application of rational choice to the case of contemporary social 
democratic parties becomes clear.
On that account, Kitscheli has hypothesised firstly that, the social democratic 
’ electoral fortune is contingent upon the strategic choices in the new voter distribution 
provided by the left-libertarian challenge. Second, the conventional “distributive”
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left-right division, by and large, remains as a decisive factor for social democratic 
parties.Third, social democratic parties can not be analysed with a reference to 
their short-run vote-maximization stances only; rather, their particular opportunities 
for choosing between complex strategic alternatives within multi-party competition 
must also be incorporated into the analytical approach. In that respect, many social 
democratic parties in Western Europe, especially in Britain, France and Sweden, 
have faced a wide range of strategic choices, and accordingly have pursued volatile 
strategies. Whilst the strategic stances of many social democratic parties around 
Western Europe are disclosed to be directed at short-term vote maximization 
between 1970 and the 1980s; nevertheless, a purely rational-choice approach to 
social democratic parties would remain incomplete, by having neglected the 
particular ideological legacy of a party and the importance of historical voter 
identifications with that party. Besides, parties may also opt for long-tem vote 
maximization as an alternative to short-term office/vote seeking. Yet, such a strategy 
becomes rational only when structural opportunities are favourable.
Based on the conclusion that rational choice becomes a useful tool only in explaining 
how party strategies are translated into electoral turnouts in a given competitive 
political space, and that it remains incompetent in analysing a party’s choices of 
strategy itself; “intra-party decision making process” and “organisation” are put 
forth as the additional internal factors in the analysis of social democratic parties. 
Therefrom, it has been suggested that strategic flexibility was undermined more in 
social democratic parties with relatively more institutionalised organisational 
schemes, as the fairly traditional economic socialism of British and Swedish social
Ibid., 131-137. 
55 Ibid., 146-198.
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democratic parties in the 1970s and 1980s indicated. On the other hand, the relative 
strength of left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation was to constitute the critical 
external factor that affected the rational strategic choice of a social democratic party, 
as has been the case in Germany.*’ Besides, the prevalence of dominant ideologies 
have also contributed to the extent to which parties adapted to the electoral 
competition around new axis of politics.
In this respect, Britain and Sweden had more difficulty in incorporating left- 
libertarian themes, as the notion of class and conventional views of liberalism and 
socialism had been the hegemonic ideologies in these polities. In Germany, 
however, liberalism did not constitute the sole antagonistic discourse that social 
democracy had to compete with. Rather, social democrats had to challenge also the 
traditional Catholic views of the society or ethnic and regional divisions. 
Nonetheless, the very existence of such particularisms helped, at the same time, for 
the easier adaptation by social democrats to libertarian themes. In France, on the 
other hand, etatist and communist visions of society seemed to have posed further 
difficulties to the social democrats. In that polity, left-libertarianism was largely 
perceived to be an adversary of traditional socialism. All in all, these have shaped 
popular demands for political alternatives in social democracy, from a conventional 
distributional strategy towards forming alliances around a more complex continuum 
of "left-libertarianism versus right-authoritarianism".
Thenceforward, it became possible for social democratic parties of Western Europe 
’ to devise strategies directed at electoral alliances for covering the newly emerging 
cleavages of advanced capitalism. To the extent that social democrats have been able
Ibid., 207-253.
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to converge their strategic appeals with political demands such as individual self- 
realisation or direct political participation; their electoral performance came out to be 
more successful. The electoral target in that case has been the voters drawn 
especially from the intellectually more demanding jobs in the service sector. Social 
democratic fortune in advanced industrial society, therefore, was contingent upon 
both structural elements and intrinsic capabilities of parties for strategic formulation. 
On the other hand, it has been reiterated that strategy was the outcome of intra-party 
coalitions within the organisational framework; hence a function of voluntarist
58change by political actors.
In a nutshell, the framework of analysis devised by Kitschelt recognises the more 
complex patterns of political competition that the traditional class analysis falls short 
of explaining. The substantive changes in popular preferences put forth by the 
modern professional and sectoral structures within advanced industrial society, as 
such, have been incorporated into the conventional structural analysis of cleavage 
formation and their translation into party systems. Therefrom, it has been shown that 
the fortune of social democracy is not necessarily dependent upon prevailing social 
structures; rather we need to be mindful of also the internal explanations, in order to 
be able to account for the variences observed in that respect. Emphasis is placed on, 
therefore, to the importance of actors within strategy and organisation; as well as the 
existing patterns of party competition and the relevant ideological legacy, as the 
critical variables in the analytical framework.
Ibid., 280-281.
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CHAPTER II
POST-1945 SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE
In view of the theoretical account given in the preceding Chapter, the social democratic 
parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden shall be examined for the post-1945 
period in this Chapter. The framework of analysis shall cover both the external and internal 
explanations put forth in the actor-oriented approach provided by Herbert Kitschelt. On 
one hand, both ideology and social basis of support are going to be among the tools of the 
analysis, for the elaboration of the prevailing dominant ideologies and the inherent 
cleavage structures respectively, as the critical external variables. On the other hand, 
strategic appeals and organisational capacity for intra-party policy formulation shall be 
scrutinised, as the internal variables, on the basis of strategy and organisation; the two 
other analytical tools employed in this study. Before running into the analysis, however, 
the developmental path of the electoral performance of these parties shall be briefly 
explained below; as grounding to the analysis.
2.1. The Electoral Trajectory of Social Democracy
As endowed by the Marxist theory, socialism around 1850s was to conquer political 
powfer by means of a revolution. The historic agent of the revolution would be the working 
class. At the wake of constitutional development on the other hand, political 
enfranchisement in Europe was continually expanding. Hence, “the crucial choice” for the
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proletariat at that time was “whether or not to participate”/  While the First (1864) and the 
Second International (1889) had adopted genuinely Marxist stands, debates on the 
parliamentary ways and means for achieving socialism continued. Almost a battle had 
been fought between the reformist and revolutionary wings within the socialist milieu, 
before the parliamentary option for achieving the socialist ends was adopted.
Contemporaneous was the fact that socialists were steadily growing from election to 
election. Left votes in Germany increased from 125000 in 1871, to 312000, 1427300 and 
to 4250000 in 1881, 1890 and in 1912 respectively. The German social democratic party 
had already, by 1890, become the largest party scoring 19.7 %; and the respective figure 
reached 34.8 % by 1912. Similarly, the Swedish social democrats received 3.5, 9.5, 14.6, 
28.5, and 36.4 % of the votes cast in the years 1902, 1905, 1908, 1911 and 1914 
respectively. By 1917, social democratic support in the latter climbed up to 39.1 %.  ^
Likewise, the British Labour Party increased its share of votes from 29.5 % in 1922 to 30.5 
% the following year.^
The rapid increase in socialist vote in Western Europe tended to slow down and stabilise 
following the First World War. Of the four countries within the scope of this study, 
Sweden had the strongest left of the inter-war period.'* Communist factions in this period, 
clearly separated their ways and broke away from the social democratic movement; most 
of them organising in their own parties. In that respect, France is an outstanding example
' Adam Przevvorski and John Sprague. Paper Stones: A History o f Electoral Socialism. (Cliicago: University 
of Cliicago Press, 1986), 13 
- ibid., 27-28
 ^ Malcolm B. Hamilton, Democratic Socialism in Britain and Sweden. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1989), 65.
Stefano Bartolini, “The Eiu-opean Left Since World War 1: Size, Composition and Patterns of Electoral 
Development”. In Western European Party Systems. Continuity and Change, eds., Hans Daalder and Peter 
Mair, 139-175. (London: Sage Publications, 1983), 156.
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in which the communists used to enjoy a weighty position within the country’s politics; 
which, from time to time, undermined the social democratic performance to a considerable
extent.
With regard to the electoral performance of left parties, Stefano Bartolini has suggested that 
since the First World War, the variance in the size of different communist parties was, by and 
large, the outgrowth of the variance in the size of the socialist parties from which they 
originated. Whereas the size of communist parties in Sweden and in Britain have stabilised 
during the inter-war period; larger alterations have taken place for the cases of Germany and 
France, after 1945.  ^ It was also emphasised in this context that, before the Second World 
War, Germany could be included in the array of countries in which a rather balanced electoral 
strength between Communists and Socialists used to prevail. That rendered the KPD 
(German Communist Party), by and large, a strong Communist party among its sisters in 
Europe. From 1945 onward however, the fortune of the KPD was reversed; and the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG), joined the post-war group of polities with social democratic 
dominance of the left, with a weak communist party. On the other hand, social democratic 
growth hardly recovered its Weimar electorate in the aftermath of 1945. Among the drives of 
this outline, both the legacy of the Nazi Regime and neighbourhood with the Communist East 
(DDR)*" as a result of the division, were held to be of significance. The latter implied, at the 
same time, the political repression of the Communist Party in the FRG in the post-1945 
period.
 ^ Ibid., 151.
DDR: Deutsche Demokratische Republik 
’ Bartolini, “The European Left”, 115.
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The general trend has been such that the size of total left during the period between the two 
world wars appeared to grow in Europe, with the exception of Belgium only. In Bartolini's 
view, post-1945 stabilisation of the total left in Europe revealed a negative correlation 
between the electoral supports of social democracy and of communism; due largely to the 
direct competition between the two*. Besides, data covering the period from 1917 to 1978 
have indicated that inasmuch as the increase in communist support was more linked to the 
decline in socialist votes; social democrats were observed to grow at the expense of the 
right, or decline in favour of the latter. France constituted a particular case that confirmed 
these findings.^ Bartolini's data denoted, at the same time, that the level of support won by 
a communist party determined not only the nature of communist/socialist competition, but 
also the competition in the party system as a whole.
By the end of the Second World War, social democrats throughout Europe had already 
become mass parties immovably committed to the democratic order. From then on, social 
democratic parties of the four countries within the scope of this study either governed or 
participated in coalitions; hence became parties of governmental responsibility. The 
average shares of social democratic vote between 1917 and 1943 came out to be 24.5 % 
for Germany; 19.7 % for France; 31.4 % for Britain and 40.8 % for Sweden. This general 
framework, with the exception of France, continued with considerable increases in the 
post-Second World War period; and the respective figures till 1978 have been 37.0 %; 
18.3 %; 44.5 % and 46.0%. "
 ^ Ibid., 156.
®lbid, 154-155.
10 Ibid., 156
" Przeworski and Sprague, Paper Stones, 30
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The political programmes of social democrats in the early post-war period, had to be 
concerned basically with the problems stemming largely from the interwar depression of 
1929 and the heavy burden of the Second World War years. In this respect, social 
democratic programmes focused on economic and social issues which were inspired 
largely by Keynesian macro-economic management. Retaining full employment as their 
essential target, social democratic governments especially in Britain and in Sweden 
embarked on interventionist economic programs directed at regulating the uncontrolled 
market, with the ultimate goal of steering resources into selected profitable sectors. As 
such, the leitmotif of macro-economic management in North-Western Europe in the period 
after the War has been the creation of a sizeable public sector and a consequential 
challenge to laissez-faire. State-led economic reconstruction was complemented by 
socialisation of welfare measures, and by entrusting the state with the task of establishing a 
comprehensive social security system. In Germany, on the other hand, social democrats 
came to power in 1969. In France, PS had taken active roles during the Fourth Republic, 
and established a comprehensive social security system. In the Fifth Republic, however, 
socialists declined \m\\\Mitterand's leadership in 1971.
The ascent of social democratic values in the 1950s and the 1960s was challenged in the 
following decade; due largely to the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1971 and to 
the relative stagnation of US hegemony in world markets. The emergence of the OPEC oil 
cartel in this decade and the accompanying crises in international finance, undermined 
gravely the appropriateness of Keynesian policies in Europe. Governments in the 1970s 
were'no longer in a position to maintain high public expenditures; on the contrary, most of 
them had to respond with strict measures such as wage cuts and tight fiscal and monetary 
controls. The following decade in Western Europe witnessed the revival of monetarism
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and laissez-faire at the expense of Keynesianism, and the congruent rise of globalisation; 
to all which social democrats gave a painstaking fight to adopt, till the early 1990s.
Complying with the economic conjuncture sketched above, the trend of social democratic 
rise till the seventies was nearly reversed at the turn of that decade, and social democracy 
in Germany, Britain and Sweden entered a phase of stagnation. The case of France 
revealed another divergence in this context, in that a socialistic revival was observed in 
that polity in the 1980s. The British Labour Party lost office in 1979 and German social 
democrats, in 1982. Sweden was governed by a non-socialist government between 1976 
and 1982, for the first time since 1932; and the Swedish social democrats had to rule 
through minority cabinets subject to legislative coalitions with the right and the radical 
left, till 1991. Consonantly, the average level of support for social democrats between 
1981 and 1990 decreased from 43.5 % to 36.9 % in Germany and from 37.8 % to 28.9 % 
in Britain. Remaining stable in Sweden, the respective figures for the same period have 
been 43.2 % and 44.5 %. In France, however, the decade of 1980s came out to be a 
significant one, and the Socialist Party’s average level of support increased from 27.0 % to
36.5 % between 1981 and 1990 12
Accordingly, although the Swedish social democrats, ever since the Second World War, 
suffered an unusual electoral defeat of 37.6 % in 1991; the successive elections of 1994 
returned the SAP back to government, with 45.4 % of support. Likewise, the British and 
French social democrats returned to office in 1997, with 43 % and 37.4 % of the votes 
cast, respectively. In 1998, general elections in Germany brought SPD back to power by % 
40.9,’after 16 years of Christian Democratic rule. Concurrently, despite decreasing to %
Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation o f European Social Democracy (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 5
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36.6, Swedish social democratic government remained in office with the support of the 
“Greens” and the “Left Party” following the September 1998 elections. As of end 1998, 
therefore, social democratic governments have returned to office in four of the countries 
covered in this research.
2,2. Ideology: from Class-Conflict to the Welfare State
Ideologically, the social democratic parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden had 
flourished on Marxist origins. A common feature of these parties in the post Second World 
War period has been the evolutionary trend from traditional socialism of the past century to 
contemporary social democracy. While, for instance, the socialist currents of the early 1900s 
in Britain seemed to have “no unifying ideology, other than a set of values ranging from 
Fabians to Marxists” '^ , the Labour Party (LP) accepted in 1918 a new programme targeting at 
the common ownership of the means of production. At the same time, however, LP seemed to 
adopt a hostile disposition towards orthodox Marxism, and refused the Communist Party’s 
demand to affiliate.
Likewise in Sweden, the SAP also espoused to Marxist affiliations during its formative years, 
which later on, gradually shifted towards reformism, perhaps earlier than any of its 
counterparts in Western Europe. It was held in the 1911 Party Conference that the concept of 
social democracy was a unitedforce o f all small folk, and the SAP endeavoured to be a catch 
all party with a broad based appeal ever since the 1911 elections.''* Early mobilisation of the
Francis Jacobs, (ed). Western European Political Parties, A Comprehensive Guide. (Harlovv-Essex: 
Longman Group UK Ltd., 1989),388.
' 'David Arter, “TTie War o f the Roses: Conflict and Cohesion in the Swedish Social Democratic Party”. In 
Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties, eds. David S. Bell and Eric 
Shaw, ( London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 71.
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large masses of the relatively deprived by the Party has helped the development of a SAP 
image as the natural ally of these people with the SAP, the implication of which has been a 
stable support of nearly half a century for the social democrats. By 1930s, the SAP’s 
ideological stance, similar to its counterparts in Germany, Britain or France, was further 
improved through the contribution of Keynes who provided the social democrats with the 
economic tool that they have been seeking for since the revisionist debates, in the manner 
mentioned before. Basic Keynesian tenets such as demand management and full employment 
have thus become the main programatic strategy of Swedish social democrats, whose 
achievements in the decades following the war have been impressive. Though in the 
immediate post-war years there has been a short-lived revival of reformist socialism 
manifesting itself in further nationalisation and more planning, Sweden was already heading 
iov^ jdxds Keynesian welfare state by the 1950s.
In that respect, it might be argued for France that although socialists had adopted a non­
revolutionary position as early as the 1890s, the Socialist Party (PS) might have been 
perceived as a latecomer in terms of adopting a reformed social democratic stance. The party 
suffered from a series of ideological disputes almost till the early 1980s, and hardly 
abandoned the old fashioned socialistic strategies by then. The communist rivalry also has 
been influential in PS’ ideological and organisational features, in the sense that the 
Communist Party (PCF) was among the key factors in the decline experienced later on by the 
socialists, particularly in the Fourth Republic. From this perspective, the PS seems to 
represent a typical case of the thesis on electoral trade-off from the social democratic fold in 
the presence of strong communist parties, as provided by Przeworski and Sprague. The 
French socialists are found to be among the three Western European left parties that suffered 
from strong trade-off in the presence of communist competitors, where trade-offs were either
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mild or intermediate in the absence of communist rivalry in other countries between 1970 and
1980. 15
As for Germany in this context, the two-fold legacy of the Second World War in the 
immediate post-war years has been closely associated with the fortune of social democracy in 
that polity: On the one hand was the almost disguised feeling of guilt inherited from the 
National Socialist regime; and the faits accomplis that resulted in the division of Germany 
into two states, on the other. The implications of this post-war conjuncture for the party 
system in the Federal Republic has been such that, the aversion towards political extremism 
reached its peak, due largely to the bitter experiences of the Weimar regime; and ideology in 
this connection, was perceived in a rather pejorative sense. Post-war political environment, 
hence, seemed to require a further “revisionism” than that suggested by Bernstein. Such 
phenomena thoroughly helped the development of a “centrist consensus” to dominate West 
German politics after 1945. Equally important was the maintenance of a broad catch-all 
alliance of the German electorate by the Christian Democrats, a prototype of Kircheimer's 
Volkspartei\ which in turn, forced the opposition parties to "de-emphasise class politics and 
overt party ideology".
In Britain, the Labour Party’s (LP) philosophy has been anchored in Keynesian welfare state 
and demand management economy, particularly in the immediate post-war period.*  ^Having 
progressively increased its electoral support, the LP had already become the single largest 
party in the 1923 elections; and two minority Labour governments were formed in 1924 and
Przevvorski and Sprague, Paper Stone, Herbert Kilschelt, The Transformation of European Social 
Democracy, 47-66.
'‘’.Stephen Padgett,“The Gennan Social Democratic Party: between Old and New Left”. In Conflict and 
Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties, eds. David S. Bell and Eric Shaw, (London: 
Pinter Publishers, 1994) 11.
'’Stephen Padgett,“Social Democracy in Power”. Parliamentary Affairs. 46:1,1993, 101-120.
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1929, The Labour Party, accordingly, seemed to have acquired proficiency in governmental 
affairs. Clement Atlee's leadership in 1935 contributed further to the rise of the Party. The LP 
participated in the wartime coalition of 1940, and finally formed the first Labour majority 
government following the 1945 elections.
Labour’s ideology following the Second World War, appeared as a compromise between 
liberal capitalism and orthodox Marxism, similar to its counterparts in Germany, Sweden and 
France. As such, the LP Programme endeavoured to manage the war stricken British 
economy along Keynesian lines with full employment as the first objective. A sizeable public 
sector including coal, railways, air transport, electricity, gas and broadcasting, as well as the 
Bank of England was boosted. The Labour Party also attempted to accept responsibility for 
the establishment of social welfare measures. As such, a comprehensive National Health 
Service (NHS) for the provision of freely available health care and medicine was created. A 
range of social security benefits was adopted accordingly. Labour’s post-war ideology 
therefore, has been confined to the maintenance of nationalisation, planning and welfare, as 
reflected by its programmatic action.
Following the Conservative rule of 1951-64, the Labour Party came to government again in 
Britain between 1964 and 1970. The LP’s ideology and programmatic orientation in this 
period did not seem to reflect any major deviations from those of the previous governmental 
years, and traditional social democratic affiliations continued till late 1970s. However, as 
social democratic ideology entered a period of decline in Northwestern Europe; LP ideology, 
as well as the other social democrats around Europe had to be revised for adaptation to the 
rise of monetarism and the downfall of the interventionist trend in the 1980s.
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In that respect, intra-party struggles for ideological reformation continued within Labour 
Party throughout the eighties. The fourth successive election defeat of the LP in 1992 
impelled significant shifts in ideological position. The years from 1992 to 1997 opened 
Labour the door to government with a highly novel discourse, under the leadership of Tony 
Blair. The new Labour philosophy, expressed by its charismatic leader, is confined basically 
to a recoil from hard-headed interventionism towards a re-alignment with markets. 
Furthermore, Labour’s Election Manifesto of 1997 seems to be clearly committed to cutting 
on high public expenditures, and reveals a prudential approach to social welfare measures; in 
sharp contrast to its ideological position of the post-1945 period.
In Germany, the 1949 Bundestag elections and the three successive ones till 1969 resulted in 
Christian Democrat governments during which the SPD underwent an ideological 
reformation of what seemed to be the most radical since what we shall call the Bernstein turn. 
In 1959, the Bad Godesberger Program had announced the Party's acceptance of the 
fundamentals of a market economy and a political orientation with the West. The 1959 
programme, therefore, represented the shift of SPD to a more pro-market and pro-NATO 
stance. The rise of the SPD to power in the historic coalition of 1966 owed much to the social 
démocratisation of the Party after the Bad Godesberg programme.
"Explicitly disavowing the Party's Marxist past, the programme emphasised the 
eclectic philosophical sources of democratic socialism in the Christian ethic, 
classical philosophy and the humanist tradition. It went on to endorse the liberal 
pluralism of the West German state and the market economy, calling for an 
extension of democratic principles into the social and economic spheres ".
18Ibid., II.
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German social democrats, nevertheless, faced further ideological dilemmas with the rise of 
ecological issues in the eighties. As left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation became a decisive 
factor in German politics during these years, the SPD became tom between left-libertarian 
and distributive/growth oriented conventional social democratic values. In this respect, the 
electoral challenge posed by the Greens has especially become the main thmst behind the 
conflicts between the intra-party factions representing old and new left. Nevertheless, due 
largely to the intra-party capability for decision-making directed at new strategies; SPD has 
been able to incorporate new-left themes into its ideological stance. As such, the Party’s 
“Program for 100 Days” declared before the September 1998 elections appeared to be a 
compromise between green values and SPD’s traditional committments.^®
Unlike the German SPD, the French socialists were suffering from difficulties in defining 
their role on the left of the political spectmm and particularly in consolidating a contemporary 
social democratic image for their Party, even in the 1970s. When the socialists came to 
government in 1981 under Francois Mitterand s leadership, the only program that they were 
committed to was the “Common Programme” signed in 1972 with the Communists. The 
basic tenets of that Programme were largely confined to extensive nationalisation and state 
intervention in the economy.^” Socialists in France, therefore, did not seem to be able to 
produce a radical programmatic return as the SPD had done in the Bad Godesberg 
Conference in 1959. The PS U-turn in rendering a socialist origin a catch-all model was 
announced only aAer Francois Mitterands leadership in 1971.
19Die Welt, “New and renewable energy resources are wind, sokir, biomass and geotliermal energy resources 
which the environmentalists tend to prefer at tlie expense of traditional resources such as nuclear and 
fossil-fuels, (September 20,1998).
Jolm Gaffney, “The Emergence of a Presidential Party: The Socialist Party”. In French Political Parties 
in Transition, ed. Alistair Cole, 61-90.( Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990), 67.
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In this connection, it must also be noted that the constitutional change that rendered the Fifth 
Republic a presidentialised one has had significant implications on the fortune of the French 
socialists, in the sense that the PS has had to bear the weight and the responsibility of being 
the presidential Party of the Republic with the election of Mitterand as president in 1981, 
Governmental responsibility, in fact, was not a new phenomenon for the PS; as the Party had 
already supported several government in the 1920s and finally coming to power in 1936 
under the leadership of Leon Blum in the Popular Front. The Party had also taken active roles 
in the Fourth Republic, however as the rise of the Communists continued after 1945, the PS 
suffered a decline till the 1960s, as mentioned before. All in all, the scholarly comment on 
French politics that “the history of the PS was a painful transition from socialist tradition to a 
catch-all party model, with Mitterand suppressing centrifugal forces of factionalism with the 
cohesive power of presidency”^’, seems helpful for a better understanding of the French 
portrait of socialism till the 1980s. With centre-right Chirac as president in 1995, the left in 
France is still widely alleged to remain discourseless and fragmented; despite polling a clear 
majority in the form of an alliance in 1997 elections.
Swedish social democracy, on the other hand, protruded in Europe almost as a prototype; due 
largely to continuous renovation of policy, hence, timely adaptation to conjunctural changes. 
Perpetual programmatic renewal is a key to understanding social democracy in Sweden, and 
its ideological transformation. Ever since its foundation in the past century, SAP has been 
confronting intra-party policy improvement struggles. The Party’s programmatic 
considerations included not only ideological values and principles but concrete policy 
reconjmendations as well, welfare society being sine qua non of all policy revisions.
David S. Bell and Byron Criddle, “The French Socialist Party: Presidentialised Factionalism”. In Conjlict 
and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties, eds. David S. Bell and Eric Shaw, 112- 
132. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994).
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Ideological transformation between the 1930s and 1950s thus, revealed a break with 
radicalism and a comprehensive reformation aiming at the dissolution of the distributional 
problem for the well being of all. As a student of Swedish politics has observed, the social 
democrats “have worked steadily to create a guaranteed basic minimum income for the 
individual Swede (cradle to grave), and introduced free child care and old age pension
schemes. ,22
The SAP tradition of continuous reform manifested itself in the 1980s as a response to the 
rise of two different ideological currents; the neo-liberal discourse and environmentalism. As 
elaborated elsewhere, the unfavourable global conjuncture and deteriorating economic 
indicators in the 1970s had discredited Keynesian economic management in Western Europe, 
the results of which have been revival of monetarism and recoil from further public 
expenditures and from social democratic values per se. The challenge proved even more 
pressing for the Swedish social democrats, who were busy combating a continued expansion 
of tax base for the management of a huge public commitment. As 1991 Riksdag elections 
showed, the SAP suffered its most severe electoral defeat with 37.6 % of the votes, unusual in 
its history ever since the Second World War. The perceived challenge of liberal values had in 
fact motivated the Party management before the elections, to prepare for the coming decade; 
and SAP’s “The 1990s Programme” was already underway by the late eighties.
The “1990s Programme” was, in essence, a response to the neo-conservative claims of the 
last decade. Endeavouring to formulate the necessary alternatives, the Programme put 
forward a third way, putting emphasis on ecological issues and on individual freedom, 
without comprising from the raison d ’etre of social democracy. A normative manuscript on
~~ Jacobs , ""Western European Political Parties”, 625.
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how the good social democratic society should work and a set of policy prescriptions together 
constituted the two integral parts of the Programme. The former focused on a good living 
environment and an enriched working life as the essentials of the modus operandi of a 
classless society. Policy recommendations referred basically to the renewal of the public 
sector and to the achievement of a strong economy.
Renewal of the public sector aimed at the stabilisation of government expenditures and at the 
provision of higher quality services through a compromise solution between public and 
market solutions. While, for instance, technical services and subsidiary branches such as 
catering, laundry and cleaning were included in the privatisation goal, the Party remained 
committed to the provision by government of some essential public services such as health, 
education and public transportation. Privatisation of state economic enterprises were 
generally to be realised through issuing new shares, with government keeping control over 
them.
Policy recommendations on a stronger economy involved traditional social democratic 
objectives such as full employment, expanded collective savings, lower inflation and 
increased international competitiveness, with the role of planning and state controls as policy 
instruments retained, albeit in a lower tone.^  ^ A comprehensive tax reform for the financing 
of public expenditures is also foreseen in SAP’s program. All together, the SAP’s ideological 
stance in the 1990s turned out to be a further step in its long history of logical compromise 
between capital and labour, including this time the incorporation of green and post-materialist 
values. The Election Manifesto of 1998 clearly places emphasis on investment in
Richard Gillespie and William E. Paterson, “Rethinking Social Democracy in Western Europe, (London: 
Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1993), 55.
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“ecologically sustainable development” and in “environmental values”.W h ile  “quality of 
life” issues are also highlighted; on the other hand, traditional social democratic values such 
as full employment, enhancement of the labour market, sound public finances and 
comprehensive social security have been meticulously preserved in the Manifesto.“  ^ In this 
respect, further improvement of educational, health and social welfare services have been 
vigorously supported.^“
All in all, it can be suggested with regard to ideology that, whilst the outset of the social 
democratic parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden had been revolutionary socialism 
of the past century; that gradually shifted towards the adoption of reformist means for 
achieving that end. The ideological evolution from orthodox Marxism to contemporary social 
democratic thought has been a laborious endeavour; within which communist fractions 
clearly separated their ways into splinter parties. In the post-1945 period, Keynesian political 
economy has given fresh insights to the developmental path of the social democratic 
ideology. Whereas social democratic ascent was challenged by the rising new politics in the 
1980s; the social democratic parties in the aforementioned polities are observed to have 
adapted to the implications of the new agenda largely through the incorporation of the fresh 
left-libertarian themes of the 1990s.
2.3. Social Base: Working Class as Father of Social Democracy
Working class has traditionally been accepted as the core constituency of social democratic 
movement in Europe. As Przeworski and Spragiie have indicated, historically, the number of
Swedish Social Democratic Party. “Election Manifesto”. Sodaldeniokratema. 1998: 4
ibid., 1998: 3
26 ,' ibid., 1998: 4-5
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workers voting left has increased gradually from the early 1900s onward. Their data on 
various West European socialist parties revealed that while the proportion of manual workers 
supporting social democrats in 1900 was 12 % in France; for Germany, in which socialists 
had been competing in elections already for thirty years at that time, the corresponding 
figure came out to be 44 %. Table 9 may be helpful in indicate the progressive integration 
of the workers to the social democratic cause in years till the 1970s.
Table 2.
Proportion of Workers Voting Left in Selected Countries (%) 27
1900 1914 1924 1936 1945 1960 1975
Germany 44 63 58 51 63 70
France 12 20 37 50 65 50 67
Sweden 48 48 81 81 88 92
Source: Ptzevvorski & Sprague, Paper Stones, 1986: 160
In Germany, the party system tended to preserve the centrist consensus that developed in the 
immediate post-war years till the 1980s, as noted before. The three decades following the 
war have favoured the relatively well functioning of the traditional left-right continuum, with 
conservatives and liberals representing business circles, and social democrats remaining tied 
to their social base of blue-collar electorate. Nonetheless, the 1980s have also witnessed the 
indications of some radical change in Western European politics and, German politics in 
particular; the coming into agenda of a new axis of politics that has started to operate parallel 
to the traditional one, as shown before.
Figures for Britain in tire respective years have not been available.
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A brief glance at the social base of the SPD in the last two decades therefore, reveals some 
considerable and rather complex shifts in the Party's electoral support. Between 1981 and 
1990, the average level of support for the SPD fell from 43.5% to 36.9%, ranking as the eight 
among nine West European social democratic parties.SPD  lost some 750000 votes to the 
Greens, and more than 2 million to CDU in 1983 elections.^  ^ The social democrats did no 
better in the first national elections held following unification in 1990. While the SPD was 
supported by 35.7 % in the West (former Federal Republic), the corresponding figure for the 
East (former Democratic Republic) turned out to be 24.3 %, leading to an overall electoral 
gain of 33.5 % for the Party at national level.B y  October 1994 elections however, the social 
democrats increased their voter support by 2.9 %, ranking as second behind the Greens, and 
reached an overall electoral turnout of 36.4 % at national level.
With regard to SPD’s electoral performance in the post-war period, it must be noted firstly 
that the core constituency of social democratic politics in Germany has shrank in size. 
Second, is the change in support granted by the blue collar workers to the SPD in the same 
period: While the working class support for the Party remained almost unchanged (around 54 
%) between 1976 and 1987 the corresponding figure declined to 45.3 % nationwide by 
1994, and the SPD performance in the East has been significantly lower (35.1 %) than in the 
West (49.5) A third factor that seems to influence the blue collar voting behaviour in 
Germany is trade-union membership. The SPD remains much stronger among unionised 
blue-collar workers (54.8 % in the samples) than among the non-unionised section (39.3
Kitschelt, The Transformation ,5.
Stephen Padgett, “Social Democracy in Power”. Parliamentary Affairs. 46:1, (1993), 101-120., 171. 
American Institute For Contemporary German Studies. “Wahlergebnis 1990”, November 1994 
36.4 % corresponds to overall result at national level; SPD support in tlie West came out to be 37.5 %, 
while in the East it remained as 24.3 %. (American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, “Super 
Election Year 1994 Reports No: X (2)”, November 1994)
Kitschelt, The Transformation, 44.
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, “Super Election Year 1994 Reports No: X (1)”, 5.
69
With regard to the support from social groups other than its core constituency, the SPD
appears as strong among employees and civil servants, as can be seen in the table below:
Table 3.
Nationwide Support for SPD from Different 
_______ Social Groups in 1994 (%)
Blue collar
Employees
Civil servants
Self-employed
Farmers
45.3
36.4
32.4
17.5
14.0
Source: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 
'“Super Election Year 1994 Reports No: X(I)”: 10
The address for the new political issues demanding programmatic changes in the established 
order has become the Green Party in Germany in the late 1980s, which started to attract the 
voters who previously supported established parties. Recruiting support particularly from 
the under 24 year-olds in major urban centres; the Greens made a breakthrough to the 
Bundestag with 27 and 42 seats in 1983 and 1987 respectively, thence posing a 
considerable electoral threat to the social democrats in these years. As the Ecologists 
established their status as the “viable third party” ®^ in German politics in 1994; social 
democrats’ efforts for the incorporation of green values to their agenda were prompted 
further, with a view to compensate their electoral trade-offs especially within the younger 
and the relatively well-educated middle-classes.
Unlike its German and British counterparts, the French Socialist Party emerged to be an 
electoral winner in the 1970s and 1980s, which seemed to owe a lot to Mitterand's
Ibid., 10. 
^ U b i d . ,  1 1 .
36 Ibid., 11. The Greens received 49 and 47 seats in 1994 and 1998 respectively.
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charismatic leadership and to his cohesive role in the Party. During this period, the PS scored 
as the second best social democratic party in Western Europe, in terms of electoral success, 
following the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE)^ .^ The average level of support for 
the PS between 1981-1990 has increased by 9.5 % despite the facts of weak party-union 
linkages and the presence of a communist competitor^* and, the PS votes in the legislative 
elections rose from 20.8 % in 1973 to 35.8 % in 1988, becoming more homogenous 
throughout the country than any of its rivals.
The PS had been able to maintain its traditional areas of influence except in the regions where 
the extreme right evolved. While the size of the working class revealed a slight decrease from 
26 % between 1976-79 to 24.8 % between 1984-87, worker support for the PS accordingly 
fell from 44.1 % to 38.8 % in the respective periods.'"’ The Socialists were able to gain 
support not only from the white-collar electorate but also from the self-employed and the 
retired as well. The younger cohort and female voters have also supported the PS increasingly 
in the 1980s. That the Party’s blue collar support remained firm in the past decade, did not 
limit its support among the middle-level executives and voters in the education sector.
The early 1990s however, marked the beginning of a different phase in French politics, in 
which the party system tended to reveal volatility in terms of the nature and of the limits of 
each party’s electoral support. While the 1970s and the 1980s were celebrated as the rise of 
social democratic forces as elaborated above, legislative elections of 1993 and the 
presidential suffrage in 1995 rendered quite reverse the socialist weight that used to dominate 
French politics in the past two decades. The break-up of the alliance between the Socialists
PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
Kitschelt, The Transformation, 65.
Francis Jacobs, Western European Political Parties, A Comprehensive Guide. (Harlovv-Essex; Longman 
Group UK Ltd., 1989), 104.
Kitschelt, The Transformation,44.
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and the Communists and the accompanying rise of the Extreme Right in 1984 had already left 
the PS alone in Government. 1986 legislative elections gave the PS a narrow majority, and a 
period of a cohabitation between a socialist president and a rightist prime minister started for 
the first time in the Fifth Republic. Re-election of Mitterand as president in 1988 preserved 
the cohabitation, and the Right came to power finally with a majority of 43 % in the 1993 
legislative elections. Although the Socialist decline continued in 1995 presidential elections 
(centre-right Chirac was elected president); fortune of the left seemed to reverse in a couple 
of years, as the left alliance polled some 37.4% of the total votes cast in 1997 legislative 
elections. As such, the united left (socialists and allies, communists and ecologists) won 319 
seats in the Parliament, where the total right fell to 257.
The electoral decline of the PS in the early 1990s was attributed to some shifts in the French 
electoral behaviour, first of which was a clearly observed tendency towards the Right. Second 
was the rise of green politics and the descent of the overall support for the established parties; 
while in 1988 the traditional parties of government received 76.5 % of the votes, the 
corresponding figure fell to 63.3 % in the 1993 elections. The tendency in electoral behaviour 
was further confirmed in the European Parliament elections of 1994, in which the traditional 
parties scored 40.1 % only."”
A third change in the electoral fortune of the PS was the changing attitude of its supporters 
towards national and non-national issues. Although the PS had lost the 1983 local elections 
and could score only 20 % in the 1984 European elections, the Socialists were able to receive 
some 31.6 % in the 1986 legislative elections and Mitterand was again elected president in
" Alan Guyomarch,“The European Dynamics of Evolving Parly Competition in Fnmce”. Parliamentary 
Affairs. 48:1 (Jmiuary 1995), 102-103.
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1988. The PS electorate, however, seemed to "ignore the centripetal logic’”*' of the election 
system in 1993 and 1994, and abandoned their traditional clientele accordingly.
As to the electoral behaviour in the second half of the same decade, volatility seems to fit best 
the attitude of the French people. Backing communist and green votes once more, the left 
returned to government in 1997, initiating the third phase of cohabitation in French politics. 
Opinion polls in 1997 indicated that unemployment has been the key factor behind the 
political change in France in the recent years. That the left strikes back in 1997, has been 
attributed firstly to loss of the French people’s confidence in the right; and secondly to the 
fact that almost no reforming proposals have been observed in the political programmes of 
both the left and the right. Thus, the main parameters of the 1997 elections have been 
unemployment, loss of confidence, increased abstention and protest votes.'*^
So far as unemployment is concerned, some 75% of the French people have shown 
unemployment as the best measure for their electoral behaviour. Loss of confidence has been 
unveiled through the fact that, while 59% of the electorate in 1978 thought that the politicians 
did not care for them at all, the corresponding figure for 1997 rose to 72%. For increased 
abstention, opinion polls indicated that percentage of people who said that they were 
interested in politics fell from 50% in 1978 to 46% in 1997. In this connection, almost two 
thirds of the younger voters (35 year olds and under) have either abstained or did not vote. 
Nevertheless, the left-right cleavage in French politics seems to be alive and kicking; as 90% 
of the electorate said they could choose between the left and the right; although identification 
with' a party seemed to be much lower than self-placement between the left and the right
Ibid., 103.
Le Monde,(June 5,1997).
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(56%). As such, 56% of the voters expressed that they did not trust the right; while the 
respective figure for those who did not trust the left was 51%.'''’
As for Britain in this context, Labour’s fortune in the last few decades has been highly 
dependent on two factors in terms of social base; that is, class positions of the electorate and 
the gradual shrinking of the size of the working class. Although traditional class structures are 
unequivocally eroding and new alignments are appearing in Western Europe, class 
consciousness in Britain seems to be alive and kicking. That the Labour has been the 
ascendant Party in the industrial regions and particularly among the blue-collar electorate till 
the 1970s, reinforces the fact that main cleavages in British politics have been economic and 
regional in essence. Labour has been most successful in the industrial parts of the North of 
England, and of Scotland and Wales, while in the mral areas and in Southern England the 
Conservatives have been dominant.
Regional alignments however, started to change by the late 1970s. While between 1959 and 
1987 prominence of a clear north-south divide characterised a Conservative voting in the 
economically prosperous southern England and Labour affiliation in the industrial north, this 
tendency was transformed by 1992 elections. As a student of British politics noted, voting 
behaviour in terms of class positions revealed some considerable shifts in the past decade and 
class voting declined: Increasingly less members of the working class voted for Labour, while 
a shrinking section of the middle class supported Conservatives in the 1983, 1987 and 1992
' Le Monde, (June 5,1997)
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general elections.Accordingly, LP support among the working class declined from 54.4 % 
in the 1976-79 period to 41.5 % between 1984-89.'**'
As Labour support decreased since the 1960s; the LP has become the first among social 
democratic losers in Western Europe with a 8.6 % average support loss between 1981 and 
1990. In addition to the electoral behaviour shifts mentioned above, the LP suffered also from 
working class contraction severely, whose percentage in samples fell from 47.8 in the 1970s 
to 39.7 in the 1980s.'*’
Table 4.
Support for LP according to Social Class Between 1983 and
1992 (%)
Years AB Cl C2 DE
1983 10 20 32 41
1987 14 21 36 48
1992 20 25 41 50
Source: Bill Jones, Political Issues in Britain Today. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 337.
AB: Higher and intermediate managerial, administrative or professional posts 
Cl: Supervisory, clerical; junior managerial, administrative or profession:!! posts 
C2: Skilled manual workers
DE: Semi-skilled and imskilled manual workers; state pensioners, casual workers
Another factor associated with the elusive electoral performance of the Labour in the past two 
decades is the rise of Liberal Democrats as a third party from an almost established two-party 
system in the United Kingdom. While Labour and Conservative votes amounted roughly to 
90 % of the total vote till 1974, the respective figures hardly reached 75 % in the following
Demiis Kavanagh, “Changes in Electoral Behaviour and Üıe Party System”, Parliamentary Affairs. 47:4 
(October 1994), 597.
Ibid., 44.
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elections, and both started to lose to the Liberal Democrats since then,“** Receiving 17% 
support from the electorate in 1997, the Liberal democrats gained 46 seats in the Parliament; 
confirming the very fact that, not only class distinctions are becoming blurred, but the 
established two-party system tends to erode. So far as Labour’s fortune in 1997 is concerned, 
opinion polls reveal that LP’s leader has been the key factor behind the Party’s impressive 
performance; While 60% of the electorate thought that Tony Blair was “a strength for his 
party”, the respective figure for John Major turned out to be 13% only.''^
All in all, there has been a nation-wide swing of 10.5% to Labour in 1997 elections.W hile 
Tony Blair ranked second (32%) behind John Major (33%) in terms of “making the best 
prime minister for Britain” '^, the former still appeared as the most trusted party leader 
(45.3%).^^ Although the British electorate thought that it would be the Conservative Party 
(36%), rather than Labour (28%) “to best represent Britain’s interests in Europe”; and that 
Conservatives “had the best policies for dealing with the economy” (30%), when compared 
to Labour (28%); Labour appeared as the first party (42%) instead of the Conservatives 
(37%) that they “would vote for”.^ ^
In Sweden, although it has been noted that the predictive value of class decreased from 53 % 
of the variance in voting behaviour in 1956 to 34 % by 1985, class concerns have traditionally 
remained as the strongest predictor of voting behaviour in Sweden.^ '* In that respect, whilst 
degree of class voting in Sweden has followed an international downward trend; class
Dennis Kavanagh, “Changes in Electoral Behaviour and the Party System ”. Parliamentary Affairs, 47:4, 
(October 1994), 597-612, 599.
The Econornist/MORI New Government Poll. The Economist, (May 3,1997), 32.
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concerns nevertheless remain as highly strong elements of voting behaviour, within an 
international framework. As such, 56 % of the electorate still voted according to their class in 
1994; the implication which was that working classes overwhelmingly voted for social 
dem ocrats.M ore precisely, class still appears to be an electorally more important factor 
than the issue of unemployment in Sweden; wherefrom it becomes clear that public sector 
employees tend to vote more for the socialist bloc comprising of the Social Democrats and 
the Left Party. Also, complying with the argument that electoral trade-offs between workers 
and allies have tended to be less in countries where communist parties are relatively weaker, 
and where ethnic-religious parties offering collective identity other than class are of 
incremental influence, trade-offs in Sweden have come out to be intermediate only.^  ^Strong 
trade union linkages also helped the social democratic electoral performance. However, issue 
voting within the framework of rising left-libertarian values is also becoming an important 
factor in voting recently^®; in conformity with the general tendency observed in Western 
Europe.
The SAP has traditionally been supported by the blue-collar electorate, and has so far been 
able to receive the support of trade unions. As social democratic affiliation has been 
perceived for a long time a s a cultural phenomenon in Sweden, workers in the agricultural 
sector, a large section of civil servants and the white collar strata have also favoured the social 
democrats. Small and medium sized industrial towns of Northern Sweden and central regions 
are the core constituencies of social democrats. In fact, SAP’s strategy as early as the 1950s 
was confined to the coverage of a wider electorate beyond the blue-collar workers. The social
Anders Widfelt,“Electoral Behaviour in Sweden”. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Election Guide 
1998. August 18,1998,3.
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democrats in Sweden increasingly attempted to appeal to the masses as the party of not only 
of the blue-collars, but the party of “all wage earners and the mutual interests linking manual 
with white-collar workers” as well.^  ^Owing to that, while 24 % of the middle-class voted for 
SAP in 1956, the respective figure rose to 35 % by 1988. However, inasmuch as the 
traditional electoral base of SAP is concerned, a relative decline of working class votes was 
being observed from 1950s to 1990s. As for 1990s, volatility within the SAP support, like 
observed in France, was becoming perceivable.^“
As of 1998, despite the existence of a relatively successful Green Party, the traditional 
left/right continuum still tends to dominate the Swedish electorate. However, SAP seems to 
have lost some of its support to the Left Party and to the Greens recently, due largely to the 
welfare and public sector cuts since 1994. The Party’s traditional support base is still in the 
industrial working class. The SAP also relies overwhelmingly on public sector employees. In 
the recent years, social democratic support appears to be increasing within the middle-classes 
as well. All in all, it became clear that Party identification in Sweden is being gradually 
declined. While in 1960s almost two-thirds of the electorate had some level of sympathy or 
identification with a political party; the respective figure for 1994 decreased to less than 50 
%; which implies, by and large, that voters in Sweden are also becoming more volatile than 
ever observed before.“^
David After, ’’The War of the Roses: Conflict and Cohesion in tlie Swedish Social Democratic Party”. In 
Conflict and Cohesion in Social Democratic Parties, eds. David S.Bell and Eric Shaw, 70-95. (London: 
Pinter Publishers, 1994), 75.
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Table 5.
Working Class Support 
Second World
for SAP in the Post- 
War Period
Years % of Working Class Voting for 
SAP
1956 72
1988 65
1991 50
Source: Arler, “The Wiir Of the Roses”, 76.
Thereupon, the basic motifs within the social composition of the electoral support for the 
social democratic parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden have been put together 
throughout the above analysis. Foremost in this context is an increasing tendency for 
volatility in the electoral behaviour in these polities. Yet, a relatively stable support for social 
democrats from the traditional blue-collar workers can still be observed. Despite the fact that 
there has been numerical erosion in the size of the manual workers; their affiliation to social 
democratic parties nevertheless, remained almost downright. Besides, the social democratic 
parties covered within the scope of this research have effectively recruited the support of the 
middle-classes as well. In that respect, they have been able to broaden their social basis of 
support, to offset to some extent, the electoral trade-off stemming from the contraction of the 
size of the blue-collar workers.
2.4. Strategy: Towards V olkspartei
Whereas socialism of the 1800s aimed at conquering political power by means of a 
revolution, institutionalisation of universal suffrage at the turn of the century paved the 
way for the parliamentary option for achieving that end. Therefrom, the basic tactical 
dilemma for socialists has been whether or not adopting a purely class-based electoral
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appeal. Once commitment to the mles of the electoral game was made, the socialists could 
no longer confine their strategy to winning the votes of workers only, but the wider masses 
including in particular the peasantry and the petite bourgeoisie, as well. With this regard, 
Bernstein had long claimed that the SAD (former SPD) had to be a Volkspartei.^^ The 
small farmers, therefore, had been the first strategic target determined by socialist parties, 
and the agrarian question lay at the heart of the Western European socialist agenda since 
then. In that respect, the French socialists had adopted an agricultural program, as early as 
1892, for the protection of small farmers, which was followed by other socialist parties 
around E urope.T hat implied, however, a fiirther dilemma stemming from the fact that 
offering protection to small farmers inevitably converged with defending private property; 
a strategic choice that thoroughly fell into contradiction with perennial socialist aims. For 
the rest of the society, hardly any elaborate recruitment strategy has been pursued, and 
most socialist parties referred to the craftsmen, artisans and small merchants as the 
“oppressed, the poor or the exploited”.^ '* Indeed, the party strategies since then reflected 
not only the numerical evolution of the class structure, but also the fluid political cleavages 
and the collateral voter realignments in Europe.Thence, with the decline of class voting 
especially in the aftermath of the Second World War, an increasing share of the electorate 
have become sensitive to the “explicit political messages and appeals issued by parties in
the competitive game”.66
Having come into terms with the democratic order and with the fundamentals of the market 
economy, the strategies of the social democratic parties covered in this study were confined
^^Rogcr Fletcher, Bernstein to Brandt: A Short History of German Social Democracy. (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1987), 169.
‘"^Przeworski and Sprague, Paper Stones, 42. 
lbid.,42
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basically to the maintenance of mass party images with broad-based appeals, in the post-1945 
period. These sister parties contributed significantly to the re-structuring of their respective 
countries’ social and economic orders; and resorted to Keynesian measures within the 
framework of efforts for the establishment of welfare states in the decades following the War. 
The making of Western Europe, therefore, seems to owe much to the social democratic reign 
of the 1960s and the following decade. Nevertheless, as the conventional left/right continuum 
was becoming complemented by the fresh political cleavages arising during the 1980s, the 
social democratic parties within the scope of this study faced considerable electoral 
challenges posed by the left-libertarian wing of the new politics. Furthermore, was the rise of 
global markets within the revival of monetarism at the expense of Keynesian welfare state in 
the 1980s.
The strategic responses given by social democrats to the political paradigm of the 1980s 
revealed some divergences, due largely to the differing patterns within the political 
competition in their respective countries. While, for instance, left-libertarian mobilisation 
appeared to be relatively unassuming and parties faced a strong centripetal pull toward the 
pivot of the party system in France and in Britain; the Greens in Germany had already 
become the rising star of the party system by 1983. Thence, inasmuch as the German Green 
party constituted the main thrust behind the strategic shift of the SPD towards new-left, the 
French and British ecologists failed, by and large, to build a genuine libertarian “alternative 
left” and preferred to adopt single-issue appeals to the environmental question. Outstandingly 
in France, the PS had to compete with the Communists, instead of the Ecologists. In Britain, 
the absence of a credible left-libertarian or a communist competitor made such a strategy 
unnecessary, at least till early 1990s. On the contrary, British Labour Party opted to turn to 
old-style socialist appeals in the 1983 election program. As for Sweden, the social democrats 
faced a less-mobilised left-libertarian electorate, hence adopted a more conciliatory strategy
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in electoral terms. Yet, the relatively higher number of centrist parties in Sweden, prompted 
the SAP towards a more new-left position in the late 1980s, for the sake of a vote
maximisation strategy. 67
Germany’s case is self-explanatory in this framework. As already noted elsewhere, the 
centrist tendency observed in West German politics in the aftermath of the Second World 
War had thoroughly helped to reinforce the status of Christian Democracy as the 
unchallenged governmental power from 1945 to 1960s. The strategic choice of the SPD in 
this period, as can be expected, was confined to the consolidation of the Party’s image as a 
centrist Volkspartei that aimed to improve the lot of the underprivileged. The 1959 Bad 
Godesberger Program, as touched before, was the clear manifestation of SPD’s shift from 
democratic socialism towards centre-right. The party strategy pursued as such, and the 
dominance of the right remained almost unchallenged till the 1970s. Intra-party strategy, 
therefrom, required that the party administration established firm relations with right-wing 
trade unionists in the Bundestag and with other centre-right groups such as the Godesberger 
Circle outside the Parliament, mainly to consolidate the ideological transformation put forth 
by the Bad Godesberger Program.
SPD remained largely prudential towards left-libertarian feminist, ecologist and pacifist 
issues, till the penetration of the new-left into the party through its youth organisations. While 
Brandfs leadership opened up new prospects for SPD’s grand strategy, in terms of 
incorporating left-libertarian currents into the party administration, it was only after the fall of 
Schmidt government in 1982 and the concurrent rise of the Green Party that the German
Ibid., 170-178.
.Stephen Padgett,“The German Social Democratic Party: between Old and New Left”. In Conflict ami 
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social democrats were prompted to resort to the new-left strategies in order to retrieve their 
electoral trade-offs. In the 1983 election campaign, the party shifted its strategy from security 
and economic growth to peace and ecology issues. As can be expected, this strategy helped to 
retrieve in 1983 and 1987 elections some of the electorate that had turned towards the Green 
Party. Nevertheless, while the West German “Left Alliance” comprising of the Greens and 
the social democrats continued to strengthen as such. Green votes were observed to increase, 
indeed, at the expense of the SPD in this period.The SPD, therefrom, ran on a stronger left- 
libertarian appeal to the electorate between 1987 and 1990, in order to compete especially 
with the Green challenge. Although the Green Party proved itself as a viable third party 
casting 7.3 % in unified Germany in 1994 elections; a re-alignment of German voters among 
established parties such as the SPD and the CDU was observed that year.^ '^
Shortly before the elections, the SPD leader Oscar Lafontaim declared on 19 September 
1998^ ,^ the Party’s “Program for the First 100 Days”. Similar to the British Labour Party 
election manifesto of 1997, the SPD Program called for a “Third Way” beyond either left or
right. On the one hand, a likely coalition with the Greens, as indicated in the opinion polls 72
was tried to be secured through vigorous emphasis on environmental protection. Most 
significant in this framework was a clear recoil from commitment to nuclear energy, by 
declaring that nuclear technology should but be phased out within 30-35 years; instead of 
which renewable energy resources should be promoted. On the other hand, the 16 year-long 
Kohl government was severely criticised, by stating that the social rights such as pension
While tlie SPD lost some 600000 votes to the Green Party in 1987 elections, tlie left-libertarian strategy 
pufsiied since then helped to regain tlie almost same amount of votes back from tlie Greens in 1990. (H. 
Kitschelt, The Transformation, 166-167.
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Johns Hopkins University), 11.
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The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, “Analysis: Election year 1998”, (October 13, 
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wages and sickness payments that had been cut down during the Kohl period would be 
granted back. With that regard, the social democrats also declared that they would re-arrange 
the sacking process that had been simplified during the Kohl government. The SPD, 
therefore, strategically appealed both to the trade unions and to the industrial entrepreneurs, 
and called for a consensus between them. In this respect, the big industrial entrepreneurs were 
called to invest on technology based renovation to create new employment opportunities; 
while trade unions were invited to voluntary cut-backs on wage increases. As such, SPD 
polled 40.9 % of the total votes, winning 298 seats; and the Greens with 6.7 % that granted 
them 47 seats in September 1998 Bundestag Q\Qci\om.
Electoral Performance of SPD 
Votes (%)
Figure 2.
Source: -Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.v. Maiuiheim, “Wahlergebnis 1990”, November 1994
-American Institute for Contemporary Genn;m Studies, The Jolms Hopkins University, “Super 
Election Year 1994 Reports No; X (I): 5 
-Die Zeit, 19.9.1998
Unlike German social democrats, the French Socialist Party, strategically, had to compete 
with the Communists instead of the ecologists, and has adopted etatist policies till recently.
73 Die Welt(September 29, 1998)
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As mentioned elsewhere in this study, the French version of abandoning orthodoxly socialist 
strategies came later than its counterpart in Germany. Bearing governmental responsibilities 
during the Fourth Republic, the PS had taken active roles in the nationalisation of some key 
economic enterprises. Establishment of a comprehensive social security system was among 
the socialists’ achievements. Due largely to the communist competition, on the other hand, 
the socialists gradually yielded power, till Mitterand's leadership in 1971. As the 
Communists’ charismatic role in the resistance movement had thoroughly helped the ascent 
of this party in the immediate post-war years; and they were invited by De Gaulle to 
participate in the government. The PCF’s popularity stood in sharp contrast to the German 
Communist Party (KPD) who remained a radical force in German politics in the Weimar 
Republic. In addition, the Socialists had not been able to identify themselves with 
contemporary social democracy like the SPD of Germany, nor there was any programmatic 
renewal complying with the post-war conjuncture, such as the one done in Bad Godesherg in 
1959.
Figure 3.
Source: -VTCOM. Election Présidentielle 95 
-Le Monde (June 5, 1997)
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The presidential elections of 1981 has been a watershed within this framework; in that 
Mitterand polled nearly 10% more than Marchais, the Communist candidate, in the first 
ballot. Vote transfers from the PCF supporters to Mitterand in the second ballot, marked the 
result in favour of the Socialists in this decisive election.^ "* Communist domination of the left 
in France gradually declined in favour of the PS from then on. The socialists’ electoral 
performance was confirmed in the legislative elections in June the same year, through which 
the PS obtained an absolute majority within the National Assembly, and Socialist domination 
remained intact till 1988. During this period, the PS acquired the image of a "'responsible 
party of government’’^ .^ Among the achievements of the socialist government was firstly an 
extensive nationalisation of key enterprises such as privately owned big banks. Générale 
d ’Electricité (The Electricity Board of France), telecommunications, aeronautics, steel and 
armaments, resulting in relative modernisation and re-stmcturing of these sectors. As regards 
achievements in the social sphere, were, decentralisation of power to elected bodies, the 
introduction of measures pertaining to the improvement of working conditions and of wages, 
re-distribution wealth in a relatively fairer manner and a re-adjustment of taxation at the 
expense of the richer. Implication of these attempts, however, has been a substantial increase 
in public expenditures, which in turn resulted in slower growth rates and in higher 
unemployment in the second half of the 1980s.^ *’
1986 Legislative Elections signalled the beginning of the end for Socialist reign in France. 
Personalised factionalism particularly around leadership, rather than on strategy or 
ideology, has become a prominent feature of the PS in the post-1986 period, with Michel
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Rocard challenging M///i?raA7i/’s post in the party. Briefed through opinion polls on the likely 
success of the right in the coming elections, Mitterand, on the other hand, tactically replaced 
the second ballot majority system with proportional representation, with a view to obstruct in 
advance, a centre-right victory. All in all, the right alliance polled nearly 41% of the votes 
(276 seats) in 1986 elections, albeit falling short of a clear majority; whereas there would 
have been otherwise under the previous s y s t e m . A  period of cohabitation, as stated 
elsewhere, started between the socialist president and a conservative government. Jacques 
Chirac as Prime Minister of the cohabitation, reversed the nationalisation programme and 
endeavoured to carry out a privatisation process from 1986 onward. Chirac also eliminated 
the proportional representation and returned to the two-ballot majority system.
Backing green and communist votes to a large extent, socialist victory in presidential 
elections was repeated in 1988, With Mitterand elected for a second term. The PS gained 276 
seats with an overall score of 37.5% in the legislative elections the same year; however, the 
socialists still were 12 seats short of an absolute majority. Mitterand appointed his rival 
Rocard as Prime Minister, who governed with a relative majority only. Despite the fact that 
the Rocard government has been more or less a stable one, personal factionalism continued 
within the PS, undermining largely the party’s image as a power on the left of centre. 
Continuing unemployment and public sector deficits further added to the misfortunes of the 
socialist performance in the post-1988 period. Equally important for the PS was the fact that 
the party has not been able to develop an alternative discourse to fit the realities of the coming 
decades; which in turn, resulted in a complete failure in 1993 Legislative Elections and in 
Chirac's presidency in 1995. While it was confirmed that the PCF remained a small force in
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French politics, and that the PS was the “Party” of the centre-left, the Socialists entered the 
1990s with “an ideological draining’’, as stated in a scholarly comment.*’
Equally important for French politics in the 1990s is the fact that the centre-right coalition 
lead by Alain Juppé since 1995 has largely failed to realise its promise of cutting taxes down 
and of decreasing unemployment. The Juppé government has been blamed for the 
unemployment rate of 12.8%, which is, by and large the highest figure for any leading 
industrial country. 1997 general elections, however, provided the socialists with another 
chance for government, in which the left alliance acquired 319 seats in the 577 member 
Parliament. This score, which is by no means attributable to the PS only, has been achieved 
through an alliance established among the socialists, the communists, the ecologists and other 
left. This phenomenon has been interpreted as the French electorate’s response particularly to 
the rising unemployment in the recent years. Nonetheless, a comparison of seats in the 1993 
and 1997 parliaments reveals that the left alliance has considerably increased its share of total 
seats, when compared to the right.
Gaffney, “The Emergence of a Presidential Party” 81.
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Figure 4.
Source: -Gaffney, ‘The Emergence’', 66.
-VTCOM, “Election Présidentielle 95”; Retour/Up 
-Le Monde, “Legislatives 97”
In Britain, the Labour Party seemed to adhere to its traditional strategy around a set of core 
social democratic values till the late 1970s. Having participated in the war-time coalition of 
1940, and governing with majority from 1945 to 1951; the LP’s locus of strategy lay on 
macro-economic management along Keynesian lines and on commitment to welfare benefits; 
as noted before in the section on ideology. While nationalisation of key economic sectors and 
planned growth remained at the heart of Labour strategy, the LP endeavoured to broaden its 
appeal as a mass party of the wider electorate, covering the other sections of the society , as 
well as the working class. Labour’s strategy, as such, continued till the emergence of the oil 
syndrome and the accompanying economic recession of the 1970s. Labour governments 
responded basically with cutting back on public expenditures.
The official break of the LP away from strict Keynesianism was declared in 1976 Party 
Conference by stating that “the option of guaranteeing full employment no longer existed”.*^  
The implication of the new conjuncture for the LP has been such that the intra-party 
consensus on basic social democratic values dissolved, and the “post-war common ground 
was deserted by both left and right” within the LP.**^  The new left, on the other hand, was 
penetrating into the Party in the same period: the Party’s route in the early 1980s was driven 
by factional forces, and the period between 1979-1983 is called by some as Labour’s civil
war.84
By the early 1990s, the LP still did not seem to cope with changing voter alignments and with 
the needs of the rising market economy competently. Ideologically, the Party hardly achieved 
anything further than “suboptimal positions ranging from a defence of Keynesian welfare
85state to traditional socialist ideas about workers’ empowerment and income distribution” 
hence, could not successfully incorporate any new left themes to its programme. 
Nevertheless, the fourth successive election defeat in 1992 propelled changes both in Party 
leadership and in ideological position. From that year onward, the Party took solid steps in 
rendering its rather old-fashioned slogans and in appearing with a highly novel discourse, in 
particular under the leadership of its new leader, Tony Blair.
The implications of Blair’s leadership for the LP has been such that, firstly the traditional 
image of Labour within the British society was thoroughly renewed, particularly in terms of 
economic policy. As stated in the Election Manifesto:
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“A new centre and centre-left politics. In each area of policy a new and 
distinctive approach has been mapped out, one that differs both from the 
solutions of the old left and those of the Conservatives... .The old left would have 
sought state control of industry. The conservative right is content to leave all to 
the market. We reject both approaches. Government and industry must work 
together to achieve key objectives aimed at enhancing the dynamism of the 
market, not undermining it...In economic management, we accept the global 
economy as a reality and reject the isolationism and ‘go-it-alone’ policies of the 
extremes of right or left.”
Second, although Labour persistently emphasised its position as the party of the deprived, it 
went on to adopt a perennial Conservative theme, the “greatness” of the British nation, and 
the need for unity. As such, the renewed Labour seemed to employ relatively more 
pragmatic slogans, and emphasised that “it was not of outdated ideology”, and that “what 
counted was what worked”.** Third, and associated with the former is the fact that Labour 
seemed to hold on to key Conservative strategies such as taxation and law and order. In this 
context, while on the one hand the shadow chancellor Gordon Brown promised in early 1997 
not to raise income tax rates; on the other hand, the Labour’s soft image in terms of law and 
order was gradually reversed by the shadow home secretary.*  ^ Labour also adopted a firm 
stand on critical societal matters such as the “National Health Service (NHS)”, education, 
unemployment, pensions and welfare benefits; and promised improvements in all. Key issues 
such as environment, transportation and new technologies have been also thoroughly dealt 
with in the Election Manifesto. Labour’s changing image was reflected in the European 
problematic also; coming up with clearly formulated strategies, the LP seemed more pro- 
European than the old Labour had been. In this respect, although the Labour policy on the 
single currency remains dubious, the Party appears as committed to restoring Britain’s
Labour Party. Election Manifesto., 2. 
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declining influence within the European Union (EU).^° Equally important is the fact that LP’s 
promise in the election campaign on introducing a Parliament for Scotland was realised, as 
the Scottish people voted in favour of this issue in September 1997.
Electoral Performance of LP
Votes (%)
Figure 5.
Source: -Jacobs, Western European, 379.
-The Daily Telegraph. (May 3, 1997).
Unlike Germany and France where social democrats had to compete either with the ecologists 
or the communists; social democracy in Sweden did not happen to come across a vigorously 
mobilised left-libertarian electorate, The SAP, thereupon, did not have to pursue a strategy 
devised to combat either the new-left or the communist challenge, as observed in those 
polities. As the SAP’s hegemonic status in the centre remained intact for several decades; 
Swedish social democrats were not urged, like the Germans, to respond to the rising new-left 
and free market issues promptly. Indeed, it has been the Communists in Sweden, to 
incorporate left-libertarian values into their electoral strategy, as early as 1970. Initiatives
The Economist, “MORI New Government Poll”. (March 3, 1997).
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towards the rising new agenda within the SAP were observed only after losing government 
between 1976 and 1982.
Just as the SAP was prompted to shift towards more market values as such, the labour unions’ 
demands for the introduction of wage earners’ fund, for the distribution of wealth and 
gradually socialising industry, jeopardised considerably the social democratic strategy; in that 
the labour union demand fell into thorough contradiction with the fresh route that the party 
had embarked on.^  ^ All in all, the tradition of social democracy required that turning a deaf 
ear to workers’ demands was almost impossible. In that respect, social democrats continued 
to pursue a strategy based on economic performance and enhancement of welfare measures. 
It has been only before the 1988 election campaign that SAP strategically focused on 
ecology, nuclear power and libertarianism towards the adoption of new-left values.
Indeed, the 1978 wage earner scheme adopted by the SAP and the traditional socialist value 
based program of the British labour Party (1973) had both indicated recoil from the 
embourgeoisement trend observed in the social democratic milieu of those years. Whilst there 
has been a moderation of traditional socialist agenda in the 1950s and 1960s, as in Germany; 
Britain and Sweden slightly diverged from this trend and aimed at a re-radicalisation process 
in the 1970s.®^  Actually, the very basic tenet of SAP strategy in the long years of government 
has been the maintenance of secure public finances and the collateral transfer of resources to 
continuous expansion of welfare measures. In that respect, social democratic effort at the 
realisation of full employment, the traditional macro-economic tool that lay at the heart of 
Keynesian policy, remained intact in Sweden so far; while for instance, the British LP overtly
Malcolm B.Hamilton, Democratic Socialism in Britain and Sweden. (London: The MacMillan Press, 
1989), 203.
Kitschelt, The Transformation, 171-172.
Hamilton, Democratic Socialism, 222
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renounced in 1976 that “the option of guaranteeing full employment no longer existed”.®"' 
Hence, the struggle against unemployment has been the locus of social democratic strategy in 
Sweden for more than half a century. The basic means for achieving that end has been the 
fact that social democracy in Sweden has always managed to be a broad popular based 
movement since the 1930s. Indeed, the fact that the overwhelming agrarian Swedish society 
at the turn of the century was successfully transformed into an industrial welfare state, 
unequivocally owes to the persistent social democratic strategy of commitment to full 
employment. As held elsewhere in this study, social democracy as the hegemonic power in 
the centre for decades developed almost as a cultural phenomenon in Sweden; that in turn 
institutionalised a broadly based popular' movement dependant on participation and 
cooperation with the wider sections of the society through its grass-root organisation.
In the light of the above findings on the strategic positions of the social democratic parties in 
Germany, France, Britain and Sweden; it becomes clear that strategy is founded on the path 
that ideology has followed. As shall be elaborated in due course, strategy also goes collateral 
with the social basis of support targeted by the parties. In this respect, whereas the strategic 
stances of these parties were directed especially at the working class before the Second World 
War; the electoral appeal during the post-1945 period was enlarged to cover a wider section 
of the society. The blueprints of social democratic strategy in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, therefore, has been the evolutionary procedure towards institutionalisation as 
mass parties. With this regard, class-politics was largely abandoned during this period.
9-1 Padgett, '"Social Democracy in Power ”, 112.
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2.5. Organisation: Trade-Unionism and Intra-Party Democracy
The four social democratic parties covered in this study divulge, by and large, firmly 
institutionalised organisational schemes. All four of them have been in organic relationship 
with trade unions in their respective countries, hence established well-organised political links 
with the leaders of the working masses, most significant in Britain and in Sweden. In the 
latter, grass-root organisation has also been a long established tradition since the turn of the 
twentieth century. Affiliated and subsidiary organisations such as women and youth branches 
have been a common phenomenon of these parties. In this context, the German and French 
social democratic parties reveal a slightly different pattern, in that their organisational 
structure appear to be more hierarchical when compared to those in Britain and in Sweden. 
The SPD, for instance, has been a solidly hierarchical organisation till the 1980s, in which a 
central top-down power in control of the Party mechanism was well established.
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In its capacity as the locus of decision-making procedure, the top Party leadership enjoys a 
high degree of autonomy in Germany. Effective power is centred on the Party elite through 
“the Praesidhim", "the Executive" and "the Parliamentary Party leadership. Balance of power 
in the SPD has always shifted towards the members of Federal and Land governments, 
literally the Parliamentary Party, which is not always rooted in the Party at large. Though 
heterogenous in political composition, the Party elite has been able to maintain the support of 
the powerful Deiitscher Ge\verkschaftsbimd:DGB (German Trade Union) leadership at its 
disposal. The twenty-two Bezirk (district) organisations of the SPD come after the central 
party elite, as the second power holder. Their role is important, in the sense that they elect 
delegates to the national party congress and, select candidates for Bundestag elections.
In France, at the top of the party apparatus is the leadership comprising of the National 
Secretariat, the “Directing Committee” and the “Executive Committee”, which are elected in 
the Party congresses held in every two years. Organisationally, the PS seems to be displaying 
a rather pluralistic character, as various rival attitudes or ideas within the Party has been 
actively involved in the making of party policies, ever since the Party’s creation. The Party 
was almost badly divided as early as the late 1880s, which continued till the unification of 
factions in 1905 to form the SFIO and, factionalism continued till 1969, the founding date of 
the new PS. In this respect, the French Socialist Party reveals slightly different patterns than 
the SPD in Germany; as no significant factions were observed in the latter, at least till the 
1970s. In the post-1969 French Socialist Party, intra-party fights could be handled by the 
installation of proportional representation in the election of the Party apparatus. Such currents 
within the Party henceforth, have been able to be represented in the national congresses, in 
particular through the submission of resolutions by each current’s adherents, for the selection 
of the Party management, on the basis of proportional representation.
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These resolutions are published and debated by the Party members before they are voted. 
Local Party managements are elected on the basis of these resolutions, and candidates for 
“Directing Committee” membership require a minimum of 5 % of the votes in the elections. 
The 131 elected members of the Directing Committee, then elect the First Secretary, the 
Executive Committee (27 members) and the National Secretariat. The National Secretariat is 
the top power holder in the Party management, which comprises of secretarial posts such as 
the ones responsible from finance, elections, information and education. The secretarial posts 
all together are key positions in the Party leadership, after the First Secretary.
Party leadership play key roles also in Britain and in Sweden. In the former, the Party leader 
and his deputy are chosen by an Electoral College whose members are drawn from trade 
unions (40 %), from the Parliamentary Party (30 %) and from the constituencies (30 %). 
Before 1981, the power for leadership elections was vested in the Parliamentary Party alone. 
The constituencies choose candidates for the Parliament, and when in opposition, the 
Parliamentary group holds a shadow cabinet election, as a measure of popularity test among 
the members of the Parliament.^^ As there is no state funding for political parties in Britain, 
the Party’s finance is largely supplied from the affiliated trade unions and from Party 
membership fees. Nevertheless, the new Party organisation under Tony Blair’s leadership 
seems to imply a considerable tendency towards centralisation. With a view to avoid internal 
strife within the Party as observed between 1979-1983; the top management introduced 
tougher disciplinary codes for members.^*’
Emerging as a genuine product of trade unionism, party leadership in Sweden used to reveal a 
more grassroots character, when compared particularly to Germany and to France. In the
Jacobs, “Western European PoliticalParties'\39l.
Ewen MacAskill,“Labour”. The Guardian General Election Site. The Guardian. (May 3,1997).
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earlier years of SAP at the top of the party hierarchy was the executive, comprising of 23 
members and a party secretary. Owing to SAP’s competent organisation from “bottom to 
top”, the labour communes participated not only in active party politics but in cultural and 
social activities as well; which won, in turn, a steady enlargement as regards membership to 
the SAP. Equally important in this connection, were the subsidiary party organs such as youth 
and women's branches, which had been organised as early as 1892. These subsidiary organs 
further contributed to mobilising mass support for the SAP; 1911 Riksdag election success, 
has been atttribuited, by and large,to the efficient functioning of the youth groups of the party.
With the impacts of the mass media from 1960s onward, party organisation seemed to 
incline towards professionalisation and bureaucratisation, as the role of the national party 
leadership was emphasised. Information and investigation capacities of leadership had to be 
further developed, and the office of leadership was more exposed to wider masses, than 
before.
Insofar as extra-parliamentary party organisation is concerned, solidarity with local 
organisations and affiliated branches has always played key roles in four of the social 
democratic parties covered in this study. That posed, nonetheless, challenges to the cohesion 
of the party, and at times even the leadership, most prominent in the SPD. In Germany, the 
two immediate post-war years, indeed, saw no major factionalism in the SPD, mainly due to 
the dominance of right in the Party and to the conflict managing ability of leadership. The 
challenge of the left in SPD started in the 1970s through the youth organisations, and 
gradually penetrated into the Party at large, to become influential by mid-1980s, to which the 
Party leadership and the right wing initially resisted. The main political platform of the SPD 
left has been the Party’s Sozialistischer Deiitscher Studenienbimd.SDS (auxiliary student
Iibid.,111.
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organisation), among whose members many were sympathetic to the FranJrfiirt Schoof^. The 
Party leadership perceived the SDS as an interference to the centrist image that has been 
created since the Bad Godesberg Programme, as the SDS was known be hostile to the Bad 
Godesberg Programme and to the coalition with the Christian Democrats. SPD strategy in 
combating the left challenge included the withdrawal of financial support from the SDS and 
the expulsion of its leaders from the Party.
The rising new left however, posed an other and a more serious question to the SPD 
leadership, in the sense that new left was already permeating the Party at large, particularly 
through the youth organisation, JUSO. Following a series of conflicts over the Party’s 
ideological affiliation, the etante was cooled down with Brandt’s intervention in favour of the 
left, that came rather as a response to the 1968 Landtag election defeat. From then on, the 
new left has been able to reach an increased representation within the SPD, and its 
representatives were invited by H. Schmidt to participate in the preparation of a new Party 
Programme. The draft came out to be a reform oriented one, and the procedure of integrating 
the new left leaders to the Party continued in Schmidt’s Chancellorship after 1974.
In that respect, the district organisations of the SPD have been dominated by the right wing of 
the Party till the 1980s. The left was relatively weak in the district organisations, with the 
exception of cities such as Berlin, FranJ^iirt and Munich. The left was also under-represented 
in the Party congresses and in the Parliament, mainly due to the weak support it received from 
the districts organisation. The Party right was organised in the Parliament through right wing 
trade union members known as Kanalarbeiter, which had formed an alliance with the H-J 
Vogel, Circle, a Parliamentary group comprising of middle-class professionals and academics.
98 Frankfurt school
99
The extra-Parliamentary Party right was also organised, with the name as the Godesberger 
Circle
Trade union support which has been an indispensable feature of the organisational aspect of 
the SPD started to weaken by early 1980s, as a response to the breakdown of Keynesian 
economic policy, and the rising unemployment in Germany, as almost elsewhere in the 
Continent. Labour movement protests against the 1981 and 1982 Federal Budgets resulted in 
the break-up of the social-liberal coalition and another dilemma within the SPD started to 
accelerate; one between the old and new left. The organisational and ideological fluctuations 
from then on rendered the once disciplined and centralised SPD a socially heterogenous and 
organisationally pluralistic party, the implication of which was a decline in the Party’s 
traditional working-class membership.
In Britain, The organisation of the extra-Parliamentary Party comprises of three different 
layers including the national level, the district level and the constituency party. The latter is 
the core unit of Labour through which the grass-root support for the Party is organised by 
means of a general committee consisting of delegates from the affiliated organisations. The 
Labour maintains organic relationship with trade unions and incorporates them in the Party 
work via the committee, together with the affiliated bodies such as the socialist society, the 
co-operative party branches and the units providing for individual participation. Two or more 
constituencies make together the district level organisation.
The LP is organised in Party Conferences at national level, and conferences are held each 
year to which the delegates are elected at the constituency level. There are delegates for the
99
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affiliated bodies and one constituency delegate for each 5000 member. Trade union delegates 
usually enjoy a weighty position in Labour Conferences. Two-thirds majority is necessary for 
a resolution to pass at the Party Conference. The Party Conference also elects the National 
Executive Committee (NEC) comprising of twelve representatives from the trade unions, 
seven from the constituencies, five from the women’s section, one from the socialist societies 
and one from the youth organisations. The NEC holds a powerful position within the LP, 
together with the Party leadership.
Insofar as Sweden is concerned, the fundamentals of organisation of social democratic party 
stretches back to the establishment of SAP’s origin in 1881, literally to the local socialist 
clubs and trade unions. The central party organisation, at that time, served as the central trade 
union organisation until the creation of Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) in 1889. 
A remarkable aspect of early Swedish labour movement was that its adherents were drawn 
from the same people, as both party members and trade unionists.^”’ The foundation and 
development of the SAP, in fact, is firmly anchored in labour movement in Sweden; as the 
LO and the SAP have been referred to as respectively the “union branch” and the “political 
branch” of the same endeavour, complying one another. Union-party affiliation, therefore, 
has been the trademark of Swedish social democracy ab initio. That SAP’s first leader 
Hjalmar Branting drew attention in 1898 to the “task of making the Swedish labour union 
movement “one” with Swedish Social Democracy and into a power “that will weigh even 
more than at present, on the political and social scales of society” '^^ " appears as characteristic 
in this context.
Villy Bergstrom, “Party Program and Economic Policy: The Social Democrats in Govermnent” in: 
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Emerging as a genuine product of labour movement, the SAP maintained an unbroken 
organic relationship with the Landsorganisation.LO (Confederation of Swedish Trade 
Unions), and remained firmly anchored in trade unionism. Initially, collective affiliation of 
the LO members to the party was introduced as obligatory, which, by 1908, was transformed 
into granting the individual members of an affiliated union the reservation to obstain from 
affiliation to the SAP.^°  ^ The party comprised of arbetarekommiinen (local labour 
communes) at the base, whose number reached around 80, at the turn of the century. Extra- 
parliamentary party activities were held in these labour communes, and the SAP was 
originally organised into three regional districts, namely Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo. 
In 1910, the three party districts were enlarged to meet each constituency. The party 
executive was assisted by these disticts. The district (constituency) organisations were further 
developed into an extensive network of representatives in rural parishes from 1911 onward. 
By 1911, the district level organisation was abolished as a result of rapid growth, and the 
labour communes were re-organised to report directly to the party executive.
The union branch and the political branch of the Swedish labour movement made together 
political mobilisation of the masses a success story. While financing comes mainly from 
membership fees, from the national subsidy to the parties represented in the Riksdag (as 
provided from 1965 onward) and from the social democratic press; SAP has been able to 
mobilise sizeable funds from the LO for occasional budgetary concerns: 90% of the election 
campaign in the 1950s has been subsidised by trade unions. Unlike other parties which 
apply to individual voluntary contributions, therefore, the SAP turn to the trade unions, in 
times of budgetary difficulties.
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Trade union-party solidarity appears, at the same time, as an integral element of the grass-root 
structure of Swedish social democracy, in the form of work-place organisations. These units, 
each comprising of a Party representative responsible from 25 workers, contribute not only to 
political mobilisation of the wider section of the society, but at the same time to long term 
opinion formation within the party. Work-place organisations report to the union committees 
which exist in each labour commune and party district. By mid-1980s, there were nearly 
100000 Party Representatives within the country. Above work-place organisatons are. Social 
Democratic Union Clubs, consisting of LO and white-collar union, members and the work­
place organisations. Number of the politically active union clubs has been recorded as around 
450 by 1980s. A network of local information groups is also active, whose responsibility is 
the follow-up of national and local politics. As of 1998, there are 2700 local Party 
Associations.
Alongwith the tradition of trade unionism, intra-party democracy has also been a significant 
feature of Swedish social democrats. The long established tradition of participatory decision 
making procedure was given a further impetus by the 1960s, through the establishment of a 
system of consultative surveys. That aimed at engaging party supporters and trade union 
members in discussions on a broad front about future party policies. Since then, consultative 
surveys have been extensively used by the party management for several political issues. 
These surveys comprise of well planned questionnaires distributed to households. Widely 
circulated for receiving comments from the electorate on current political issues, these 
surveys contributed to policy-making within the party and to mass mobilisation within the 
country. While the 1967 survey on economic policy covered 25000 party members, the 1969
Swedish Social Democratic Piirty, “The Sweedish Social Democratic Movement Today”, 
Socialdemokraterna, October 1, 1998.
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survey on taxation policy surfaced 40000 participants. The following 1974 survey on energy 
policy, and the 1978 survey on Wage Earners' Funds incorporated respectively 44000 and 
65000 participants nationwide.
The SAP has 240000 members of which, 41 % are women, as of 1998.^°' The “from the 
bottom to the top” organisation of the SAP is such that, the Party members may become 
active in terms of participation in decision making, largely through the Local Party 
Organisations. These associations are independent parts of the Party, and can express their 
opinions in internal meetings, studies and other grass-root activities. Most Party Associations 
carry out their activities in a limited geographical area or at a work-place often in cooperation 
with a trade-union. At the municipal level are the Municipal Party Organisations (Workers 
Commune) that determine the Party’s political program for the municipality. All Social 
Democratic Associations within a Municipality are members of the Municipal Party 
Organisation which supports the Associations in their activities and which has the primary 
responsibility for the planning of different election campaigns in the local community.
At the top of the Municipal Party Organisation is the “County Council” governed by a 
County Council Meeting that refers to the County Parliament. Members of the County 
Council are elected in general elections held at the same time with the regular elections to 
municipal councils and to the Parliament in every four years. Covering the County Area and 
at regional level is the Party District Organisation to which. Municipal Organisations are 
members. The District Organisation chooses the candidates for the parliamentary and for the
Gidlund, “From Popular Movement to Political Party” 119-125. 
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County Council Lists. The Party District Organisation also elects delegates to the Party 
Congress.
Depending on the above analysis of the organisational framework of the social democratic 
parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden; the concluding remarks may appear such 
that grass-roots structure and intra-party democracy are essential features of organisation in 
these parties. Furthermore, solidarity and organic relations with trade unions is another 
significant attribute of organisation; a tradition that has its origins in the formative years of 
the parties covered in this study.
2.6. Main Profile of Western European Social Democracy: Evolution from Revolution
Sketching a lucid profile of Western European social democracy does not emerge as an easy 
task, nor is it possible to find a tailor-made pattern for individual national experiences of 
different countries in social democratic politics. Although Western European states are 
founded on a common historical legacy, the various regional socio-economic and cultural 
differences inherent within the process of political development have implied some diverse 
parameters for the emergence of nation-states in Europe. In that respect, whilst the cement 
binding together the array various polities in Western Europe during industrialisation has 
been the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law; formation of basic socio-economic 
cleavages from among which, modern political parties have emerged, revealed some 
disparities between nations. Nevertheless, the framework of analysis carried out so far reveals 
that the outgrowth of social democratic parties in Western Europe was prompted within the 
worker movements of the past century.
Ibid., 2-4
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Consequential with the fundamental societal transformation brought about by the 
industrialisation process, the number of workers employed in basic industries had reached 
some millions, by the early twentieth century. The growing urban proletariat especially in the 
rising manufacturing, mining and construction sectors were continuously propelled to 
improve their life standards and working conditions. Mass mobilisation of these workers 
was given impetus particularly by the political socialism of Marx and Engels. Hence, the 
outset of social democratic parties, by and large, was structured around the “distributional 
problem” and the representation of the class interests of these groups; as their origins may 
indicate. The social democratic parties of France, Sweden, Britain and Germany flourished 
from the worker associations and trade unions in these countries. The French PS, the Swedish 
SAP, The British LP and the German SPD were founded in 1879, 1889, 1893 and 1869 
respectively.
In this respect, it becomes clear that the industrialisation process in Europe has been the main 
drive behind the emergence of the blue-collar working class and its gradual organisation as a 
cohesive political force. Having given the impetus for the development of particular social 
and political cleavages, therefore, the Industrial Revolution seems to be among the decisive 
factors that set the backdrop of functional cleavages and their incorporation into modern 
party systems, as the structural analysis suggests. Construction of the industrial society, as 
such, becomes a key variable in explaining the outgrowth of social democratic parties within 
the left-right continuum of Western European democratic society, as disserted both by Moore, 
and Upset and Rokkan.
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Accordingly, it becomes clear that the sister parties within the framework of this study 
adopted a Marxist ideology initially. Owing to the institutionalisation of universal suffrage 
and especially to the legacy of Bernstein, socialists in Western Europe gradually shifted 
towards the non-revolutionary way for the organisation of the society on a socialist basis. 
During the inter-war period, contribution of Keynes to political economy accommodated 
fresh insights to macro-economic management. Social democratic ideology, since then, 
emphasised the allocation of resources with regard to the general social interest, in the 
existing democratic order. With this regard, the desirable virtues of free markets were to be 
maintained, while the State institutions were to take active roles in the regulation of the 
economy and in redistribution of resources towards the deprived. The welfare state in 
Western Europe was institutionalised in the aftermath of the Second World War largely on 
the leitmotif of Keynesian political economy.
Nonetheless, the social democratic parties have experienced notable changes, as further 
challenges were posed by the seventies and the eighties. On one hand, the traditional core 
constituency of social democracy, the blue-collar working class has been eroding in number. 
The extent to which the physical contraction of the blue-collar voters undermined the social 
basis of support for these parties remains vague. Although support from the founding father 
of Western European social democracy remained considerably salient, quantitative 
contraction seems to have adversely affected the social bases of these parties recently.
On the other hand, the distributive and growth oriented conventional tenets of social 
democracy was being increasingly challenged by the rising laissez-faire and left-libertarian 
cleavage mobilisation Due to the profound societal transformations put forth by the advanced 
industrialised society and the collateral decrease of manual jobs therein, it became evident
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that social democratic parties were no longer in a position to pursue strategies structured on 
class-politics only. The social democratic response given with regard to these changes was 
the incorporation of libertarian new left themes into political programs; with tower overtones 
on state control in the markets. That implied, by and large, formulation of novel strategies 
directed at broader electoral coalitions. In that respect, the core of the electoral support had to 
be reinforced with the new-left voters drawn especially from the rising service sectors. Social 
democrats, accordingly, have been able to recruit sizeable support from the new middle 
classes.
On that account, the relevance of pure class-analysis on social democratic parties becomes 
considerably undermined, especially for the period after 1970s. Further insights, instead, has 
to be accomodated into the framework of analysis for the study of Western European social 
democracy in the recent period. On the other hand, whilst structural analyses devised on 
cleavage formation remain intact; they also need to be enhanced with internal explanations 
based on political actors. As can be observed from the analysis in the Second Chapter, social 
democratic success has been contingent upon the strategic choices in the new voter 
distribution brought about by the left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation, as Kitschelt has 
suggested. Furthermore, the intrinsic constraints for choosing between different strategic 
alternatives must also be borne in mind; such as the particular ideological legacy of a party 
and the historical voter identification with that party.
In this respect, the analysis in Chapter Two, divulged that the social democratic parties in 
Germany, France, Britain and Sweden have pursued strategies based on electoral alliances for 
adaptation to the newly emerging cleavages of advanced capitalism in the eighties and the 
nineties. Due to the fact that class identity has been a relatively more strong indicator of
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voting behaviour, and that conventional views on socialism and liberalism have been 
dominant ideologies in Britain and Sweden; social democrats in these polities faced more 
difficulties in incorporating left-libertarian themes to their strategic appeals. In Germany, left- 
libertarian cleavage mobilisation appeared to be a more propelling force than has been in the 
former. Forasmuch as the SPD adapted to the rising ecological and libertarian views of 
society, the electoral challenge posed by the Greens was circumvented. The French socialists, 
on the other hand, seemed to have pursued a rather volatile strategy with regard to left- 
libertarianism, as it was largely perceived as the adversary of the hegemonic etatist and 
conventional socialist views in that polity. It became clear thereupon, that internal variables 
such as the capability for strategic formulation have been successful, to the extent that 
structural opportunities were favourable.
The organisational capacity for intra-party decision-making constitutes the other decisive 
internal factor in the analysis of social democracy in Western Europe. Strategic flexibility 
and timely adaptation to the fresh electoral conjuncture in the recent period, seems to be 
structured on the fairly institutionalised democratic organisation in four of the parties 
covered in this research. The generic organisational framework reveals a path in which party 
members and extra-parliamentary organisations such as youth branches and other affiliated 
bodies have been resolutely granted a legitimate voice in the decision-making procedure. 
Although leadership enjoys a more prestigious status in the German SPD and the French 
LP; the democratic structures of these parties are by no means observed to be impeded by 
the party administration. Thence, organisational capability for strategic decision-making 
seems to be functioning as a decisive internal variable, as the framework of analysis 
suggests.
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On the other hand, the study in the Second Chapter has provided that the traditional 
solidarity with the institutions of the working masses are prevailing. Not unexpectedly, 
organic relations with trade unions have been an integral part of organisation in these 
parties since the outset; as these parties were born from labour organisations. Thenceforth, 
the tradition of trade unionism within social democratic politics in Western Europe has 
decidedly remained intact, reiterating the relevance of ideological legacy and the 
importance of voter identification within the existing patterns of party competition, as key 
external explanations.
All in all, the common profile bears in itself significant convergences with regard to 
ideology, social basis of support, strategy and organisation; the four main tools of analysis. 
The common historical legacy can also be incorporated into this framework. If the outline of 
social democracy in Western Europe were to be devised in one simple phrase “evolution from 
revolution” would probably fit the task best. The study of German, French, British and 
Swedish social democratic parties so far, reveals a long process commencing in the 
revolutionary worker movements of the past century, to culminate in the political position 
firmly anchored in liberal capitalism in advanced industrial society. Tradition and 
colloquialism, therefore, protrude as trademarks of the social democratic parties in these 
countries; within which, the main features of Western social democracy appear.
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CHAPTER III
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY
The framework of analysis in the foregoing Chapters has put together a number of 
key variables to be of particular importance within the study of Western European 
social democracy. The analysis suggests that while the prevailing socio-economic 
structures and the dominant ideologies are indispensable external factors in this 
context; they need to be complemented with internal explanations, as well. 
Accordingly, it becomes clear that a thorough understanding of social democracy, 
indeed, has to cover internal variables such as the intrinsic capability of parties for 
strategic formulation within the organisational scheme. Thence, the analysis 
becomes enhanced with the incorporation of an actor oriented approach into the 
existing patterns of party competition and the relevant ideological legacies.
With this regard, the formative phase of the basic cleavages in the Ottoman-Turkish 
society and the outgrowth of socialist currents shall be dealt with initially, for the 
evaluation of the prevalent structural conjuncture and the relevant ideologies therein. 
On the other hand, Cumhiiriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) in the First Turkish Republic and 
its transformation towards the left of centre during the Second Republic shall be 
examined in this Chapter. The division of social democrats in the Third Republic is 
going to be scrutinised as well. In that respect, the relevant economic and political
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conjuncture in this periods shall also be highlighted, with a view to offer a structural 
grounding for the analysis of Turkish social democracy in the following Chapter.
3.1. Structuring of the Main Cleavages
The Ottoman Empire in the “Classical Age (1300-1600)” was a textbook example of 
absolutist polity, in which the patrimonial authority of the Sultan remained intact. 
The land tenure system required the functioning of military bureaucrats as Sipahis 
(fief holders) who collected the fiefs of the lands sown on which the free peasants 
lived as tenants. The particular regime of miri (state) lands as the property of the 
Treasury, provided for an economic structure quite dissimilar with the capitalistic 
development observed in the Western settings.* The absolutist regime of the 
Ottoman sultans, and the tradition of a strong centre prevailed as such, until the 
nineteenth century; during which the gradual dissolution of the land tenure system
and the collateral weakening of the centre vis a vis the ayans (local lords) in the
2
periphery was being observed.
The Classical Age Ottoman society was shaped basically according to a division 
between a ruling class and a ruled. The former referred to as the askeri (military), 
included groups who held executive duties in the state device. The executives of the 
Sultan’s patrimonial authority comprised of military and civil bureaucrats and the 
ulema (scholars of Islam). The second distinctive class, the reaya, comprised of free
' Sina Akşin, "Siyasal Tarih [Political History]". Osmanli Devleti 1600-1908, Türkiye Tarihi 3 [The 
Ottoman Empire 1600-1908, Turkish History SfS''* ed)[, ed. Sina Akşin, 73-187. (Istanbul: Cem 
Yayınevi, 1992), 80.
 ^ Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions rmd 
Reequilibrations". In Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey, ed. Ergun Özbudun, 1-58. (Ankara: 
Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 28. See also Suat Aksoy, Tarim Hukuku [Agricultural 
Law). (Ankara: Ankara Basımevi, 1970), 40-41.
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peasants, merchants and artisans, and had no saying in governmental affairs. Hence, 
'"Kalem erbabı olmak veya kılıç kuşanmak” (becoming either a bureaucrat or a 
soldier) was a privileged position that overtly implied membership to the ruling 
classes, A clear dichotomy, accordingly, came into existence between the “ruler” and 
“the ruled”, which was complemented with a gap between the centre and the 
periphery.
The Turks who settled in urban centres were overwhelmingly drawn from the civil- 
military bureaucrats or scholars of Islam.^ The Ottoman centre-periphery divide, 
hence, did not necessarily reflect cleavages in a geographical conception, in which 
regional isolation and the accompanying economic underdevelopment constituted the 
main contrasts within the society only. It referred, abundantly, to the centrality of the 
state and of the political elites to the rest of the society."* Serif Mardin has given a 
comprehensive account of the befitting dimensions of this centre-periphery gap in 
their historical context.^
The often prudential, and at times repressive approach of the state elite towards the 
residues of the pve-Oitoman notables and the inherent religious heterodoxy of the 
Anatolian periphery, appears as another dimension in that context.*" Indeed the non- 
Sunni Anatolian sects or cults had always been a dilemma for the central authority 
since the Seljiikids; as officialdom both in the latter and in the Ottoman state was
 ^ Kurt Steinhaus, Atatürk Devrimi Sosyolojisi: Sosyo-Ekonomik Yönden Az Gelişmiş Ülkelerde 
Burjuva Toplumunun Gelişmesi Sorunu Üzerine bir Araştırma [The Sociology o f the Atatürkian 
Revolution: A Research on tlıe Problem of Development of Bourgeois Society in Underdeveloped 
Countries]. Turns. M. Akkaş, (Istanbul: Sander Yayınlan, 1973), 21.
'* Özbudun, "Development o f Democratic Government", 29-30. See also Metin Heper, "Centre and 
Periphery in tlie Ottoman Empire: Witli Special Reference to the Nineteentli Centuiy". 
International Political Science Review. 1, (1980), 81-105.
 ^ Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?”. DEADALUS. 102:1 (Winter 
1973), 169-189., 170.
Mardin, "Centre-Periphery", 171.
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devised according to the fundamentals of Sunni ideology. Although often employed 
for military service, the Turkoman groups that preserved their pre-Islamic 
(Shamanistic) values and which resisted the musts of the Sunni hegemony since the 
eleventh century, continued to be sources of rebellions against central authority in 
the Seljuk and the Ottoman periods. Therefore, owing to “a system of decentralised 
accommodation toward ethnic, religious and regional particularisms” established by 
the Ottomans, and to the very fact that no attempts were made for more complete 
integration of these localisms in the Anatolian heartland, the centre and the periphery 
became “two very loosely related worlds”.^  Thence, the disunity of these 
components of the Empire, the highly segmented structure of the society, and finally 
the conflict between the Sultan and his bureaucracy in later times put together a 
centre-periphery dichotomy that was to play a key role in Turkish politics.
The salience of a peripheral reality, the tradition of a strong centre and the 
cultural/social divisions, therefore, constituted the basic political cleavages in the 
Ottoman society in modern times. On that account, it has been suggested that the 
basic cleavages in the Ottoman-Turkish society resulted from territorial and cultural 
oppositions rather than functional ones.^ Functional cleavages, as conceptualised by 
Upset and Rokkan, are those that cut across territorial units of nation-state and are 
largely committed to class and collective interests, on which party systems of the 
West are based. In their typology, functional cleavages usually cut across the 
territorial units of the nation.  ^ At one extreme of this cleavage structure there are *
’ Ibid., 171.
* Ergun Ozbudun, Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 23-24.
’ Seymour Miutin Lipset ¿md Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter 
Aligmnents: An Introduction”. In Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National 
Perspectives, eds. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 1-64. (New York: The Free Press, 
1967).
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illustrative antagonisms on either short or long term allocations of resources and 
benefits; such as the conflicts between producers and buyers, workers and 
employers, tenants and owners and the like. Accordingly, at the other extreme are 
solidaristic alignments grounded on ideological poles; where contentions are no 
longer arising from specific benefits but from normative conceptions pertaining to 
the economic and the social.
Territorial cleavages on the other hand, are confined to cultural and regional issues. 
While at one extreme of this cleavage formation are peripheral reactions of local, 
cultural, ethnic or religious particularisms to the centralisation attempts of the secular 
national elites and their bureaucracies; at the other extreme are intra-elite conflicts 
either on the control of central power or on the desirable strategies for domestic and 
foreign politics. The very existence of concrete antagonisms, nevertheless, hardly 
fall exclusively at the extremes of the territorial and functional cleavage structures; 
rather they historically emerge to have combined the basic features of both." In that 
respect, Ergim Ozbiidun has put forth that with increasing industrialisation and social 
mobilisation, centre-periphery conflicts tend to be replaced by functional cleavages, 
provided that they are grounded on less enduring ethnic, religious or cultural 
divisions. Thence, Turkey, being a “relatively homogenous country in terms of 
language, religion, ethnicity, culture and historical traditions, seems to have a good 
potential for the development of functional cleavages” .
Another decisive factor in the outgrowth of main cleavages in the pre-Republican 
Turkish politics has been the emergence of a new landed class in the periphery.
"^ibid., 10-11
" ibid., 11.
1 Ozbudim, Social Change, 55-56.
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stemming from the dissolution of the classical land system and from the gradual 
weakening of central authority.*^ That gave the impetus, by and large, to the 
protrusion of an additional dimension with regard to the structuring of the cleavage 
system. The decline of absolutist state tradition in the past century, thoroughly 
helped the peripheral forces to reinforce their position vis a vis the centre. 
Acquisition by the local notables of some proportion from the miri lands, suggested 
a peripheral challenge that was to enjoy a weighty position in Turkish politics since 
then. The landed gentry in the countryside, gravitated in time, towards forming 
alliances with the Muslim traditionalists at the centre.'“*
Thereupon, the formative phase of the party system developed differently from those 
observed in Western polities. Stemming largely from the reaction towards absolutist 
state tradition,'^ liberalism has been a remarkable feature of Turkish politics in the 
nineteenth century. Beyond that, a wide range of worldviews circulated around in 
this period; each of which was held by its adherents as the panacea to the ills of the 
Empire. In search of a solution for the “salvation of the country”'*', the Turkish 
intellectuals’ affiliations varied from Constitutionalism {Hürriyetçilik), secularism 
and enlightenment, to nationalism and Islamic conservatism.
A variety of political groupings, concurrently, came into existence in the period 
between the Tanzimat Act and the proclamation of "’Kamm-i Esasi” (The First 
Constitution) in 1876. The forerunning opponents were drawn overwhelmingly from
Ergun Özbudun, “State Elites and Démocratie Political Culture in Turkey.” In Political Culture and 
Democracy in Developing Countries. (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Reinner publishers, 1994), 191.
''' Özbudun, !988, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and 
Reequilibrations". In Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey, ed. Ergun Özbudun, 1-58. (Ankara: 
Turkish Political Science Association, 1988).
'^Toprak, "iknsatTarihi", 187 
Tills refers to “vatanı kurtarmak" in Turkish.
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the civil and military bureaucracy and from the intelligentsia of that period, hence 
elevating the role of these strata to a predominant status within the opposition 
tradition in Turkish politics.Indeed, the nineteenth century Ottoman reformers had 
already, by and large, “succeeded in producing a well-trained, knowledgeable 
bureaucratic elite guided by a view of the interest of the state”.*® Although the 
opposition movement penetrated into the military bureaucracy as well, it fell quite 
short of building a genuine mass base.***
One of the main components of the opposition thrust in Turkey, therefore, came 
from the middle classes with relatively high levels of education. Thence, party 
politics in Turkey remained as an intra-elite conflict^ **, rather than reflecting 
antagonisms written in terms of relations of production, literally of functional 
cleavages in the Western sense. The other fundamental element of opposition in 
Turkish politics was, as touched above, stemming from the Muslim traditionalists at 
the centre, largely as a reactionary attitude towards the secularist modernising efforts 
of the bureaucracy. The Islamic conservatism at the centre was to receive support 
from the landed peripheral forces, and to ally in time, with the latter against the 
secularist and modernist attempts at the centre.
On the other hand, industrialisation, the key factor within the outgrowth of worker 
movements and the collateral rise of social democratic parties in Western Europe, 
was largely retarded in the overwhelmingly agrarian Ottoman-Turkish society. 
Indeed, it appeared to be a gradual process prompted only after the establishment of
Emre Kongar, İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı [The Social Structure of 
Turkey from Üie Empire to Day]. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1985), 69.
Mardin, "Centre-Periphery", 180.
Steinhaus, Atatürk Devrimi, 49.
-"Özbudun, "State Elites", 191.
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the nation-state in 1923. Production patterns in Anatolia still revealed a pre- 
capitalistic nature by the turn of the century, the implication of which was the lack of 
a powerful bourgeoisie to give impetus to developmental capitalism. Most 
significant for the purposes of this study was the existence of a social coalition of 
small entrepreneurs, merchants and landed gentry, which constituted in turn, the 
main support behind the Turkish Revolution.
By the early twentieth century, the worker associations of the non-Muslim 
organisations of ethnic origin based particularly in the Balkans and in Macedonia, 
and Muslim guilds remaining from the classical age constituted the main 
components of the initial organised worker movements in the Empire. Majority of 
the organised proletariat was affiliated to trade unions founded by either Greeks or 
Armenians.Accordingly, the size of the Turkish working class has been recorded 
around 14 thousand only.^^
In that respect, the Turkish working class was hardly in a position to form a cohesive 
political force in Turkish politics. Neither the quantity nor the intrinsic feature of 
worker movements both in the Empire and in Republican Turkey seemed to qualify 
for the organisation of the working groups into a political party. It has been reported 
in this context that, the Reji Tekeli (Tobacco Monopoly) founded by French capital 
in 1884, had established factories in cities such as İzmir, Samsun, İstanbul, Adana, 
Damascus and Haleb; with 450 and 500 workers employed in the former two. While
Stcfanos Yerasimos, Azgelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye: Bizans'tan 1971 'e [Turkey in the Phase of 
Underdevelopment: From Byziuitine to 1971]. (Istanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980), 889.
Wliile some other sources referred to tlie number of urban proletariat in Turkey as around 200000 
(cited in: Timur, Türk Devrimi, 31), even this figure is negligible when compared to tlie 
corresponding figures in Western Europe. In tliis context, Dimitr Şişmanov held tliat tlie number 
of workers in factories had reached 50000 by 1913. (cited in: Dimitir Şişmanov, Türkiye İşçi ve 
Sosyalist Hareketi, Kısa Tarih (1908-1965) [Turkish Worker and Socialist Movement, A Short 
History (1908-1965)]. Beige yayınları, 1978. Reprint. (Istanbul: Beige Yayınları, 1990), 35.
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no comprehensive data on the social and ethnic composition of these workers are 
available, it has been estimated that the employees of these factories were permanent 
urban working c la s s .I t  was noted that in the early decades of the 1900s, some 
experiences were gained by workers in these factories to seize their rights; and by 
those within the mining industry in the Eregli region, founded in 1896. (For the 
latter, the estimate on the number of workers is around 10000. '^') That did not 
change, nevertheless, the fact that, of the industrial proletariat, the most qualified and 
responsible from administrative affairs were foreigners, and that the skilled and 
semi-skilled workers were overwhelmingly drawn from Ottoman non-Muslims; 
Turkish workers remaining either as non-skilled or as temporary workers.
Table 6.
Size of the Working Class in Turkey (1965-1995)
Years No of 
Workers
No of 
Population 
(million)
% of Workers 
in Total 
Population
1965 895802 30 2.9
1970 1315500 35 3.7
1975 1823338 40 4.5
1980 2204807 44 5.0
1985 2607865 50 5.2
1990 3446502 56 6.1
1995 4410774 62 7.1
Source: State Planning Organisation 26
Alpaslan Işıklı, Türkiye 'de Sendikacılık Hareketleri İçinde Demokrasi Kavramının Geliçimi [The 
Development of tlıe Concept of Democracy within tlıe Trade Union Movements in Turkey]. 
(Ankiua: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), 61.
Ibid., 66.
Şişmanov, Türkiye İşçi ve Sosyalist, 75.
The number of workers have been drawn from: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Ekonomik ve Sosyal 
Göstergeler (1950-1995) [Economic and Social Indicators (1950-1995)]. (Ankara: DPT, 1996), 
166-168. For the population figures; ibid., 163. The percentage of workers in total population have 
been calculated from tlie figures in tlie respective columns.
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3.2. Socialist Currents in the pre-Republican Period
3.2.1. The Second Constitutionalist Period
The appearance of socialist endeavours in Ottoman politics was no exception to the 
phenomenon of “elite-driven opposition for salvation”. Osmanh Sosyalist Fırkası: 
OSF (Ottoman Socialist Party) founded in Istanbul in 1910 was the first 
organisation in the form of a political party with socialist affiliations. The OSF was 
not able to gain representation in Meclis-i Mebusan; however a group was formed 
with socialist tendencies at that time, comprising mainly of Armenian and Bulgarian 
members of the Parliament (MPs). The socialist group had no organic relations with 
the OSF, and the latter remained as an extra-Parliamentary party. The Party leader 
Hüseyin Hilmi published the periodicals İştirak (Participation) and İnsaniyet 
(Humanity), and the newspapers Medeniyet (Civilisation) and Sosyalist (Socialist); 
with a view to help dissemination of socialist ideas. The OSF endeavoured to survive 
via its affiliated branch in Paris under the leadership ofZ)r. Refik Nevzad^^
Whereas the ideological formation of the Party Centre in Istanbul lead by Hüseyin 
Hilmi lingered between utopian socialism and liberalism , members of the Paris 
Branch established relations with the Second International, and announced clearly 
their adoption of the principles of scientific socialism.^^ A close look at the profile of 
the founding members reveals that the OSF, like other sister parties of its time.
Tank Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye 'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952 [Political Parties in Turkey 1859-1952]. 
(Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınlan, 1952), 452. (Tlie period between 1918-1923, in wliich The 
Turkish Republic emerged as a nation state as successor to the Ottoman Empire), 304-306. 
Yerasimos, Azgelişmişlik Sürecinde, 883.
Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 307.
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emerged as an intellectual attempt with almost a negligible mass base.^° The 
political conjuncture required the Istanbul group to gradually shift its ideological 
stance to liberalism. The OSF lost blood as its leaders were exiled by the Jön Türk 
government, and it was shut down in 1913. Hüseyin Hilmi and group re-established 
the party under the label of Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası. TSF (Turkish Socialist Party/
While there was a short revival between 1920-21, the TSF disintegrated finally in 
1922.
T he first po litica l party carrying the title  o f  soc ia l dem ocrat in T urkey, n am ely  
Sosyal Demokrat Fırkası: SDF (Social Democratic Party^ was founded in Istanbul, 
in January 1918, shortly before the Armistice. Like the TSF, the founders of the SDF 
were drawn from a certain social stratum, from the educated upper middle-class. 
Among the founders were Dr. Hasan Rıza, the General Director of the Housing 
Bank^* Cemil Arif and retired civil servant Habip Bey. The Party’s ideological stance
rested on principles such as the re-organisation of the political and economic system 
on a socialist basis, harmony with international social democratic institutions and 
establishment of trade-unions and enhancing their solidarity. The SDF did not 
participate in the 1919 elections and remained outside the Parliament. The Party 
annulled itself in 1920.^^
Another socialist Party founded in this period was Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist 
Fırkası: TİÇSF (Turkish Socialist Workers and Peasants Party). The TİÇSF was
Among tlie founders of the OSF were four journalists, namely Hüseyin Hilmi, Namık Hasan, Pertev 
Tevfik and Ismail Faik. For more details see: ibid., 305. See also Suna Kili, Atatürk Devrimi, Bir 
Çağda.Jaşma Modeli [The Atatürkian Revolution, A Model for Modernisaüon]. (Ankara: Türkiye 
İş Bankası Yayınlan, 1981), 65.
Emlak Bankası Genel Müdürü 
Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 423.
122
founded in September 1919 hy Dr. Şefik Hüsnü and friends {Ahmed Akif, Ethem 
Nejad), and entered the elections the same year, with no electoral gains. The 
fundamentals of Party ideology rested on the organisation of workers and peasants in 
Turkey according to the principles of scientific socialism. The TİÇSF established 
relations with the Third International and adopted a Leninist stand. During the 
Defence of Rights Period, the Party gave support to the Kemalists, and became 
active by publishing Kurtuluş and ylyJ/AîM journals. It annulled itself in 1924.
While remaining uninfluential politically, a remarkable endeavour as regards the 
history of socialist parties in Turkey was Osmanli Mesai Fırkası: OMF (Ottoman 
Labour Party) founded in Istanbul in 1919. Its originality lies in the fact that blue- 
collar workers and small civil servants were observed as members, in addition to 
intellectuals. The Party was founded by a mechanical engineer H. Memduh and 
writer Avni Ali, as a counter-act to Hüseyin Hilmi and group; in that it reflected 
another symptom of intra-elite conflict in politics. Most significant in this context 
was the election of a blue-collar Party candidate, as MP from Istanbul in 1919. The 
Second Constitutionalist period ended as the Parliament in Istanbul was annulled on 
11 April 1920, following British occupation of the city on 16 March.
3.2.2. M iid a fa a -i H u k u k  Period
Miidafaa-i Hukuk Period, the second phase of political party formation in Turkey 
commenced on 30 October 1918, with the signing of an armistice between Turkey 
and the Allies. The consequential Allied and Greek occupation of the Turkish 
territory, prompted in turn, various resistance movements both in the Thrace and in
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Anatolia. Such endeavours emerged to organise as local or regional congresses; 
among which the congress held in Erzurum in September 1919 appeared to be of 
particular significance; in that it overtly declared the ultimate goal of defending the 
territorial integrity of the Turkish nation as described by Misak-i Milli (National 
Oathj.^^ In addition to signalling the initial phase of the emergence of Republican 
Turkey as a nation state, this period refers, at the same time, to the formative years of 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, which shall be studied in due course. The present section 
of this study is limited with the socialist parties of the time.
The first in an array of socialist endeavours in the Defence of Rights Period was 
Amele Fırkası'. AF (Workers Party  ^ founded in Istanbul in 1920, which was also an 
elite drive. Amele Fırkası remained an unfinished business and has not been able to 
institutionalise. A similar attempt was Müstakil Sosyalist Fırkası. MSF (Independent 
Socialist Party^ ), a splinter party founded by some of the previous members of the 
former TSF. Not much is known about the MSF, but that it was founded by a 
handful of tram workers in Istanbul in 1922.
More significant within the scope of this study are two different Marxist endeavours, 
the first of which was Türkiye Komünist Partisi: TKP (Turkish Communist Party  ^
founded by a group of MPs in the Ankara Parliament, in May 1920. The group 
comprised of figures such as Tevfik Rüşdü (Aras), Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), Mahmut 
Celal (Bayar), Yunus Nadi (Abalyoğlu), Refik Koraltan and Eyüp Sahri, who 
actually acted on directives given by M. Kemal. The Party did not establish any 
relations with the Third International, and remained loyal to the Parliament and to
Misak-i Milli is a decision o f tlie Istanbul Parliament taken in 28 January 1920, before the British 
occupation of the city in 16 March 1920. The decision describes tlie national boundaries of the 
Turkish territory.
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the Revolution; in that it has been accepted as consequential within the policies 
pursued by Kemalists in the framework of the intimate relations with Leninist 
Russia.
A contextual approach would be better equipped to help clarification of the thrust 
behind the legal TKP attempt. Percussion of two factors, literally foreign relations 
and domestic politics emerged as the fulcrum of policies pursued within this context. 
As far as foreign relations were concerned, the Government in Ankara had to be 
considerate of both the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and of the termination of the 
First World War in Allied victory. The Kemalists seemed to be mindful of the fact 
that the Allied powers, and particularly Britain who controlled much of the Eastern 
Mediterranean, intended to isolate the new regime in Russia strategically through the 
Caucasia, and this way to circumvent Leninism , which they perceived as a political 
challenge. The Allied strategy covered, at the same time, blocking through the 
Caucasian countries, of all links between Russia and the Revolutionaries in Anatolia, 
for the entire surrounding and ultimate division of the latter. At that point, the locus 
of Kemalist tactic lay in the utilisation of the antagonism between Russia and the 
Western powers to serve revolutionary purposes, which had to be done, according to 
the cadre in Ankara, while keeping Leninist Russia at an arm’s length/'^
That diplomatic relations were initiated with Moscow in May 1920 immediately 
after the First National Assembly, stemmed from a historical necessity, which
For a tactical evaluation of the strategic conjuncture of that time, see tlie cryptogram sent by 
’ M.Kemal to tlie “ 15* Army Headquarters on 6 May 1920, titled: "Genel Siyasi Dunun ve 
Bolşeviklerle İttifak için Aradaki Ennenistan Engelinin Kaldınimasına dair Vekiller Heyeti 
Müzakeresi [Negotiations of the Cabinet on the General Political Conjuncture and Removal of the 
Armenian Barrier for the Alliance witli the Bolsheviks]”. In Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve 
Beyannameleri IV: 1917-1938 [Notifications, Telegramms and Declarations of Atatürk III: 1917- 
1938. 2'“* ed. (Ankıua: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1964), 318-319. See also: “Parliamentary 
Closed Session Minutes dated: 24.4.1920”, in: Sadi Borak, ed.. Gizli Oturumlarda Atatürk'ün 
Konulmaları [Speeches of Atatürk in Closed Sessions]. (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1977), 16-17.
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continued with the official recognition by the Soviets of the Government in Ankara 
in June, and protracted as the Bolshevik Government did not recognise the Treaty of 
Sèvres signed in August. Accordingly, the Turkish army launched an offensive in the 
Eastern Front in September, and the Armenian question was solved by December 
1920. At the same time, the Georgians were discouraged of their territorial demands 
on Eastern Black-Sea, which implied that the major offensive against the Greeks in 
the western Front could finally begin. Most significant in this context were the 
financial and logistic support received from the Soviets in summer 1920, and the 
Non-Aggression Agreement signed between the parties in March 1921.^  ^ All in all, 
relations between the Bolsheviks and Kemalists remained a tactical alliance during 
the Independence war, and domestic politics towards Marxism appeared as 
consequential within this conjuncture. V.I. Lenin''s own evaluation of the movement 
in Anatolia was such that:
“Mustafa Kemal is by no means a socialist; he is, nevertheless, a 
competent organiser.. A talented leader that conducts a national 
bourgeoisie revolution...An intelligent and a revolutionary statesman 
that can evaluate the very pith of our socialist revolution, hence can act 
positively towards us. He is fighting a battle against the occupants. I 
personally believe that he will be able to defeat the imperialists and will 
overthrow the sultan and his collaborates., we must help him.” *^"
As has been noted elsewhere, nationalism, Islamism and Marxism emerged as 
influential from among the already circulating ideas during the Independence War^’. 
Attitude of the Ankara Government towards such currents appeared Machiavellian in
For a detailed list of the Soviet aid, see: Fahir Amıaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914-1990 [The 
Twentietli Century Political History, 1914-1990]. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınhm, 1993), 
' 307-317.
Reported in: S.I. Aralov, Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Hatıraları [Memoirs of a Soviet 
Diplomat in Turkey], trims. Hasan Ali Ediz, (İstanbul: Yenigün Basın-Yayıncılık AŞ., 1997), 46- 
47.
Timur, Türk Devrimi, 32.
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essence, which required basically, the maintenance of an elusive balance between 
antagonistic groups. In this context, a handful of bureaucrats, literally the 
Revolutionary cadre, had to rely on a weird alliance of conflicting interests, and had 
no chance but to mobilise the support of particularly land owners and Islamists, for 
their ultimate goal of creating a democratic nation-state based on Western values. 
While the Turkish Revolution reflected a democratic bourgeoisie character in 
essence, diplomatic and logistic support from the Soviets remained an imperative, on 
the other hand. Complying with his Western based bourgeois endeavour, therefore, 
M. Kemal intended to take under control all Marxist movements by enhancing the 
foundation of a legal Communist Party lead by his close friends in the Parliament. 
We read from his cryptogram XoAli Fuat Paşa, Commander in Chief of the Western 
Front on 31 October 1920 that:
“It is understood that net converging opinion on the applicability of 
communism has not been established yet in Russia, leave alone our 
country.. The very fact, however, that this current has been penetrating 
into the country from either domestic or external origins, and each with 
various aims, and that it has been perceived not impossible for the peace 
and union that is much needed by our nation, to be disturbed, unless 
rational measures are taken. Establishment of a Turkish Communist 
Party from among our reasonable colleagues, and within the surveillance 
of the Government, therefore, appeared to me as the most rational and 
natural measure in this context. This way it may be possible to merge all
such factions into one.....I decided that our distinguished Generals
Fevzi, Ali Fuat and Kazım, as well as Mr. Refet and Mr. İsmet to join 
secretly. This way, our friends, the heroes of our national goal and the 
backbone of the country, are going to be present in this organisation, 
with a view to have an effect upon its activities....”
Insofar as Marxist currents in Turkey in the Miidafaa-i Hukiik Period are concerned, 
the almost narrated movement of Green Army (Yeşil Ordu) may also deserve some
See the Cryptogram on: "Komünizmin En Büj'ük Kumandanlann Elinde Kalmasına Dair Şifre 
[Control of Communism by the Top Commanders of tlie Army]", dated 31.10.1920. In Türk Tarih 
Kurumu, Tamim, Telgraf, 360-361.
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elaboration within the context. While the Green Army remains a much speculated 
subject, it is generally held that the phenomenon of Green Army is attributed to the 
militant group lead by Çerkeş Ethem and his brother. Çerkeş Ethem was an 
ex-soldier, who initially appeared as a resistance leader in the Salihli region, 
following the occupation of İzmir by the Greeks on 15 May 1919. He became 
remarkable as he restored domestic revolts in Biga (lead by Anzaviir), Düzce, Yozgat 
and Zile, from February to May 1920; and was accordingly employed in the Western 
Front of the National Army by August 1920, almost as a national hero. On the other 
hand, illegal activities of the Green Army were already under way, as of May the 
same year. Former İttihat ve Terakki member and Denizli MP Hakkı Behiç stood as 
the secretary general for this secret organisation According to the statement received 
by the Independence Court in Ankara (Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi) from Tokat MP 
Nazim, the central administration comprised of 14 MPs, of which 3 held ministerial 
positions within the government by then.
Ethem was recorded to have arrived in Ankara, and to have established relations with 
Hakkı Behiç, the Marxist member of the Parliament, in 1920. The allegation by 
Hakkı Behiç that “the conventional army remained conservative and incompetent ” 
and that “only the organised forces of Ethem could serve socialist interests as the 
militant arm of the movement in Anatolia’”"^  appears as significant within the 
context of Ethem’s relations with the Marxist movement. The Government in 
Ankara nevertheless, seemed to be informed of the Green Army’s activities. While 
from the beginning the official attitude of the political elite, and of particularly İsmet
Suna Kili, Atatürk Devrimi, Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli [The Atatürkian Revolution, A Model for 
Modernisation]. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1981), 81.
Kenan Esengin, Milli Mücadelede İç Ayaklanmalar [Domestic Revolts in tlıe National Liberation 
War). (İstanbul: Ağrı Yayınlan, 1975), 231.
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Paşa, remained prudential towards Ethem and brothers, the troubled alliance 
between the two parties deteriorated in time, due largely to the increasing fame and 
influence of Ethem within the militant resistance groups {Kttvva-i Seyyare). Ethem's 
growing charisma speedily gravitated towards a political challenge to Ankara with a 
view to questioning the legitimacy of the government. Locus of opposition from 
Ethem and Tevfik brothers lay in the controversy over the establishment of an orderly 
army {Nizami Ordu) by İsmet Paşa, where the former insisted upon the superiority 
of Kiivva-i Seyyare, and upon their own leadership in the Independence War.
Kuvva-i Seyyare was to constitute the militant arm of the Green Army. Prof. Suna 
Kili reported that the Green Army had issued a “32 Article Regulation”, and 
endeavoured to be active by disseminating its views through ‘‘Seyyare-i Yeni Düzen 
(Star o f the New World) ” published in Eskişehir. Among the basic tenets of its 
doctrine was the convergence of Marxism and Islamism, with a view to enhance 
Islamic brotherhood under Marxist principles; and to merge ''the Red Flag of 
communism with the Green Flag of Islam”. Bearing in mind the conservative 
structure of the Turkish society, the Green Army declared that it remained respectfiil 
to family life, and intended to attribute a religious outlook to Marxism. The 
movement established relations with Moscow and with the Red Army in Russia, and 
seemed to acquire a pro-Soviet position.'*^
For further details see: Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk II: 1920-1927 [Speech II: 1920-1927], ed. Türk 
Devrim Tarilü Enstitüsü [Turkish Institute for History of the Revolution]. (Istanbul: Maarif 
Basımevi, I960), 467-471.
Kili, Atatürk Devrimi, 82-83. For further details on tlie relations of the Bolsheviks with Ethem, see: 
“Closed Session Minutes dated 29.12.1920. In Sadi Borak, ed.. Gizli Oturumlarda Atatürk’ün 
Konuşmaları [Speeches of Atatürk in Closed Sessions]. (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1977), 197- 
198.
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The illegal Communist Party founded outside the Parliament, shortly after the 
official TKP, in June the same year, thus had entered into organic relations with the 
Ethem group. By December 1920, it was legalised under the title of Türkiye Halk 
iştirakiyim Fırkası. THİF (Turkish Peoples’ Participatory Partyj, to which some 
some MPs also joined. The Party adopted a Leninist stand, and aimed at receiving 
the support of particularly the peasants. It was shut down in 1921.'*^  Ethem and 
brothers ultimately joined the Greek troops in Western Anatolia in 1922, and the 
Marxist movement was subdued.
The main drive behind the outgrowth of the political polarisations at the wake of the 
nation-state has been the Revolutionary-Reactionary divide in the turbulent years of 
the Miidafaa-i Hukuk Period!^^ Rather than a left-right continuum as observed in the 
parliaments of the Western polities, therefore, the First National Assembly reflected 
bitter struggles between traditionalists (as represented by the Second Group) and the 
Kemalists. Accordingly, hardly any mass mobilisation occurred in the formative 
years of political parties in Turkey. Political party tradition, hence, was born as an 
elite attempt, which was to play a key role in the structuring of the party system in 
Turkey. An array of various socialist endeavours was no exception to that, either. 
While a number of political parties under labels such as socialist or social democratic 
were founded from 1908 onward, it becomes clear that they practically held no mass 
base.
Yerasimos, Azgelişmişlik Sürecinde, 887.
For a more detailed analysis o f the Green Army, see; ibid., 885-887.
Tank Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye 'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952 [Political Parties in Turkey 1859-1952]. 
(Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınlan, 1952), 452. (The period between 1918-1923, in which The 
Turkish Republic emerged as a nation state as successor to tlie Ottoman Empire).
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A crystal clear feature of social democratic politics in contemporary Turkey is 
factionalism. As Ciimhuriyet Halk Partisi :CHP (Republican Peoples’ Party) and its 
splinters are accredited as the agents of social democratic mission in the Third 
Turkish Republic, a thorough study of this party becomes an imperative, in order to 
go to all lengths within the context.
CHP originated from ’''Miidafaa-i Hiikuk Cemiyeti: MHC" (Anatolian and 
Roumelian Society for Defence of Rights) founded in the Congress held in Sivas in 
September 1919. The announcement of MHC in Sivas was, in fact, a “Merger Act” 
of various local-regional Miidafaa-i Hiikuk: MH (Defence of Rights) organisations 
that had flourished in the Empire, in the form of resistance movements against Allied 
occupation, following the Armistice in October 1918.''  ^ The ultimate goal of 
defeating Allied occupation reconciled delegates to the Congress, who actually 
reflected conflicting interests and sharp divergences as regards social background 
and political affiliation. The social profile of the local and regional resistance 
movements, indeed, provide the very clue for the comprehension of the social base 
of the MHC; hence the future CHP.
3.3. С Н Р  in the First T urkish  R epublic
Local or regional resistance movements tliat had emerged before the Sivas Congress were merged 
into one under tlie title of “Anatolian ;md Roumelian Society for Defence of Rights”, which refers 
to Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti in Turkish. For a tlıorough study of all Üıe 
resistance movements see: Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 478-509. In tliis context, also see: Bülent 
Tanör, Türkiye 'de Yerel Kongre İktidarları: 1918-1920 [The Reign of Local Congresses in Turkey: 
1918-1920]. (İstimbul: Cumhuriyet Yayınları, 1997).
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The numerous MH movements organising both in the Thrace and in Anatolia, in 
essence, appeared to be propelled mostly by the eşrafa, the intelligentsia and the 
ulema, their proportional weight in each organisation varying according to region. 
These strata represented the middle classes; thence, the national bourgeoisie of the 
Ottoman-Turkish society at that time. In his comprehensive work titled Anadolu 
İhtilali (The Anatolian Revolution), on the Turkish national movement, Sabahattin 
Selek also pointed to the weighty positions of both the eşraf and the intelligentsia, 
within the MH congresses. As regards the former’s role in the national movement, 
however. Selek preferred to emphasise the common denominator of the 
heterogeneous eşraf as the preservation of property, instead necessarily of a 
patriotic attitude. As such, they either opted to collaborate with the occupants, or 
decided to fight; the driving motive, nevertheless, remaining similar in both cases. 
Consequential was the very fact that, those from the eşraf in urban centres, and ağas 
(semi-feudal land-lords) in the countryside, most of the times, provided logistic 
support to the revolutionaries, or even fought in the national resistance movement. It 
might be of value, to read from Selek, in this connection, that
“Mustafa Kemal, who had been thoroughly mindful of the weighty 
position of the ağa and the eşraf within the social structure, addressed 
these local notables immediately after the Erzurum Congress, and invited 
them to organise national movements in their respective regions, with a 
view to circumvent counter-revolutionary propagation.
The term “eşra f refers to the independent merchants, craftsmen and tlie landed gentry o f the region 
in question; they all together made up tlie notable figures in the town, as such tliey have been 
referred to as tlie “local notables”. Tliis stratum had been won for the national cause of tlie 
“Defence o f Rights Period”, and tlie alliance of these groups with tlie locomotive o f the 
Revolutionary movement, literally the civil-military bureaucratic cadres lasted till the multi-party 
period in the First Turkish Republic.
Tanor, Türkiye'de Yerel, 54.
Sabaliattin Selek, Anadolu İhtilali [The Anatolian Revolution]. (Istanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 
1968), 63-64.
”  ibid., 64.
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The First Grand National Assembly, accordingly, opened on 23 April 1920. Whilst 
the Grand Goal seemed to unite in principle this non-homogenous gathering, an 
apparent heterogeneity lingered on in the Assembly. Indeed, the locus of main 
controversies fell on the Republicanism question.^'
Factionalism in the First Parliament evolved in time to the coming into existence of 
two major political groupings, literally “the First” and “the Second” groups. The 
former was represented by the members of the MHC Group which remained secular, 
etatist and revolutionary; and which indeed constituted the basis of the CHP.^^ The 
declaration issued by the MHC administration on 8 April 1923 stated that the MHC 
would be re-organised as a political party. The 8 April Declaration, as such, 
constituted the first party program of the CHP.^  ^ The MHC group won the 1923 
elections, and the second period of the Grand National Assembly started. The MH 
Group in the Second Parliament discussed the program of the future “Halk Fırkası: 
HF” (Peoples’ Party) from 7 August onward, and FIF was officially founded with 
the adoption by the MH Group of the “Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi ” (HF Program) on 
11 September 1923.^ '*
Mustafa Kemal provided an account of various factions in tlie First Parliiunent, in his Speech. In 
Atatürk, Nutuk II, 594. They were as follows: -Tesanild Grubu (Solidarity Group: Conservatives) 
-İstiklal Grubu (Independence Group: Left oriented younger MPs), -Mtidafaa-i Hukuk Zümresi 
(Defence o f Rights Group), -Halk Zümresi (Population Group: Bolsheviks), -Islahat Grubu 
(Reformation Group: Former ittihat ve Terakki members and Ottoman reformists)
Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 534.
”  The Declaration of 9 Principles is tlie “Dokuz Umde Beyanname” in Turkish. For the original ftill 
text, see: Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 580-582.
The party was officially founded as “Halk Fırkası". With all its institutions, tlie MHC was 
incorporated into HF on 23 October 1923. On 10 November 1924, tlie Party changed its name to 
CHF (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası), and finally in tlie 1935 Congress it took the name of CHP 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). For more details, see: ibid., 559-560.
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The Revolutionary-Reactionary continuum that dominated the First Parliament 
between 1920-23 has provided, by and large, the CHP with the fundamentals of its 
Program. During the single-party period in the First Turkish Republic, the CHP 
founded 19 governments and held 8 congresses till 1946.^  ^ The 1927 Congress was 
also significant, in thatM  Kemal delivered his famous “Niituk” (Speech), which has 
been accepted, by and large, as a comprehensive documentary history of the CHP. 
In 1931 Congress a more comprehensive and a doctrinaire program for the party was 
adopted, which was further enlarged and translated into contemporary Turkish in the 
1935 Congress.
CHP governed for 27 years from the foundation of the Republic onward. During this 
period, the party ideology remained intact mostly around the establishment of a 
nation state from among the residuals of the Empire. CHP, in its capacity as the 
“State Party” of the young Republic, was perceived as the locomotive of the 
consolidation of the nation state. Among the main motives behind this endeavour 
were modernisation, secularisation and establishment of the notion of popular 
sovereignty. The six fundamentals of the Party Programme were inscribed in the 
Constitution. The party secretary held, at the same time, the office of the minister for 
interior affairs, while the local party elites acted as governors in their respective 
regions. As such, CHP’s organic relations with the state was institutionalised. 
Relatively independent from the masses at large, local party organisation remained a 
coalition between the eşraf and the state-party elite. CHP’s support in the Anatolian 
heartland, accordingly, came from the local notables to a large extent in the pre-1946 
period.^*’ The alliance of the “Miidafaa-i Hukuk” period, as sketched in the previous
Atatürk, Nutuk II, 495.
Ayşe Güneş Ayata, CHP (Örgüt ve ideoloji) [CHP: Organisaüon and Ideology). (Ankara:
Gündoğan Yayınlan, 1992), 74-75.
134
section, consequently remained unbroken till the emergence of the Demokrat 
Parti:DP (Democratic Party) as a splinter from the CHP in 1945.
Grounding for post-1945 social democracy in Turkey requires, by and large, the 
analysis of particularly two facts, of which the image of CHP as the state party shall 
be evaluated first. In this connection, refutation by the state party of the First Turkish 
Republic of class politics, and location of its strategy midst the formation of a nation 
state on solidaristic assumptions, protruded as the basic tenets of CHP rule in the 
pre-1945 period. The CHP elite seemed to reject class politics and relied mostly on 
the support of its founding father, the bureaucratic cadres that made the party’s core 
constituency in the pre-1945 period. The alliance of the state-party elite with the 
eşraf continued till the outburst of the DP movement. Genuine democracy, according 
to the CHP discourse, remained firmly anchored in the solidaristic cooperation of 
different professional groups; which at the same time, ought to act in harmony with
57the cooperation in wider society.
The state party manipulated, largely through organisational structure, the support of 
different social groups, as touched above. The introduction by CHP of the Land 
Reform Bill in 1945, however, signalled the end of the coalition between the local
C  O
notables and the bureaucratic cadres of the Turkish Revolution. The growing 
opposition from the landed gentry to the Land Reform, allied in time, with the 
discontented in the countryside immediately after 1945. Henceforth, the war-time 
alliance of conflicting interests was broken, giving birth to the DP movement in
Ibid., 69.
Land Reform Bill of 1945 aimed at tlie nationalisation and eventual distribution of land to tlie 
landless peasants. For more details see: -Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İkinci Adam (1938-1950) II. 
Cilt [The Second Man (1938-1950) 2nd vol.]. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1967), 128-131; and - 
Suat Aksoy, Tarim Hukuku. (Ankara: Ankara Basimevi, 1970), 45-55.
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1945. The fundamentals of Turkish politics from 1946 onward, accordingly, were 
written mostly around the cleavages that had been subdued for the national cause
during the national liberation movement.
CHP won 396 seats in 1946, the first multi-party regime elections; in which the 
newly founded DP acquired 62 seats. From then on to 1950, CHP rule seemed to be 
confined basically to démocratisation and relative liberalisation of the economy. 
Important for our purposes is the fact that, during this period, a recoil from 
identification with the state was observed within the party, in that partial power was 
granted to local CHP organisations and steps were taken towards organisational 
decentralisation in the party apparatus.C H P  finally lost government following 
1950 elections, and DP came to power winning 408 seats in the Parliament, with the 
former falling to 69 seats only.
Whereas hardly any ideological or strategic revision within the party could be 
observed during the initial years of multi-party politics, it was only after CHP’s 
descent to 31 seats in the 1954 elections that the party elite seemed to be propelled to 
initialise programmatic renewal within the party. A new party programme, on that 
account, was drafted shortly before the early elections in 1957, through which some 
basic principles such as the introduction of the right of strike for unionised workers, 
granting of organisational independence to universities and abolishing of anti­
democratic legislation were adopted.W hile DP support in 1957 came out to be 
relatively lower than that of the previous election, decreasing from 490 to 419 seats
Ayata, CHP Orgiit, 76. 
^  Ibid., 80.
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in the Parliament; CHP fortune seemed to reverse, and the latter increased its seats 
from 31 to 173 that year.
CHP’s programme was further revised in 1958. Including this time an extensive 
critique of DP economic policy, the 1958 programme recommended that economic 
development should be planned. Stressing the need for the establishment of social 
justice and enhancement of supremacy of law; this programme also proposed some 
constitutional changes such as the establishment of a bicameral parliament and 
adoption of proportional representation. CHP’s programmatic agenda of 1958, by 
and large, constituted the blue-prints of the constitutional change after the military 
intervention of 1960 and “by the fall of 1960 the government was virtually in the 
hands of the CHP once more, although there were military personnel in a number of 
important positions”.
3.4. The Second Turkish Republic: Transformation in the CHP
The military intervention of 1960 can be said to have received widespread support 
particularly among the civilian bureaucracy and among intellectuals; as the 
intervention came as a result of increasing dissent with the anh-Kemalisi policies and 
with the growing authoritarianism of the DP rule between 1957-60. Discontent 
particularly within the bureaucracy was evident, as their status, prestige and income 
had declined considerably during the DP governments; and who, at the same time, 
felt that their once strong ties with the political elites had loosened.That the DP
ibid: 81
for a more detailed analysis o f the tension between political elites with die bureaucracy in the DP 
period, see: Ozbudun, “State Elites".
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administration endeavoured to reduce the influence of the civil-military bureaucracy 
in the state apparatus with a view to consolidate the role of the rising 
entrepreneurial groups and peripheral land owners, impelled the opposition from 
etatist cadres who had been perceiving themselves as defenders of Kemalism since 
the foundation of the Republic, and who consequentially felt obliged to combat 
“counter-revolutionary attempts” in their own ways. As such, one of the implications 
of the intervention was the recruitment of strictly etatist CHP sympathisers to the 
government.
Drafted by the Constituent Assembly^ ,^ the 1961 Constitution reflected to a large 
extent the basic etatist values of pro-CHP bureaucracy. It provided for an “effective 
system of checks and balances to limit the power of elected assemblies”, in that 
firstly, a Constitutional Court entrusted with the task of supervising over the 
constitutionality of the legislation passed from the Parliament, was introduced' '^*. 
Second, was the creation of the “National Security Council: NSC” comprising of 
ministers and top commanders of the Staff, with a capacity to advise*^  ^ the 
government on national security policy. Third, and quite significant as regards the 
post-1960 factionalism in the CHP, was the creation of the “State Planning 
Organisation: SPO”, with a view to realise the indicative planning of development. 
The radical etatists in the CHP initially demanded the decisions of the SPO to be
The bicameral Constituent Assembly was composed of the “National Unity Committee; Milli Birlik 
Komitesi" o f the military on one hand, and “The House of Representatives” comprising of 
delegates from the CHP, tlie judiciary, universities, trade unions, chambers of commerce and 
industry and from farmers’ associations, on tlie otlier.
Ozbudun, "Perspectives on Democracy", 19.
The “advisory” status of tlie NSC was retained in tlie 1982 Constitution, and it played a crucial role 
in the Third Turkish Republic. The NSC seemed to Ciury out the duty of guarding the Kemalist 
principles effectively, by advising the RP government on 28 February 1997 to take the necessary 
measures against Islamic bigotry, which it perceived as a “bigger threat” to tlie Republic than tliat 
posed by the Kurdish separatist movement. The outcome was the fall of RP government, which has 
been referred to in tlie Turkish media as a “post-modern intervention”.
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autonomous from parliamentary control; to which the conservative wing in the CHP 
responded severely. In conclusion, înönü's charisma within the CHP intervened to 
resolve the issue finally in a compromise, and SPO’s status was placed under the 
authority of the government. That implied, by and large, a tension between the 
reformist/radical and the conservative wings in CHP.
In addition to the introduction of checks and balances as touched briefly above, the 
1961 Constitution also provided for some radical changes, in that social rights and 
civil liberties were expanded, and autonomy was granted to public agencies such as 
the “Turkish Radio and Television:TRT” and to universities. In that respect, the 
1960s have been the years through which leftism rose, both as an intra-party conflict 
within the CHP, and as extra-parliamentary endeavours within different circles. In 
this conjuncture the implications of Türkiye İşçi Partisi: TİP (Turkish Labour Party) 
to the transformation in CHP becomes significant
According to its first leader Mehmet Ali Aybar, the intrinsic quality of TİP was such 
that it was the only political party with a grass-root organisation, whose founders 
were not drawn specifically from the educated elite groups in Turkey, in contrast to 
those of the similar endeavours observed in the past.*"*" In this context, the former TİP 
leader told Uğur Mumcu that while political parties in Turkey had always been 
founded by the "bey takımı (state elites) ”, the TİP differed in essence, in that it was 
founded by eleven labour unionists and one driver, all with rural backgrounds. Aybar 
further explained in this context that the Mesai FirkasuMF founded by some 
workers in 1919 in İstanbul constituted no exception to the rule that Turkish political
66 Uğur Mumcu, Aybar ile Söyledi [Interview With Aybar]. (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1993), 25.
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parties were elite drives, as the MF had been propelled and guided by elites as a 
counter action to the socialist endeavours of the time.^’
The TİP was being perceived as a rising electoral challenge by the CHP elites. 
According to Siina Kili, the strategic appeal of that Party was increasingly recruiting 
support especially from the university students, who used to be among the traditional 
supporters of CHP. With that regard, CHP leader İnönü was becoming more 
sensitive on the strategy to be directed particularly at the new supporters of the TIP, 
as his speeches delivered shortly before the elections of 1965 indicated.^ **
TİP entered 1965 elections and gained 15 seats. For the first time in Turkey an 
overtly Marxist, yet a non-revolutionary party, was being represented in the 
Parliament. What exhibits relevance to the strategic shift in CHP lies in the 
contribution by TİP to legitimating the notion of “left” in the rather conservative 
Turkish society, to the extent that it has been active in the Parliament. In that respect, 
this Party seemed to influence the confrontation between the reformist and 
conservative wings in the CHP. However, as TIP has not been able to perform the 
transformation towards becoming a contemporary social democratic party at the 
expense of traditional Marxism, that role in Turkey, was to be played by the CHP. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the discursive challenge of TİP constituted an impetus for 
the metamorphosis of the State-Party into a social democratic party becomes clear, 
as shall be elaborated in more detail throughout the analysis in the following 
Chapter.
ibid., 32-33.
Suna Kili, 1960-1975 Döneminde Cumliuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler [Developments in CHP 
in tlıe Period between 1960-1975]. (Istanbul; Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1975), 211-219.
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The very fact that elections of 1961 produced no satisfactory results for CHP, and 
that the party could score 36.7% of the total votes cast, may throw light upon the 
thrust behind the strategic transformation of CHP in those years. CHP’s score in the 
previous election, however, had been around 40.8%. In its capacity as the majority 
party with a narrow margin in 1961, CHP founded three coalition governments, and 
did not participate in the right wing coalition cabinet headed by the Adalet Partisi: 
AP (Justice Party), heir to the outlawed DP. The time-span from 1961 to 1965 has 
been one during which the concept of “left of centre” was extensively discussed 
within CHP. Although attempts were initiated for the re-structuring of the economy, 
particularly via the steering role of the newly founded SPO, CHP did not seem to 
recover its pre-1945 popularity within the masses, and the 1965 elections resulted in 
a complete failure for the party. AP came to power with an overwhelming majority 
in 1965, receiving some 52% of the total votes cast, CHP remaining with 28.7% 
only. While this election defeat has been attributed by the conservative wing of the 
CHP to the newly emerging concept of “left of centre”; for the reformists, leftism 
was not only desirable for the Party, but it was at the same time the basic means for 
achieving economic growth and social justice in the country.
With this regard, the CHP leader İnönü had already announced shortly before 1965 
elections that his party’s location within the political spectrum was left of centre.*^ '^  
All in all, the election defeat of 1965 was attributed by conservative wing of the CHP 
to this newly emergent concept. For the young reformists, the left of centre 
movement was perceived as the means for the desired change in the party. 
Controversies on the implications of “left of centre”, with this regard, continued
69 Milliyet, (July 29, 1965).
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from 1965 to 1972, to culminate in the victory of the Ecevit faction within party 
administration. In this context, whilst for the right wing opposition outside the CHP 
left of centre referred to an equivocal announcement of the party’s shift towards 
communism; for the conservatives in CHP, a centre-left strategy would imply 
deviations from Kemalist principles, which they held as intolerable. The latter also 
insisted that the centralist-elitist structure of the party should be preserved.
In such a volatile conjuncture, the successive election defeat of CHP in 1969 
further impelled the intra-party unease, and conservative reaction proliferated in the 
interim. A splinter centre-right party {Güven Par/A/'-GT’:Confidence Party) had 
already been founded in 1967 by a former conservative member of the parliament 
from CHP, namely Prof. Turhan Feyzioğlu, who accused the centre-left movement 
as “excessively socialistic”.’ ' Later on by 1973, another splinter group from the CHP 
joined the GP, to form the Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi: CGP (Republican 
Confidence Party). In spite of all the discontent within CHP, İnönü’s support for 
Ecevit remained unbroken till the military ultimatum of 1971, which signalled, by 
and large, the termination of this uneasy collaboration.
Prime Minister, the AP leader Süleyman Demirel had resigned, and Nihat Erim, a 
conservative CHP member of the Parliament was entrusted the task of forming a 
technocratic cabinet above party interests. İnönü’s intention of support for the Erim 
government received a severe reaction from Ecevii, on the grounds that the 
legitimacy of a cabinet backed by the Army should be questioned. At that point, the 
party secretary general Ecevit strictly refrained from any identification with the
CHP scored 27.4% of the total votes cast, winning 31.8% of the seats in tlie Parliament in 1969. 
’’ Ozbudun, "Development of Democratic Govermnent", 57.
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military, who insisted that CHP’s image as such, should be avoided. For the 
secretary general, the implication of a renewed alliance between CHP and the Army 
as in 1960, would but be a disaster for the party, as the CHP’s shift towards left and 
refutation of some of the traditional Kemalist principles had already “alienated the 
military from the CHP in general and from Ecevit in particular.”
Ecevit’s final break with İnönü came when the former resigned from his post in the 
party, with a view to seek support from local party organisations, instead of the 
central administration. Backed by the party base in local provinces, Ecevit returned 
to the party congress of May 1972 with a substantial support that enabled him to be 
elected the party leader, which led in turn, İnönü to resign. From the 1972 Congress 
onward, CHP ideology was clearly announced as democratic left, and the party was 
gradually geared to the charisma of its new leader Bülent Ecevit.
1973 legislative elections following the interim period of 1971-73 came out to be 
relatively successful for the renewed CHP, and it appeared for the first time since 
1961 as the largest party in the parliament. Before the elections, CHP and AP had 
collaborated in the Parliament for electing a retired general, namely Fahri Konitiirk 
as president. The interim period, thus, had come to an end, and the normalisation of 
Turkish democracy was once more underway. In October that year, CHP polled % 
33.3 of the votes cast, with AP falling to % 29.8. According to the electoral 
behaviour patterns in 1973, the new CHP appealed particularly to the urban lower 
classes.W ithout any governmental majority however, CHP had no chance but to 
form a coalition cabinet in January 1974, with the Islamic fundamentalists, the then
Ayata, CHP Örgüt, 85.
Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government" 21.
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Milli Selamet PartisUMSP (National Salvation Party) that held only 48 seats in the 
Parliament.
The CHP-MSP government continued almost as a troubled alliance till the autumn 
of 1974 until its substitution by a right wing coalition headed by S. Demirel (The 
first so-called Milliyetçi Cephe: Nationalist Front). Despite all the uneasiness and its 
relatively short life, however, the coalition government played an important role in 
Turkish politics. Most notable as regards its performance was firstly the lifting of the 
ban on cultivation of opium poppy, that had been imposed by the US on the former 
Erim cabinet. Second was pardoning of those who had been sentenced during the 
interregnum of 1971-73. Third was the historic decision of launching a military 
operation on Cyprus in July 1974, that further contributed to Ecevit's popularity
within the masses. 74
The CHP leader resigned in September 1974, as tension with his coalition partner 
turned nearly a crisis. Backing widespread popularity especially due to the Cyprus 
issue, he had also hoped to call for an early election. Instead, Turkish politics entered 
a phase of political impasse, as Ecevit was left alone being not able to find any 
coalition partner to form a cabinet that would go for elections. Some seven months
Turkish intervention was initiated as a result of a series of attempts by the Greek Cypriots at 
ENOSIS, literally the annexation of the Island to Greece. Terroristic activities o f the Greek 
Cypriots reached peak when a coup d'état, driven by the Colonels’ Regime in Athens and in 
collaboration with tlie terrorist organisation EOKA-B, against tlie sut generis Federal Republic in 
Cyprus was ciirried out; with the ultimate goal of ENOSIS. Acting in the exercise of her rights and 
obligations under tlie Fourth Article of tlie Treaty of Guarantee of 16.8.1960, signed between the 
United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey; the Ecevit government intervened in tlie Island on 20 July. 
As talks between tlic tliree guaranteeing states produced no solutions, a second military operation 
was initiated on 14 August; this time controlling the territory that constitutes tlie Turkish Republic 
o f Nortliern Cyprus today. That signalled, by and large, die end of the bi-zonal Federal Structure of 
tlie Island based on tlie equal political stotus of the two communities, as had been provided by the 
London and Zurich Agreements of 1960. Since tlien, stalemate in talks have been continuing; tmd a 
new phase in Turkey’s policy on Cjprus is beginning, as triggered by the Greek Cypriot side’s 
accession negotiations to Üte EU in 1997. After 24 years, Ecevit, in his capacity as deputy prime 
minister, is once more in tlie government which is to tackle the problem.
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had to be awaited before the governmental crisis was solved with the foundation of a 
right-wing alliance with Demirel, the AP leader, as prime minister.
Although CHP increased its votes to % 41.4 in the 1977 elections and became the 
first party in the Parliament, it was still in short of a clear majority. The minority 
cabinet founded by EcevH in the aftermath of the elections has not been able to 
receive vote of confidence from the Parliament, and the CHP leader resigned in turn. 
The governmental vacuum was once more filled by a right-wing alliance, literally 
the “Second Nationalist Front”, albeit lasting for five months only. In January 1978, 
Ecevit's notorious “The Elevens Cabinet” was formed, by transferring eleven 
members of the Parliament from AP to CHP; to each of which a ministerial office 
was granted. The “Elevens Government” lasted till October 1979, and faced grave 
problems both socially and economically. While on the one hand political terrorism 
was exacerbated due to the provocative militantism of the radical groups; on the 
other hand, economic bottleneck stemming from the oil crisis, was tightening.
3.5. The Third Turkish Republic: Personalised Factionalism
The fortune of social democracy in the post-1980 Turkey has often been identified 
with that of its prominent leader, Ecevit. Having articulated a social democratic 
discourse for his party in the 1970s, the leader’s charisma had thoroughly helped to 
amalgamate the numerous factions inherent within the CHP. In the aftermath of the 
12 September intervention, however, beans were spilled within the party elites:
”  The structural constraints tliat Uie Ecevit cabinets in the 1970s have faced, shall be evaluated in the 
section on the analysis o f strategy in the following Chapter.
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Personal rivalries and conflicts erupted as Ecevit resigned from CHP leadership on 
30 October 1980, and continued at full steam during the interregnum of 1980-83.
According to Engin Unsal, a former member of parliament from CHP, Ecevit had 
already decided, by December that year, to found a new party comprising of young 
and competent people, with a grass-root organisation. In this context, it has been 
provided in Unsars memoirs that: ""Ecevit thought that his close party aides had 
alienated him from the Party’s base, and from the society at large, and believed that 
while he had been busy with governmental affairs, those people around him formed 
cliques, that in turn, constituted enclosure around himself” *^’ Ironically enough, 
Umal also gave an account of his personal contacts, the very next day, with Deniz 
Baykal, where the latter was reported to have said: “ Ecevit is definitely to be re­
elected CHP leader, provided that he is not banned from political life. However, that 
would be a disaster both for the CHP and for the country.”’^
Henceforth, the cat was let out of the bag, for social democrats, in the aftermath of 
the intervention: As the national Security Council (NSC) annulled all political parties 
on 16 October 1981, personalised factionalism burst out within the former CHP 
cadres. The following two years came out to be almost chaotic for the party elites; 
as nobody seemed sure about the future leadership, or even about the future of the 
party itself: all members of the 1977 Parliament were banned from political life. 
When the NSC had given the initial signals for the forthcoming elections^**, Ecevit
Engin Ünsal, Ecevit'ten Ecevit'e (1977-1987 Yıllan Arasında Sosyal Demokratların Çöldlpmü 
Belgeleyen Anılar) [from Ecevit to Ecevit (Memoirs Documenting tlıe Descent of Social 
Democrats between tlie Years 1977-1987)]. (Istanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1994), 47.
”  ibid., 48.
The legal arrangements for transition to multi-party politics were initiated with tlie introduction of a 
new Law amending Law No: 298 (Law No. 2812 of 5.4.1983; OJ No: 18011, 7.4.1983). Following 
tliis, a new Law on Political Parties was enacted (Law No. 2820 of 22.4.1983; OJ No: 18027, 
24.4.1983). Finally, the NSC lifted tlie ban on political activities, with the Decision No. 76 of 
24.4.1983 (OJNo: 18027, 24.4.. 1983).
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had told Ünsal in May 1983 that he would not found a party justified by five 
generals, and that nobody should expect from him to ask for permission from those 
who had closed down his party and who had insulted him severely/^ On 20 May 
1983, Halkçı Parti: HP (Populist Party) was founded by the former undersecretary 
of the Prime Ministry, namely Necdet Calp, and was authorised by the NSC to enter
the elections. 80
An other party on the left of the political spectrum was the Sosyal Demokrasi 
Partisi: SODEP (Social Democratic Party) founded by Erdal İnönü and 20 friends. 
This party, however, was not able to participate in the November 1983 elections, as 
its founding members were vetoed by the NSC, according to the provisional fourth 
Article of the Law No. 2820. A different figure, Cezmi Kartay was elected SODEP 
leader in June that year. Although different candidates for founding membership 
were shown by the Party administration; they were insistently vetoed by the NSC; 
hence, the newly established social democratic party was practically not able to fulfil 
the requirement of having minimum 30 founders for entry into the elections.*' 
Having polled 30.46 % of the total votes, Calp’s HP acquired 117 seats and became 
the second largest party in the Parliament, after Turgut ÖzaTs Anavatan Partisi: 
ANAP (Motherland Party).
As Ersin Kalaycıoğlu has drawn attention, the new members of the Parliament in 
1983 were “recruited from among the politically ambitious lower echelons of power
Ünsal, Ecevit, 54.
According to tlie provisional article of the Law No. 2820 (Article 4), the NSC enjoyed a veto right 
on founders of political parties. Besides, tlie Decision No. 76 of tlie NSC had provided tliat 
members of the annulled political parties were not allowed to defend tliemselves or tlieir former 
parties (Article 2a); nor tlie newly established parties could eitlier praise, defend or allege against 
tlie annulled parties (2b).
Decision No. 99 of 26.7.1983 had stated tliat parties witli less than tliirty founding members, as of 
24.8.1983, were not going to be allowed to enter tlie November 1983 elections.
ANAP, the winner of the 1983 elections had won 45.15 %, acquiring 211 seats. (DIE Figures)
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in the former political parties”, and that “they had no major role in national or 
parliamentary politics prior to their election to the Parliament”.*^  On that account, 
voters in 1983 had to “choose among parties and leaders who were new to Turkish 
politics.”*'' Hence, the party system in the 1980s revealed quite dissimilar patterns 
than those observed in the past decades. Bülent Tanör’s comments on that phase of 
politics in Turkey have been such that, the newly founded parties were “like trees 
without roots”, whence the electorate had difficulty in identifying their own parties.*^
In the aftermath of November 1983 elections, while the former AP supporters 
tended towards DYP; post-1983 centre-left was observed to be uniting around SHP, 
to which Erdal İnönü was elected leader. Insofar as the formative phase of political 
cleavages after 1983, the 25 March 1984 local elections have been decisive; in that 
the essential patterns of opposition to the ANAP government were becoming to 
crystallise. While ANAP seemed to preserve its support among the electorate with 
45 %; the vetoed SODEP of 1983 ironically became the second largest party (22 %), 
with HP and MDP falling to 8 % and 6.5 %, respectively. The HP leader Necdet 
Calp had to resign in April 1984. In Tanöfs view, these developments signalled “a 
normalisation process” within Turkish politics; as November 1983 elections had 
been based on a rather unnatural party formation.*^ Thus, the assertion that there had 
not been much fragmentation on the Turkish left, and that the HP had replaced CHP
Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “The Turkish Grand National Assembly: A Brief Inquiry into tlie Politics of 
Representation in Turkey”. In Turkey: Political, Social and economic Challenges in the 1990s, 
eds., Çiğdem Balım and et al., 42-60. (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J.Brill, 1995), 55.
Üstün Ergüder "Post-1980 Parlies and Politics in Turkey". In Perspectives on Democracy in 
Turkey, ed. Ergun Özbudun, 113-146. Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 126. 
Tanör,  ^Bülent, "Siyasal Tarih, 1980-1995" [Political History, 1980-1995]". In Boratav, Korkut, and 
Akşin, Sina. Bugünkü Türkiye ¡980-1995, Türkiye Tarihi 5 [Turkey Today 1980-1995, Turkish 
History 5]. 2'“* ed. ed. Sina Akşin, 23-158. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997), 62.
Ibid., 63.
148
as a social democratic force in 1983*’, does not seem to suffice for complementing 
the picture of post-1983 centre-left. Though HP received support from sources 
highly similar to those of the former CHP in 1983, hence appeared to be the 
successor to pre-1980 social democracy,** the centre-left in Turkey came into view 
as badly split in the following years.
Indeed, cases of both the left and the right in post-1983 Turkey revealed bitter 
fractures and persistent intra-elite conflicts, complying with the fact that a 
prominent feature of electoral behaviour in Turkey in the late 1980s and 1990s has 
been volatility*^. As for the left. Aydın Güven Gürkan, a fresh name within social 
democracy, was elected HP leader in the party congress of 30 June 1 9 8 5 .Gürkan's 
leadership has given the impetus for reinforcing the social democratic block that 
revealed a rather weird dilemma in those years: HP, with its capacity of 117 
representations in the Parliament had fallen to an electoral support of 8 % only; 
while the extra-parliamentary party of the centre-left, SODEP was appearing to be 
the second largest party with an overall support of 22 %, as of 1984. Owing largely 
to the reconciliatory attitudes of leaders of the two parties; factionalism was 
temporarily overcome, and SODEP merged with HP under the title of Sosyal 
Demokrat Halkçı Parti.SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) on 4 November 
1985. Some ten days later. Demokratik Sol PartiiDSP (Democratic Left Party) was
Ergiider, "Post-1980 Parties", 116. 
ibid., 128.
Üstün Ergüder, “The Turkish Party System imd tlie Future of Turkish Democracy”. In Turkey: 
Political, Social and economic Challenges in the 1990s, eds., Çiğdem Balım and et al., 61-73. 
(Leiden/Nevv York/Köln: E.J.Brill, 1995), 70.
Tanör, "Siyasal Tarih", 63.
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founded by Rahşan Ecevit^^ Erdal İnönü was elected SHP leader in the party
congress of 1 June 1986 92
Although İnönü protruded as a compromising and a dignified politician, even these 
qualifications proved incompetent to unite the social democrats into one political 
party. Thereupon, the centre-left continued to remain badly divided ever since then. 
While at first sight these fractures appeared to be confined to the division of social 
democracy between two parties, indeed both parties were inherently occupied with 
various cliques. On the other hand, though DSP looked more of an organisationally 
disciplined party, it must be noted that this was rather due to the charisma, thence to 
the personal hegemony of its leader on the party elites. From its foundation onward, 
DSP has been continuing almost as a “one man show”, within which nearly all intra­
party oppositions have been suppressed so far. In the general elections of November 
1987, DSP has been able to poll 8.53 % of the votes only, while SHP scored as the 
second largest party winning 24.74 %, following ÖzaVs ANAP. As for SHP, 
enduring intra-elite conflicts and allegations on corruption in municipal 
administrations have undermined to a large extent the party’s popularity within the 
masses, which was further exacerbated on participation in the coalition governments 
between 1991 and 1995, as shall be elaborated in due course.
SHP came to power as junior partner to the coalition formed following the 1991 
general elections. Within the coalition cabinets formed between 1991 and 1995, the 
SHP (and later on CHP), were granted ministerial positions apart from those
Bülent Ecevit was not allowed to participate in active politics at that time.
Tanor, "Siyasal Tarih", 65.
ANAP was also in an electoral decline; it polled 36.31 %, when compared to 45 % in 1983. (DIE 
Figures)
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responsible from the management of the economy; in that they officiated in 
Ministries such as of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Industry and Trade, Tourism, Culture, 
and Labour and Social Security. Despite having been excluded from key roles within 
the economic apparatus, the social democrats, in their capacity as the coalition 
partner, had to carry all the weighty accountability of the coalition from 1991 to 
1995; as the period in question was dominated by chronic high inflation and 
instability. Whilst some considerable progress had been made in Turkey towards the 
establishment of the fundamentals of markets operating within the framework of an 
outward oriented economy; inflationary trend and investment difficulties in the 
industrial sector, by and large, tended to continue. With coming to power of the 
coalition in 1991, almost no significant progress has been recorded with regard to 
these prominent problems; on the contrary, Turkish economy gravitated towards a 
crisis situation by the end of 1993.
Public deficits, from 1991 onward, increased continuously to undermine seriously 
the macro-economic balance in Turkey. As such, the expansionary trend observed in 
the fiscal policy caused an instable growth structure relying on domestic demand, 
with chronic price increases.Increasing fiscal deficit prompted a severe 
deterioration in foreign balance, in particular from the second half of 1993 onward. 
As liquidity became uncontrollable, a serious crisis erupted in money, capital and 
exchange markets, by the beginning of 1994. Highest inflation rate of the entire 
Republican Period was recorded,^^ with sizeable investment cuts that year. Although
The PSBR/GNP ratio rose to 12:1%, foreign trade deficit to 14.2 billion US Dollars, and current 
account deficit to 6.4 billion US Dollars in 1993. 1995 Yih Programı [1995 Annual Program]. 
(Ankara: DPT, 1996), 2.
DPT, Ekonomik ve Sosyal Göstergeler (1950-1995) [Economic and Social Indicators (1950-1995)]. 
(Ankara: DPT, 1996), 20.
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an “Economic Measures Implementation Plan” was put into effect on 5 April 1994, 
with a view to stabilising the economy rapidly, mainly by reducing public deficits; 
no significant progress could be achieved either in terms of macro-economic 
balances or of the declining popularity of the government.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The study on the socialist currents in the pre-Republican Period and on CHP so far, 
has highlighted the fact that the emergence of social democracy in Turkey has 
followed a different pattern than those observed in the Western settings. Rather, 
social democracy was to ground on the legacy of the state-party that emerged out of 
the National Liberation Movement. Although an array of elite attempts at socialist 
politics came into existence before the Republican Period, it becomes clear that they 
practically held no mass base.
Social democracy in Turkey emerged in the Second Republic and was structured on 
the transformation of CHP towards the left of centre. Efforts were put forth in this 
period for the consolidation of the CHP’s identity as a social democratic party, 
largely through the confrontation of the conservative and reformist wings within the 
Party. CHP came into government during this period either through coalitions or 
minority cabinets. Yet, the particular political and economic conjuncture prevailing 
in the country in the 1970s largely undermined the social democratic governments’ 
performance. In the aftermath of the interregnum of 1980-1983, social democrats 
were divided as two different parties. The experience in government as coalition 
partners to the right-wing governments during the Third Republic also appeared to 
be impeded by structural constraints. The particular external and internal factors that
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influenced the fortune of social democracy in Turkey shall be an integral part of the 
analysis in this Chapter.
4.1. Ideology
The very fact that CHP discourse emanated from the “national cause” of the 
Mudafaa-i Hukiik years, instead of being grounded on theoretical justifications, 
needs to be reiterated in this context. With that respect, it may also be possible to 
highlight the rationale behind the “cross-class appeal” of the Turkish Revolution, in 
that it was not “directed against a particular social class, but against foreign enemies 
and their Turkish collaborators”.^  Ks Maurice Duverger had stated in his analysis of 
political parties, generally, praxis preceded theory in single party systems. At times, 
indeed, hardly any theory seemed to either justify or even to complement the actual 
being of the single-party, as the pre-1946 Turkish politics indicated. That in fascist 
Italy and in national socialist Germany theoretical justifications had been articulated 
for the de-facto hegemony of their respective single-parties constituted the two rare 
exceptions within this phenomenon.^
The "Declaration o f 9 Principles (8 April 1923)" emerged as the first political 
program of the CHP, in that the fundamentals of party ideology such as 
republicanism and secularism came forth. Republicanism, as the major impulse 
behind the Kemalist endeavour, has been inscribed in the first principle of the 
Declaration, as "Sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation". Equally 
important on commitment to republicanism was the proposition in the second
' Ergun Özbudun, “The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime”. In Ergun Özbudun Ali Kazimcigil, 
eds, London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981), 83.
■ Maurice Duverger, Siyasi Partiler [Political Parties], trans. Ergun özbudun. 4* ed. (Ankara: Bilgi 
Yayınevi, 1993), 336.
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principle that the Decision of the First Parliament on the abolition of the Monarchy 
dated 1.11.1922 was an inalterable norm. The second principle in the Declaration 
suggested the intention of Kemalist cadres to ultimately establish secularism in the 
new regime, as it stated strategically that the “the Caliphate is empowered by the 
Grand National Assembly” .^
For economic and social policy, the 8 April Declaration put forward clearly a 
commitment to the fundamentals, thus to the liberal spirit of the “First Economic 
Congress of 1923” held in İzmir, and in the final analysis, revealed an unveiled 
tendency towards a mixed economy,.'* The CFIP elites signalled during the peace 
negotiations in Lanseme their intention to bring Turkey closer to the political and 
economic system of the Western World. That the Izmir Congress took place during 
the interruption of negotiations in Laiisenne, was by no means a coincidence, as 
stated elsewhere.^ In this connection, the ninth principle in the 8 April document 
stipulated that, for the rapid re-construction of the war-stricken country, private 
enterprise would be promoted, in addition to measures to be taken by the state. 
Enhancing domestic security, improvement of justice affairs, and augmentation of 
the rights and of the welfare of both the civil and military bureaucrats were also 
among the essentials of the 8 April Act.
 ^ Caliphate was abolished by the decision of the SGNA on 3 March 1924.Ottoman sultans have been 
generally accepted to have represented tlie post of “Emir ül-müminin" (leader o f the Moslems) 
since Selim I’s return from Cairo in 1518, \Â\AbcMhamit I's reign. Wliile no official documents or 
imperial coins registered the sultans as eitlier the caliph or emir ül-müminiır, it is of no controversy 
that tlie Ottoman tlirone acquired tlie position of “centre o f sacredness" within tlie Muslim world. 
From Selim's reign onward, Islamic principles started to gain weight, and the role o f the ulema 
(schohus of Islam) increased in the governance of the Empire. (Metin Kunt, “Siyasal Tarih 1300- 
1600 [Political Histoıy 1300-1600]. In Metin Kunt et al., Osmanlı Devleti 1300-1600, Türkiye 
Tarihi 2 [The Ottoman Empire 1300-1600, Turkish History 2 (3^ ‘* ed.)j. ed. Sina Akşin, (İstanbul: 
Cem Yayınevi, 1992), 113-117.)
“Declaration of 8 April 1923: Preamble”, cited in: Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 580.
 ^ Taner Timur, Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası [The Turkish Revolution and After], (3'^ ‘‘ ed., Ankara: İmge 
Kitabevi, 1994), 38-41.
155
CHP’s party program was further enlarged in the 1927 Congress, in which also the 
historic six-day speech was delivered by M. Kemal, the party leader. The six 
fundamentals of CHP ideology were announced for the first time in the 1931 Party 
Congresses, and they were incorporated into the Constitution of 1924. These 
fundamentals were republicanism, nationalism, populism,*" etatism, secularism, and 
revolutionism.’ The years between 1923 and 1935 has been the period during which 
the CHP’s ideological stance, largely stemming from the conjunctural developments 
of the time, gravitated towards a full commitment to etatism, a concept that shall be 
elaborated in a more detailed fashion in the following parts. The Party program 
adopted in the 1935 Congress unequivocally indicated the consolidation of etatist 
doctrine within the CHP, and the pragmatic impulse behind it.
The concept of etatism, as employed by Robert W. Kerwin directly from its French 
original, instead of statism as in English, refers to the particular encountering of 
Turkey in economic policy between the period 1933 to 1950. Kerwin delineated the 
Turkish experience as efficient, powerful and as developmental; while indicating, at 
the same time, the demarcation between Statism in the broader sense of the meaning 
and the stii generis character of Turkish economic policy in this period.*
 ^ The principle of "halkçılık” has been referred to as "populism”. The latter had "openly anti­
imperialist and anti-capitalist overtones in Kemal's early statements", however in later years it 
gradually meant "popular sovereignity and equality before the law, as well as a rejection o f class 
conflict”. (Özbudun, “Kemalist Political Regime”, 88).
 ^ The essential component of CHP ideology "devrimcilik” has been referred to as revolutionism in 
tliis study. The term revoliitioni.mi may not, in fact, suffice for clarification of the concept of 
devrimcilik, as the latter refers to a wider spectrum of beliefs and/or attitudes. As E. Özbudun has 
pointed out; "This principle (devrimcilik) sometimes meant a committment to specific Kemalist 
reforms, and sometimes a more general commitment to permanent change and progress, as well as 
a rejection o f gradualism and evolutionism ". (ibid., 91).
* R.W. Kerwin, “Türkiye’de Devletçilik [Etatism in Turkey]. In Nevin Coşar, ed., Türkiye’de 
Devletçilik [Etatism in Turkey], 97-114. (Istanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1995), 97.
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On that account, Korkut Boratav has shown that there have been, indeed, different 
periods in the economic policies pursued by the pre-1946 CHP. Thereupon, the 
time-span between 1923 and 1929 was referred to as the “liberal period” of the party; 
yet, in a rather narrower sense of the concept. CHP’s liberalism in this period was 
described as an outward oriented promotion of private capital by the state; while in 
the years from 1930 to 1932, private capital based protectionism and import 
substitution policies were pursued instead. In this context, the period between 1933- 
1939 was registered as the Synthesis o f etatism and protectionism. Comparisons 
between the economic indicators of the transitionary stages have been interpreted by 
Boratav as the empirical evidence supporting the very fact that the etatist synthesis 
emerged as consequential within the perceived impacts of the policies pursued in 
these respective periods. ^
The CHP Program of 1935 clearly aimed at the maintenance of a “mixed economy” 
with far-reaching state intervention. While it seems possible at first hand, to attribute 
basic social democratic values to the 1935 Program, an analysis of the subject from 
different points of view divulges that no ideological orientation in the Western sense 
has been influential, but that it was rather pragmatism that lead the CHP cadre 
towards etatist economic policies, as mentioned before. Prime Minister İsmet İnönü 's 
words appear noteworthy in this connection, as he was reported to have said in 1923 
that: “I know not of that theory or this theory; what I do is to construct a hand-span 
of railway each day.”.
® Korkut Botarav, “Devletçilik ve Kemalist İktisat Politikaları [Etatism and Kemalist Economic 
Policy)”. In Nevin Coşar, ed., Türkiye’de Devletçilik [Etaüsm in Turkey], 115-142. (İstanbul: 
Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1995), 117-118.
Reported in: Falilı Rıikı Atay, Çankaya. (İstanbul: Yeniğim Basın-Yayıncılık AŞ., 1997), 421.
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Equally important within the context was the world economic conjuncture stemming 
largely from the great depression of 1929, rendering interventionist policies 
inescapable not only in Turkey but in European countries as well. The Great 
Depression o f 1929 has been generally accepted to have burst out following a series 
of crises both in real markets and in monetary markets in the Western world; the 
implications of which have been serious falls in the levels of production and of 
employment. Hardly any country on Earth escaped the outcomes of contraction in 
international trade volume and of the breakdown in financial and monetary 
structures. Consequential within this conjuncture was the fact that many countries 
inclined towards protectionism, pursuing inward-oriented economic policies. 
Prominent features of international trade in this period have been quota applications, 
bartering and clearing; while self-sufficiency appeared as a requisite for national 
economies. State intervention in economy rapidly increased, and theoretical 
discussions on the economic measures to be taken culminated in the late 1930s, as 
Keynes appeared in political economy. It has been noted in this context that étatism 
should be evaluated as a dual response of a particular state; which grounded firstly, 
as a defensive to the Great Depression of 1929. Second was the implication of 
developments in Turkish economy in the period between 1923 and 1930. ' '
All in all, the pragmatic thrust behind the étatisl synthesis of 1930s was announced 
by key figures within the party administration of the period, such as Prime Minister 
İsmet İnönü:
” Faruk Birtek, “Devletçiliğin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü [The Rise and Fail of Etatism]. In Nevin Coşar, 
ed., Türkiye’de Devletçilik [Etatism in Turkey], 143-172. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1995), 
144.
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“Etatism as an economic policy appeared to me, above everything, as a 
vehicle for defence. In order to compensate for the negligence of 
centuries, to re-construct unfair destruction, and to establish a strong 
state structure capable of resisting the though conditions of contemporary 
times, the State had to be freed from devastating factors in the economy. 
We were obliged, therefore, to adopt etatism as a protective agent to 
pursue a developmental path, and as a reference for, and a fundamental 
within economics.
....That we regard etatism an abundant and a positive policy for 
development and for re-structuring, stems not only from a conservative 
point of view, but also from the anticipation that etatism constitutes the 
most efficient means for development and growth. Only the naive may 
hope to establish the required industry and the infrastructure, without the 
supervision of and direct intervention by the State. Our immediate and 
challenging duty is to create as soon as possible, through powerful means 
and possibilities of the state, the national industry and to establish the 
economic structure of this great nation, which was left underdeveloped 
and with insufficient means.
....State railways make possible the transportation of certain goods in 
certain areas with rates below the cost of the coal fired in these trains. 
Does it ever seem possible for any railway other than those under state 
ownership?
.....Etatism grounded naturally due to the patriotism and goodwill of the
last ten years. 12
The relevant provisions of the 1935 CHP Program on economic policy also indicate 
the pragmatic impetus behind the etatist strategy. Likewise, in the sphere of social 
and distributional policies, the respective provisions of the Program were confined to 
the notions of a “social state” pursuing the welfare and security of its citizens, yet 
without any ideological motifs lurking behind. With that respect, the social and 
financial policies of the 1930s may indicate the commitment of the party 
administration to the establishment social security, and to the preservation of the 
rights of working people.
İsmet İnönü “Fırkamızın Devletçilik Vasfı [The Etatist characteristic of our Party]”. İn Nevin 
Coşar, ed., Türkiye’de Devletçilik [Etatism in Turkey], 41-44. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 
1995X 41-43.
For tlıe relevant provisions of 1935 CHP Program, see tlıe Annex to tliis dissertation.
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Thereupon, it becomes clear that the origins of CHP ideology were by no means 
rooted in Western thought, nor they revealed any evolutionary path from orthodox 
Marxism to parliamentary socialism, as had been the case in Western European 
social democratic parties. CHP ideology in the pre-1946 period, instead, indicated 
policies written in terms of the economic and political conjuncture of the time, and 
appeared as highly pragmatic. M. Kemal had stated once that “if the Party (CHP) had 
had a doctrine, than the Turkish Revolution would have been frozen.”*'* 
Nevertheless, a thorough reading of the 1935 Programme reveals that it was highly 
oriented towards basic social democratic values such as egalitarianism, fair 
distribution of wealth, state intervention in the economy and establishment of social 
security.
The ideological transformation of the Second Republic, on the other hand, was 
largely a confrontation between the conservative and reformist wings in the Party, as 
noted before. Indeed, the 1965 attempt put forth almost no radical deviations from 
the party’s traditional ideology; in that CHP’s fundamentals such as republicanism, 
reformism, democracy, etatist economic development and social justice remained 
intact. It has been argued with this regard that, the concept of left of centre was 
utilised to present the identity of CHP in terms of the (then) newly fashioned 
concepts of the post-1960 paradigm.'^ Here, the libertarian spirit of the 1961 
Constitution, and the challenge posed by the TİP as a rising star on the left of the 
political spectrum, has to be reiterated. According to Ayala·, being on the centre-left 
referred by no means to any change as regards either ideology or programme; rather.
'  ^ Reported in: Tevket Süreyya Aydemir, Тек Adam 1922-1938, Ill.Cilt [The Only Man 1922-1938, 
VOİ.3]. (Istanbul: remzi Kitabevi, 1965), 501.
Ayse Güneş Ayata, CHP (Örgüt ve İdeoloji [CHP Organisation and Ideology]. (Ankara: Gündoğan 
Yayınlan, 1992), 82.
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the concept seemed to have been employed by the party elites to present the identity 
of CiiP in terms of the newly fashioned concepts of the post-1960 political
paradigm. 16
In Miizaffer Sencer's view, on the other hand, the social democratic party 
programme was drafted basically through a re-definition of the ilmdamentals of the 
CHP ideology, in particular of etatism and populism. Hence, the 1965 Programme 
was based on the country’s realities rather than being propelled by any dogma or 
theory. Geared to economic development, therefore, etatism would serve as the
• 17means for enhancing social justice and security.
Along with weighty etatist values, it was declared in the Programme that the Party 
was respectfial to the private sector, in that the latter was believed to be as beneficial 
as the former, in serving the goal of national development. Nevertheless, in order to 
steer the private sector to useful fields and to ensure its operability in harmony with 
the fundamentals of the national economy, the state was entrusted the task of taking 
the necessary measures in areas such as foreign trade, customs, taxation and credits 
policy. In this context, development plans were accredited as the agents of the
demarcation between the state and the markets 18
CHP’s 1965 programme laid emphasis also on the principle of populism, and 
endeavoured to elucidate the concept with reference to democracy and class 
harmony. The basic novelty within CHP discourse at that point, was the recognition
Ibid., 82.
” Muzaffer Sencer, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partilerin Sosyal Temelleri [The Social Origins of Political 
Parties in Turkey], (istiuibul; May Yayınlan, 1974), 282.
1965 Programme, cited in: Ayata, CHP Orgut, 195.
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of the existence of different classes within Turkish society. Class conflict, however, 
was still refuted; and the locus of CHP’s populism appeared to be an according of 
class interests, instead of the articulation of antagonisms. As long as class harmony 
was ensured, the Turkish society was a whole, indivisible on class grounds. CHP’s 
basic policy in this context was to preserve the general will from economic and 
social coercion; by preventing certain individuals or classes to enjoy dominance on 
the grounds of their social and economic status.
Furthermore, CHP programme envisaged that the working masses should have a 
voice on matters pertaining to working conditions and to wages. Populism also 
covered that equality of opportunity in access to education should, at any cost, be 
provided for the society at large. In the final analysis, therefore, populism as 
accounted for in the 1965 Programme, attempted to evaluate the problems of Turkish 
society from a social justice point of view, and endeavoured to take the necessary 
measures for eliminating regional disparities in access to public services and to 
developmental enterprises. CHP’s basic policy prescriptions within the framework of 
the distributional question, therefore, lay in harmony with traditional social 
democratic values; with the concept of “indicative planning” retained as the means to
that end 19
' Ibid., 196.
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4.1.1. The Concept of “Left of Centre”
According to Bülent Ecevit, CHP had endeavoured to carry out radical 
transformations and reforms in the past, that had been perceived as a potential threat 
to the interests of certain groups either in Turkey or outside
“Having challenged the interests of big land owners through the Land 
Reform Bill; having shown a bold front to tax evaders by attempting at 
tax reforms; having granted the working people their political rights, that 
in turn defied those who had been addicted to exploitation; and having 
endeavoured to preserve national independence and the national 
economy, CHP has unequivocally steeled itself on the left of the centre 
of other parties in the political spectrum of 1965.”
Ecevit also provided an account of the competitive spectrum of multi-party politics 
in this context. In order to be able to clarify the centre-left’s position, the CHP leader 
elucidated a range of political positions from the extreme right to its counterpart in 
the left; hence attempted to highlight the social democratic position of the CHP in 
relation both to the right and to the extreme left. On that account, extreme rightists 
were those who tried to turn the clock back, literally those that wished to pull the 
society backwards. Most of them were eager, according to the CHP leader, to keep 
the masses in the darkness of bigotry, with the ultimate goal of depriving them of 
their social and economic rights. Hence, in order to be able to exploit the masses for 
the hegemony of a few, they either attempted to suppress people under right wing 
dictatorships, or to tranquillise them by means of pseudo-democracies. As such, they 
boldly put to use the concepts of free enterprise and private property, consequently 
rendering the means of production and working life subject to monopolistic capital 
and to big land owners; the law and the state serving as the means for their ends. To
:o Bülent Ecevit Ortanın Solu [Left of Centre]. Istanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1974), 12. 
Ibid., 11.
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that end, both fascism and national socialism were among the contemporary versions 
of the extreme right.
Closer to the centre, the centre-right comprised of those conservatives who were 
alarmed at any changes within the society. In the CHP leader’s view, they opposed 
all kinds of reformation or transformation, as they desired to. preserve the existing 
order for the sake of their dominant position. In this context, they perceived the 
concept of social justice both as a retarding agent in front of development, and as an 
unnecessary burden for the economy. Hence, they held that the state should not be 
active in economic and social life; but should be subservient to the interests of the 
dominant groups only. Owing to that, they could accept democracy insofar as it did 
not pose any threat to their hegemony on the society. In this connection, the CHP 
leader had identified the position of its rival AP as bearing a range of values from the 
right of centre to the extreme right.
Differing in some value, the centrists were those who could accept gradual changes 
within the society; nevertheless, there existed no revolutionaries on the centre of the 
political spectrum. On the contrary, they opted for small improvements, and 
refrained from any radical attempts for reformation. Although they favoured 
democracy, and they recognised the concept of social justice; they were reluctant, as 
in the case of the centre-right, to state contribution to social justice, except marginal 
levels. So far as the developmental question was concerned, their sole perspective 
came out to be grounded on private capital only.
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In contrast to the right however, the intrinsic value of the left of centre was the 
emphasis laid on humanistic issues. The centre-left, in Ecevifs view, ultimately 
aimed at furnishing each and everyone with the opportunity for individual 
development. It was populism, in the sense that it placed the interests of the wider 
society above those of certain groups; hence, populism as adopted by CHP never 
referred to the flattering of the people with electoral concerns. Following from 
there was the very fact that, left of centre, according to the CfiP leader, was geared 
to blotting out the existence of all kinds of discrimination and inequality, and to 
doing away with class differences. Hence, instead of privileging one class at the 
expense of another, the centre-left aimed at enhancing equality and justice in the 
distribution of the national income.
On that account, those on the left of centre have adopted social justice and social 
security as their basic tenets; as they found it unnecessary and unjust to await for 
gradual societal development by means of investments carried out by particular 
groups only. The leftists on the centre were also reformist and revolutionary; and 
were looking forward to change the society as rapidly as possible. Consequential was 
that the left of centre was etatist not on the grounds that the means of production and 
economic life in general should all be nationalised, but owing to the fact that the 
right for free enterprise and private property should be made use of within the 
framework of social justice and the common good of all. To that end, the centre-left 
opted for planned development in order not to leave the door open to arbitrariness 
within social and economic development, which implied that economic activities 
should be supervised by the state.
CHP’s concept of populism refers to “halkçılık" in Turkish, instead of “halk dalkavukluğu" as Üıe 
English plirase may imply.
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For the CHP leader, the centre-left was immovably committed to the concept of 
liberty; in that it rejected any limitation on basic rights and freedom; thus aimed at 
achieving its economic and social ends within libertarian democratic order. For that 
purpose, the left of centre has adopted social democracy as its fundamental, 
stemming from the very fact that democracy alone could not serve the common good 
unless the general will was freed of economic and social coercion by a few, on the 
wider society. Therefore, not only the formal but also the social dimension of 
democracy was attributed paramount importance by Ecevit. At that point, the basic 
demarcation between social democracy and the extreme left was elucidated by the 
CHP leader, according to who, freedom of enterprise and private property was 
rejected by the latter. It might be of value to note in this connection that, during his 
political career, Ecevit came to be known to have appeared as meticulous in 
highlighting the essential differences between his party’s position and that of the 
extreme left.
For instance, TİP was attributed to inherently possess positions from the left of that 
of the CHP to the extreme left; whilst the CHP was intrinsically consistent as regards 
its position on the left of centre. As such, the extreme left was defined by him as 
covering a range of positions grounded on dogmas and doctrines; including 
communism as well. Whilst these might not have overtly refuted democracy; 
libertarian democratic order was doomed to parish once entire economic life was 
taken under state ownership, which would imply in turn, that any checks and 
balances on the state would but be desolated. Hence, the sine qua non of Western 
style social democracy, as adopted also by CHP, was the right for free enterprise, for
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private property and for heritance. The position of left of centre as held by Ecevit, 
therefore, was a refutation of state dictatorship, as well as a quest for a democracy
23grounded on social justice.
So far as class politics was concerned the demarcation between the extreme left and 
the centre-left was such that, while the former aimed at the h eg em o n y  of one class on 
others; the latter, in contrast, intended to dissolve class differences peacefully in the 
democratic order, by means of measures to be taken for improving income 
distribution and for the utilisation of labour value rationally. On that account, the 
ultimate goal of left of centre was to base the structure of the society on more 
humanistic and merging grounds, instead of class antagonism. In the final analysis, 
the centre-left, according to the CHP leader, comprised of a set of values for the 
establishment of a fair and a humanistic order in which mental and material 
deprivation end for all; and within which any method or tool incompatible with 
ethics, liberty and social justice were inexcusable. '^*
4.1.2. Ideological Demarcations after Division
Although social democrats were split into different parties during the Third 
Republic; hardly any fundamental contradictions can be spotted within the 
ideological stances. It appears that both the CHP and DSP programs are defending 
essential social democratic values, yet with some divergences on the management of 
markets. Despite increasing reaction from its electorate on dividedness, Turkish 
social democracy has been entering elections as different parties, without any exit
Ibid., 92-95. 
Ibid., 292.
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option even for electoral alliance. Factionalism and fractures within the social 
democratic milieu in Turkey seems by and large, to revolve around personal 
conflicts rather than programmatic differences; hence dividing its electorate, too.
As for CHP, the basic tenets of its economic policy after 1992,^  ^ is confined to the 
concepts of “organised market economy” and “strategic planning”. When compared 
to its previous program of 1976, CHP seems to tend towards market mechanism, at 
the expense of traditional etatist values. The essential target is to provide 
productivity, rational management and economic efficiency, within the framework of 
an organised market system based on competition rules. To this end, a genuine 
market system has been defined as one within which the critical balance between 
different interests and rights are maintained fairly and defended democratically. 
Competition, according to CHP, is the libertarian medium grounded on a dynamic 
understanding of enhancing productivity and efficiency. As for the organisation of 
the markets, CHP foresees the encouragement of free organisation of labour and of 
all the other sections of the society, in a socially responsible manner that will take 
into account the conservation of the environment and the protection of consumers, as 
well. Equally important is that weighty economic decisions should by no means be 
dictated by monopolies. The fundamentals of the organised market mechanism as 
provided by the CHP program requires, at the same time, that protectionism should 
be limited to those sub-sectors that reveal strategic importance in terms of 
industrialisation and social development; from whence it appears that protectionist 
measures as such, should not be allowed to undermine integration with foreign
markets. 26
New CHP program was adopted on 9.9.1992. CHP and SHP merged into one parly in 1995.
CHP, Yeni Hedefler, Yeni Türkiye: CHP Programı [New Targets, New Turkey: CHP Program). 
(Ankara: CHP, 1995), 113-114.
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So far as “strategic planning” is concerned, CHP’s policy is such that, macro- 
economic planning should be utilised as a means for steering the medium and long 
term economic targets, instead of enjoying a commanding position. Besides, 
strategic planning should be able to provide for the enhancement of the deficiencies 
of market mechanism, without interfering in it. To that end, strategic planning is to 
put forth the strategies for a “high-technology and a “sustainable” industrialisation 
policy; and for a globally competitive economic structure.^^ As strategic planning 
shall be confined to long term evaluation of resource allocation, powers of the “State 
Planning Organisation (SPO) shall be limited to strategy and policy formulation; 
thus the SPO shall not be allowed to interfere in implementation.^*
It must be emphasised thereupon that, when compared to DSP, CHP appears to be in 
a more pro-market position; hence seems to be more influenced from the globalist 
discourse of the 1990s. Though actually no fundamental divergences can be spotted 
between the two parties’ economic policies, DSP program reveals a more persistent 
stand on traditional Keynesian strategy. While for instance, an apparent scepticism 
towards laissez-fairé can be traced in the DSP program, CHP policy on macro- 
economic management lays emphasis on the virtues of market mechanism and on 
globalisation. Despite commitment to rooted social democratic values such as fairer 
distribution of resources, comprehensive social security or institutionalised labour
Ibid., 115.
Ibid., 116. Indeed, contrary to what is generally held, Uie SPO in Turkey has never been in a 
position similar to those planning systems that had prevailed in socialist systems. In the latter, the 
enbre public sector used to be planned centrally, with production targets set for each sub-sector; 
hence such systems used to enjoy a commanding position on the economic apparatus. In Turkey, 
tlie planning system has been prevailing, by and large, in tlie form put forth by the 1995 Program 
The depiulments of the SPO responsible from implementation, literally the Departments for 
“Foreign Investment” and for “Investment Promotion” were detached from the SPO in 1992. In 
fact, they had been incorporated into tlie SPO during Ozal governments.
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organisation in both programs, CHP’s stand on the role of the state remains more 
limited, when compared to that of DSP. For the regulation of markets, the former is 
content with stating that it is against “deranged markets controlled by monopolistic 
capital within which the weak are restrained by the powerful and the consumers are 
exploited by monopolies’’.^  ^DSP on the other hand, elaborates in detail the rationale 
behind the necessity of state intervention in the market mechanism, without which an 
economic structure subservient to the interests of the powerful is bound to prevail. 
Utilisation of market rules in harmony with the other components of the economic 
apparatus, therefore, is to the benefit of the society at large, including the have-nots
as well. 30
Another divergence from the CHP is a prevailing commitment to etatist values. It has 
been unequivocally stated in the DSP program that “enterprises providing public 
service and infrastructure shall be owned by the state”; and that “while natural 
resources shall be operated by the state, the ownership of the defence industry shall 
remain public”. Apart from these, all economic activity shall be open to the private 
sector.^' It is stipulated in this context that, in their capacity as national property, 
natural resources shall not be operated according to personal interests or to short 
term market rules, but they shall be subordinate to the benefits of the entire nation, 
bearing in mind the future and the interests of the country.Beyond that, the state 
shall take the responsibility of founding pioneer enterprises in the less-favoured 
regions even when they may not prove profitable, whence unattractive for the private 
sector. The state shall also be assigned the task of establishing the high-technology
CHP, Yeni Hedefler, 113-114.
DSP, Demokratik Sol Parti Programı [Party Program]. (Ankara: Sistem Ofset), 64-67. 
DSP, Demokratik Sol, 63. 
ibid., 75.
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industries of the future. On that account, the general principles, strategies and targets 
set forth by the plans shall be borne in mind, production, exports and imports shall 
be planned. To this end, enslavement of the economic and the social by laisséz faire 
shall be deterred, without prejudice to the essentials of the market rules. In the final 
analysis, DSP reveals a clear commitment to an enlarged participation of the state in 
economic activity and to its steering role for the markets; as it has been stated in the 
program that “In order that the state may carry out the tasks assigned on it, public 
revenues and expenditures shall be increased.” '^'
Deriving from the two key issues of étatism and planning as commented on above, is 
the divergence from CUP also on the “privatisation” question. While the latter 
anticipates the rapid privatisation of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) that fall 
short of competitiveness and efficiency, or those beyond a limited scope;^  ^
privatisation for DSP is a means for the re-establishment of the SEEs to operate in 
harmony with the plan targets and market rules. Having stated that “no ideological 
approach can be accepted” either for public enterprises or for privatisation, a 
comprehensive account of the legal and institutional arrangements to be carried out 
for proper privatisation of the SEEs have been provided in the CHP Program. From 
that point of view, this party appears to have abandoned its age-old legacy of the 
“state as the backbone of the industrialisation process”. Having dropped import 
substitution policies in favour of competition and of integration with world markets, 
CHP seems highly influenced from the 1990s’ rhetoric on globalism.
”  ibid., 64. 
ibid., 78.
35 CHP, Yeni Heclefler, 132-133.
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In a nutshell, a comparison of the programs of both parties would unveil the fact that 
whilst DSP places emphasis on traditional Keynesian macro-economic management, 
CHP appears to be in a more pro-market position. Although, therefore, an apparent 
scepticism towards uncontrolled markets and a clear tendency towards planning can 
be perceived in DSP’s position, CHP puts together a more receptive discourse on the 
market mechanism. In this context, the former is unequivocally committed to an 
enlarged participation of the state in the economic activity, where the latter’s 
tendency is closer to the establishment of a globally competitive economic structure. 
In addition to such issues relating to étatism and planning, another divergence is on 
the privatisation question. Despite that no a priori refutation of privatisation can be 
traced in both programs; DSP explicitly raises the belief that privatisation is 
acceptable to the extent that it constitutes a means for the re-establishment of the 
SEEs to operate in harmony with plan targets and market rules. As such, CHP’s 
position on this enigma seems to be closer to that of the centre-right; as rapid 
privatisation of the SEEs that fall short of competitiveness and efficiency is boldly 
argued for in the CHP Program. In a nutshell, inasmuch as DSP remains more 
committed to traditional social democratic values, CHP appears to be highly 
influenced from the recent rhetoric on globalisation and on the virtues of markets.
4.2. Social Base
The Turkish party system in the 1970s still revealed the bulk of the legacy that had 
written the politics of the Ottoman State in the last century. As Ergiin Ozbudun has 
suggested, power struggle in the First Turkish Republic was still confined to an 
intra-elite conflict in those years. In that respect, attention has been drawn to the fact
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that, the social profiles of the two main opposition attempts in the single-party 
period, literally of both the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyetçi Firka:TCF (Progressive 
Republican Party: 1924-25), and of the Serbest Firka:SF (Free Party; 1930), were 
hardly distinguishable from the CHP, in terms of the social backgrounds of their 
leaders.H ad these two attempts lived longer as political parties, they would most 
probably have tended towards representing peripheral interests,^’ as the case of the 
DP have verified in due course. The very fact that the locus of CHP lay on the civil- 
military bureaucrats supported by the etraf and big land-owners till the multi-party 
period, highlights the nature of the shifty balance between the partners of this weird 
coalition, that had emerged out of the necessity of the national cause.
As noted before, support of local notables to CHP continued only till 1945. A 
scholarly comment, with this regard, has been such that, “the alliance of provincial 
notables and the national bureaucratic elite was more a marriage of convenience than 
a manifestation of a genuine integration between the centre and the periphery.” *^ 
Therefore, whilst the CHP prevailed as a vanguard party to carry the Kemalist 
revolution further, efforts at penetration into the masses in the countryside remained 
limited, which in turn, implied that the Party’s popular support within the peasantry 
was undermined to a considerable extent. That CHP received support from the 
relatively underdeveloped rural Eastern provinces in the 1950 elections, has been 
attributed to the influence of the semi-feudal lords still prevailing within the CHP 
elite^ ;^ instead of necessarily contradicting the argument above. As such, regional 
voting patterns did not seem to reveal any major deviations from this tendency in the
Ergun Ozbudun, Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976) 41; see also Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 174-201.
Ozbudun, Social Change, 41. 
ibid., 45. 
ibid., 104.
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elections of 1954 and 1957; and the DP continued to receive the support of 
particularly the more modern peasantry and appeared to be successful in mobilising 
the urban propertied middle-classes and merchants as well,
A fundamental re-definition of cleavages' '^, nonetheless, was commencing by the late 
sixties in Turkey; to gradually replace the perennial centre-periphery gap with a 
political polarisation around functional cleavages, instead of cultural and territorial 
ones. That CHP’s support from urban centres started to increase from the 1965 
elections onward, and that it tended to lose the support of less modern regions from 
then on, signalled, by and large, an “ongoing process of voter realignment”; which 
implied the growing importance of functional cleavages at the expense of the old 
centre-periphery cleavage.“'^  Due to the foregoing was that, the tendency towards 
CPIP among the relatively better-educated electorate in urban centres became more 
visible in the late sixties. While, for instance, CHP increased its votes from 6% to 
7.3% within the middle and upper-middle classes in Ankara, the corresponding 
figures for Izmir came out to be 7.4% and 6.7%, from 1965 to 1969.'*^
Collateral was the fact that, not only the predominant party system in Turkish 
politics came to an end, but also CHP’s status as the party of the urban centres within 
the more developed regions, was registered by the 1973 elections. Increase in CHP 
votes was 10% in the Marmara region, 7.3% in the Mediterranean and 7.7% in the 
East Central
ibid., 104-109.
Üstün Ergüder, “Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey”. In Perspectives on Democracy in 
Turkey, ed. Ergun Özbudun, 113-146. (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 117. 
Özbudun, Social Change, 116-117. 
ibid, 205. 
ibid, 215
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Accordingly, it has been argued that Turkish party politics between 1950 and 1969 
revealed a pattern that fitted the Sariorian typology of predominant pa r t y , The  
fundamental requisite of Sariori’s predominant party model that predominance is 
qualified by a system’s major party obtaining the absolute majority of seats for at 
least four consecutive elections'*'’, justified Turkey’s position as having had a 
predominant party system in the period from 1950 to 1969; on the grounds that the 
first party (DP-AP) obtained 84 and 56% of the seats in the respective parliaments of
1950 and 1969 47
With the aforementioned realignment of political cleavages, and the concurrent 
volatility observed in voter preferences,'** however, the AP tended to lose its 
predominant position from 1973 elections onward; the implication of which has been 
an apparent inclination of Turkish party system towards fragmentation and 
polarisation,.‘*^ Thereupon, an “extreme and polarised pluralism”, as typified by 
Sartori, came into existence within Turkish politics, in that period.
The essence of the polarised pluralism observed in Turkish politics between 1973- 
1980 lay firstly in the very existence of “anti-system” parties, thence, of the 
“centrifugal drives” over centripetal forces; with the centre weakening in turn.^° 
Inherently challenging the legitimacy of the regime it functioned within, the case of 
particularly the MSP seemed to fit, by and large, the framework of “anti-system” set
Ergiider, “Post-1980 Parlies”, 122.
Gio\ anni Sartori, Parties and Parly Systems, A Framework for Analysis. Vol.I ('Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976) 196 
Ibid., 198.
Index of political volatility between 1948-1977, as suggested by Mogens N.Peterson (cited in: 
Ergiider Ü, 1988: 117), was 19.3% for Turkey; while tire Western European average \r as obseiv’ed 
to be 8.1% only.
Ergüder, “Post-1980 Parties”, 1221-122.
Gio '^aIUU Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, 134-135.
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forth by Sariori^^ Extremist parties such as MSP and МНР participated in 
coalitions, and played key roles in the formulation of governmental policies in this 
period Second was the fact that while the opposition parties during the coalitions of 
that period (CHP-MSP coalition from January to September 1974, and the following 
MC governments) seemed to be closer to the governing parties than to one another 
(AP to CHP, in the sense that both were located in the centre); the opposition 
apparently could not easily join forces to form alternative governments; appearing in 
turn, as a “bilateral opposition” instead of a unilateral one.^  ^ Polarised pluralism in 
Turkish politics continued until it culminated in the intervention of the Army in 
September 1980.
Insofar as the Third Republic is concerned, it becomes evident that the centre-left in 
Turkey has absolutely lost support during the period between 1989 and 1994. 
Support for centre-left fell from 29.7 % in 1991 to 23.7 % in 1994 among registered 
voters. (Respective figures for valid votes were 37.7 % and 27 %). In this context, 81 
% of former DSP supporters and 50 % of former SHP supporters voted for the right; 
while some 25 % of these opted for the radical right, between 1989 and 1994.^ "^
Ibid.,132-133.
Ibid., 133.
Türkiye Sosyal, Ekonomik, Siyasal Araşünnalar Vakfı (TÜSES) [Foundation of Turkish Social, 
Economic, Political Research]. Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin 
Tabanı [Electorate of Üıe Political Parties in Turkey and tlie Social Base of Social Democracy]. 
(Ankara: TÜSES, 1995), 13.
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T ab le 7.
Support for Centre-Left in Turkey According to Occupational 
Category (December 1993)
Occupation
Blue collar
White collar
Civil servant d 4
Tradesmen/artisan/small farmer
Self-employed
Employer
Retired
Unemployed
Housewife
Student
Others
TOTAL
Source: TÜSES, 1995: 43
% in the 
Sample
15,2
5.9
7,4
14.:
1.0
1.3
5.2
6.4
40.8
2.6
0.1
1 0 0 .0
SHP
0.95
1.16
DSP
1.55
0.91
1.74
0.96
0.74
1.29
0.96
0.67
0.91
1,29
0.90
0,86
0.90
0.94
1.72
1.43
0.76
0.36
2.09
Other significant findings within the scope of the study have been such that, while 
the locus of SHP supporters fell on white collar jobs and on civil servants, students 
and employers; the supporters of DSP were centred mostly on the blue collar jobs, as 
well as the retired and the unemployed. In this context, blue collar support for DSP 
was 63 % higher than for SHP; the latter’s support appearing as highest among civil 
s e r van t s . On  the other hand, the rate of blue-collar support for both parties 
remained stable between 1989 and 1994; while the rate of civil servants increased. 
As for DSP, the increase of civil servants by 45.5 % has been remarkable. Both 
parties have lost support from employers in the same period. So far as the 
unemployed were concerned, SHP lost 30.8 % of its support, while DSP’s share 
remained intact within this group.
VVliite collar categor)' includes clerical jobs in tlie pri ·^ate sector, and professional categories such as 
medical doctors, lawyers, engineers, teclinicians tliat work in salaried jobs; as well as salaried 
administrative posts.
Ibid., 44.
Ibid., 52.
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Another notable finding has been the very fact that, when compared to the right, 
centre-left support appeared to be higher among those with relatively better levels of 
education, as the table below may indicate:
Table 8.
Left-Right Support According to Educational Level as of December 1993 (%)
Educational Level % in the 
sample
SHP DSP ANAP DYP RP
No diploma 10,0 0.81 0.93 0.87 1.43 0.99
Primary school 
diploma______
54.6 0,88 1.06 1.05 1.07 1.17
Secondary school 
diploma________
10.: .02 1.11 1.18 1.00 0.84
High school diploma 17.4 1.19 0.84 0.94 0.75 0.80
University diploma 7,6 1.65 0.89 0.69 0.52 0.42
TOTAL 100.0
Source: TÜSES, 1995: 59
Depending on three different surveys carried out between 1990-94, Yılmaz Esmer's 
conclusions also confirmed the above. According to Esmer, level of education, as 
measured by the highest diploma received, displayed a consistent and a significant 
relationship with the SHP vote. In that respect, the relationship between education 
and support for social democracy, as has been confirmed elsewhere, has been 
suggested to be “probably rooted in the traditional ties between the former CHP and 
intellectuals, teachers and bureaucrats; in general, the well educated”. I t  has also 
been noted in this context that, the figures left no doubt about the nature of the
”  Yılmaz Esmer, “Parties and tlie Electorate: A Comparath e Analysis o f Voter Profiles of Turkish 
Political Parties”. In Turkey: Political, Social and economic Challenges in the 1990s, eds., Çiğdem 
Balım and et al., 74-89. (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J.Brill, 1995),79-80.
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relationship between support for the left and education; while for the centre-right and 
the religious right, a reverse relationship existed.^*
TUSES findings threw light upon another crucial phenomenon within electoral 
behaviour in Turkey, which is the increasing volatility observed in the same period. 
While electoral stability remained around 76.7 % in 1991, the respective figure for 
1994 has fallen to 59.9%. It is also interesting to note that radical right has proved to 
be the locus of attraction to the right; with an increase of some 3.5 million votes. 
Nonetheless, these basic patterns inherent within Turkish politics between 1991-94 
appeared to have changed by December 1995. Most significant feature of the 1995 
general election was firstly an absolute rise in the rate of abstentions and invalid 
votes of a protesting character. Inasmuch as protest votes increased from 3.7 million 
in 1994 to 6 million in 1995; former left votes came out to be the main source of the 
protest block of votes.^^ Second, was the continuing absolute decline in the centre- 
lef t .Despi te the fact that there has been an apparent increase in DSP votes, the 
declining tendency in the total left votes speeded up in 1995, when compared to the 
period between 1991 and 1 9 9 4 . As such, centre-left lost blood in urban centres, 
diminished in shanty towns and became totally extinct in the less favoured regions 
such as South-Eastern Anatolia, in favour of the radical right.
It appears, thereupon, that while there is still an electoral fluency between the two 
parties of the centre-left, DSP’s social base is becoming more distinct from that of
-'*Ibid., 81.
A)dm  Koj'inen, Nccat Erder, and Ahniet Kardam.‘TÜSES Araştınnası, Seçim Sonuçlan \'e Sos>aI 
Demokrasinin Krizi Üzerine [On TÜSES Research, Election Results and Üıe Crisis of Social 
democracy]”. Sosyal Demokrat Değişim. (March-April 1996). 7.
“  Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 11.
Ibid., 12.
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the CHP. Forasmuch as the former is becoming affiliated to class left, mass left 
protrudes forward to define the electoral support of the latter.*^  ^Worthy to note here 
is also that, as of summer 1998, 17 % of DSP electorate favours a state based on 
Islamic Law. Furthermore, while 4.7 % of this party’s electorate place themselves in
the centre, 3.4 % declare that they are on the right.64
One may also note the perceivably higher rates of support for left in provinces where 
the Alevi population is dominant. The relationship between social democratic parties 
and Alevi votes becomes significant particularly in two provinces; in Timceli and 
Hatay. In the former, the social democrats have been winning landslide victories 
since the 1960s. HP votes were 63.6 % in 1983 general elections. SHP won 54.8 % 
and 57.9 % in the 1987 and 1991 elections, with DSP 19 % and 1.6 %; from whence, 
the total social democratic votes figured up as 73.8 % and 59.5 % respectively. 
Despite the absolute erosion of the left votes throughout the country in 1995, CHP 
was still the first party in Timceli with 23.4 %; the total centre-left as 27.2 % (DSP: 
3.8 %).*’^  Similarly, the social democratic bloc became the winner of the general 
elections in Hatay in the Third Republic. HP votes in 1983 was 36.4 %. SHP won
32.7 % and 32 % of the votes in 1987 and 1991 elections, in which DSP votes were
6.7 % and 6.2 %; the total centre-left votes amounting up to 39.4 % and 38.2 %. The 
corresponding figure in 1995 was 29.6 %; with CHP 21.9 % and DSP 7.7 In 
Amasya and Adana, HP scored as the second party after ANAP in 1983 (with 37.2 %
63
6-1
Tlie concepts of class-left and mass-left ha\ e been operationalised on the basis of the respondents’ 
answers in tlie TÜSES research. In tliis conte.xt, the centre-left electorate ha\e been classified 
according to tlie weight of tlie “class-based answers” in tlie questionnaires.
PİAR-GALLUP Suirey conducted among 1434 respondants in 16 provinces. Reported in 
Cumliurivet. (August 4, 1998)
T>\EMill^tvekili Genel Seçimi Sonuçları (İl ve İlçe Sonuçları) 06.11.1983, 29.11.1987, 20.10.1991, 
24.12.1995 [Results of General Election of Representath’es (Results by Province and District) 
06.11.1983, 29.11.1987, 20.10.1991, 24.12.1995]. (Ankara: DIE, I998)DİE, Results of the General 
Election of Representatives (Results by Pro\ ince and District), 288.
“  Ibid., 140.
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and 36.9 % respectively) and the total centre-left continued to be the winner of 
elections in 1987, 1991 and 1995.*'^
Therefrom, emerges the question on the extent that parties of the social democratic 
front receive genuinely left votes in Turkey. So far, contentions on that issue have 
been revolving around firstly the historical link between Atatilrkism and CHP; in that 
it still remains dubious whether or not, support for CHP is centred on KemaJist 
values, instead of being left. Second in this context is DSP’s situation, as the 
question if the locus of its electoral support lies on the personal credit of Ecevit or on 
left affiliated voters; remains open so far. Put it differently, the present dilemma is 
whether or not CHP survives as “Aiaitirk’s Party” and DSP as ''Ecevit Fan Club”; 
instead of necessarily being social democratic.*’*
4.3. Strategy
Stretching the account of social democratic strategy in Turkey to the pre-1965 period 
may well appear fallacious enough to propel the question whether any social 
democracy, in the real sense of the word, existed at that time. Not undeniable, 
Turkish social democracy comes into view as newly born, when the legacy of its 
associates in Western Europe are borne in mind. It has to be re-emphasised however, 
that the strategy of CHP during the single-party years was in fact, confined to the 
maintenance of balanced budgets within the industrialisation process.
Ibid., 20,2. In Amasya, tlie centre-left polled 35.3 %, 32.2 % and 27.6 % in 1987, 1991 and 1995 
respectively. In Adana, the corresponding figures were 36.9 %, 33.7 % and 26.7 %.
Haluk Olman, “Solda Birlik, CHP ve DSP Üzerine [On Unity in tlıe Left, CHP and DSP]”. Sosyal 
Demokrat Değilim. (May-June 1997), 30-32.
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On the other hand, efforts had to be directed at the modernisation of the autocratic 
structure inherited from the Ottoman Empire. As such, the State Party of the period 
endeavoured to institutionalise within the masses the CHP ideology largely through 
the establishment of Halk Evleri (Peoples’ Houses) in towns and Halk Odaları 
(Peoples’ Lounges). These social clubs, with the younger generation of Republican 
teachers at their top, were entrusted basically with the task of disseminating the 
Republican discourse to wider masses.
The single-party mle of CHP in the pre-1946 period, in DiivergePs view, aimed 
ultimately at replacing the traditional aristocracy with new elites to be recruited from 
the society, in that it endeavoured to modernise the old autocratic structure.^^ There 
was the respect, according to Diiverger, that made the Turkish case the sole example 
of a procedure towards a genuine democratic structure, via bringing up independent 
political elites, within the framework of a single-party system.’® With that regard, the 
national democratic revolution had to be brought forward; with the new elites 
entrusted the task of agency. To that end, the prevailing structures appear to be 
relevant for the comprehension of the strategy pursued during the single-party years.
Insofar as the strategy during the Second Republic is concerned, the “actor oriented” 
transformation of CHP towards the left of centre appears as the key for the analysis. 
As disserted in the relevant sections of the preceding Chapter, the strategic shift in 
1965 was propelled largely by the confrontation between the reformist and 
conservative wings in the Party. The main thrust behind the outset of the reformist 
initiative was the party’s charismatic figure Bulent Ecevit. Indeed, CHP’s divergence
Duverger, Siyasi Partiler, 362-363. 
™ ibid., 364.
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from its traditional values was grounded, by and large, on the adoption by the Ecevit 
faction, a rather different view of the concept of populism than that of the 1930s. 
Whereas the traditional CHP populism refuted class politics, the centre-left wing 
frankly accepted the reality of different classes within Turkish society, albeit 
appearing averse to the notion of class struggle, as elaborated in detail in the section 
on ideological analysis. In that respect, the Ecevit initiative seemed to resort to 
reformist measures rather than radicalism, and has been able to recruit the support of 
especially the local party organisations.
Accordingly, efforts of the reformists were directed particularly at the Party 
members in local administrations. The capacity for the mobilisation of these groups 
was structured on the serious and competent group work and the organisational 
capability that the Ecevit faction had displayed during the Party Congress in 1996, in 
the views of Sima Kili. The left of centre group displayed a genuine success during 
this critical Congress, to have elected Ecevit as Party Secretary, and his group to the 
Party Administration. Eventually, the reformists were successful in defying even 
InornCs charisma and elevating £cev/7 to Party leadership in 1972.’*
The electoral decline that has been continuing in the multi-party regime was 
stemming from the Party’s alienation from the masses, in the reformists’ eyes. 
According to Ecevit and his group, the Party had largely deviated from the 
revolutionary thrust of the Kemalist years; and had compromised for electoral 
concerns at the expense of CHP’s basic principles such as secularism, etatism, 
reformism and populism. As such, the Party’s mission as the agent of the
Sima Kili, ¡960-1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler [De\'elopments in CHP 
in tlıe 1960-1975 Period]. (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1975), 231-257.
183
independent nation state and the creation of independent citizens therein, was being 
continuously eroded. That was due to the contradictory attitudes within the different 
intra-party factions and the Party members at large. Besides, the approach of the 
Party elites towards the basic problems of the country thoroughly lacked the impetus 
that had been given by genuine Kemalist s tra tegy .T h is self-critism directed at the 
Party, was a bold attempt at the expense of the Party’s dominant leader Inonu 
According to the reformists, this self-critism should have been publicised overtly to 
both the electorate and the Party management.
On the other hand, the reformist intra-party movement was endeavouring to adapt 
strategically, to the relatively successful articulation by TİP of a fresh discourse on 
the left of the political spectrum. As TIP’s appeal was most promising particularly 
on issues on which CHP and the other established parties had proved incompetent; it 
was perceived within the reformists of the CHP as a potential challenge to the Party's 
support among the lower and middle classes, as well as the intellectual milieu. All 
in all, the palpable transformation within the CHP towards a Western style social 
democratic discourse was institutionalised largely on the personal charisma and the 
successful mobilisation of the local party organisations by the reformist action within 
the Party.
With regard to strategy in government, it may be suggested that economic policies 
pursued in Turkey in the 1970s used to be based on the populist concerns of 
electorally weak governments. As the social democratic CHP came to government 
either through coalitions or minority cabinets, its governmental strategy was
Ibid., 227.
Akdere and Karadeniz, Türkiye Solu, 262.
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considerably undermined, due to structural constraints, CPiP formed a coalition with 
the Islamist MSP in 1974, during which oil prices had doubled, stemming from the 
emergence of the OPEC Oil cartel that year. Attempting to restrain the prices of 
basic commodities through state subsidies, Turkey’s budgetary balance in those 
years revealed a genuine crisis.
Likewise, the minority cabinet of 1978 faced a similar situation. Although at first 
sight the essentials of the economic conjuncture during the 1970s may well appear to 
be of secondary importance within the framework of this study; a closer look at the 
particulars that have written the fortune of social democrats at that decade is believed 
to be of paramount value, for a better understanding of the structural constraints that 
the CHP’s strategy in government came across.
An inward oriented import substitution policy had been relatively successfully 
implemented in Turkey in the 1960s; with the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) 
performing as the backbone of industrial development within the framework drawn 
by the development plans. In 1970, Turkish Lira had to be devaluated by % 66.7, due 
largely to the growing gap in the balance of payments.’"' That proved to be a rational 
strategic choice at that time; as foreign currency reserves improved considerably in 
the following few y e a r s . B y  1973, however, a global crisis stemming from the 
emergence of the OPEC oil cartel, and the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system 
was approaching: Similar to the Great depression of 1929, no economy in the world 
escaped the outcomes of the tripled oil prices in 1974; to which the industrialised
Memduli Aslan Akçay, Para Politikası Araçları: Türkiye ve Çeşitli Ülkelerdeki Uygulamalar 
[Monetary Policy Instruments and Applications in Different Countries]. (Ankara; DPT, 1997), 96. 
Balance of payments has been a critical issues in Turkey in the course of economic gro \^’th; as 
Turkey used to pay some ninety percent of her export revenues to for importation of oil. (See 
Tables 19 and 20).
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countries in Western Europe responded with strict fiscal controls with sizeable cuts 
in public expenditure.
For Turkey however, the response given to the oil syndrome appeared to be 
grounded on electoral concerns rather than being effective policy instruments to 
combat the consequences of this crisis on macro-economic balances. Hence, instead 
of responding to the tripling oil costs with the necessary measures as was the case in 
the West, Turkey opted to finance her balance of payments gap largely through short 
term foreign loans; with a view not to reflect the increasing costs to prices, at the 
wake of the elections. Furthermore, agricultural support prices were announced to be 
higher than even the world prices in \91AJ^ bitterly providing a text-book example 
of populist policies at times of general elections. In addition, high costs of the 
Cyprus intervention exacerbated the already salient budget deficit
With a view to restrain inevitable price rises, efforts had been launched by the right- 
wing governments in 1975 for the channelling of the remittances of workers in 
Germany; which contributed, to some extent, to the balance of payments, for a while. 
As such, the inescapable adjustment of prices that should have been carried out 
earlier on time, could be suppressed only until 1978. Accordingly, the right-wing 
coalition government had to respond with adjustment measures such as devaluation, 
increased interest rates and contraction in Central Bank loans, with a view to
Tiirkijc Ticaret Odalan, Sana\i Odaları \e  Ticaret Borsalari Birliği (TOBB) [Turkish Union of 
Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Conunodit}· E.xchange]. iktisadi Rapor. (Ankara: TOBB, 
1975), 501.
'' DPT, V. Beş Yıllık Plan Destek Çalışmaları I, V. Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı Öncesinde Gelişmeler 
¡972-1983 (Ekonomik ve Sosyal Gelişmeler) [Grounding Studies for tlıe Fifth Fi\’e Year 
De\ eIopment Plan 1, De\'elopments before die Fiftli Fi\ e j ear development Plan 1972-1983 
(Economic and Social Developments)]. (Ankara; DPT, 1985), 102.
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encounter the observable impasse. By 1979, however, whereas no considerable 
increases in the volume exports could be achieved; short term foreign and domestic 
debt stock was climbing, to prepare the grounds for a genuine fiscal bottleneck. The 
crisis was further impelled by the re-doubling of world oil prices that year. As a 
result, the imports of investment goods and basic intermediate goods were reduced 
considerably, with industrial capacity utilisation and production falling in turn. 
During this period, excess state subsidies pumped liquidity expansion, appearing as a 
heavy inflationist pressure; thus undermining, in turn, working-life peace and
no
impelling social unrest.
The minority cabinet of the social democrats in 1978, therefore, inherited a legacy 
with a scarcity of basic commodities, and political impasse. Crude-oil imports had 
already been cut down in the year 1979, thus were unable to meet the growing 
demand. Similarly, the imports of iron and steel, the basic intermediate goods for 
industrial production, were also seized in 1978-79, due to the difficulties in the
79balance of payments.
Along with that, anarchy and domestic terror was climbing. On 22 December 1978, 
Kahramanmarat witnessed a provocation that resulted in 109 people dead and some
500 premises ruined. While that was generally held to be a confrontation between
80radical left and the right; for some, it was a fight between Sunni and Shaia sects. 
All in all, street battles between contending militant groups gravitated towards a
For an extensive discussion on the subject, see: Akçay, Para Politikası, 96-97.
DPT, V. Beş Yıllık Plan Destek Çalışmaları 1, V. Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı Öncesinde Gelişmeler 
1972-1983 (Ekonomik ve Sosyal Gelişmeler) [Grounding Studies for tlıe Fifth Fi '^e Year 
Development Plan 1, Developments before tlie Fiftli Fh e year development Plan 1972-1983 
(Economic and Social Developments)]. (Ankara: DPT, 1985), 78
Sina AK\h\,Ana Çizgileriyle Türkiye'nin Yakın Tarihi, 1789-1980 [Recent Turkish History', 1789- 
1980]. (Istanbul: Yenigiin Basin ve Yayıncılık AŞ., 1997), 149.
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hegemonic nature; and even persons who were known to be politically neutral were 
executed, their murderers remaining unidentified most of the times. Ecevit resigned 
in that conjuncture, on losing the by-elections of October 1979.
With regard to the Third Republic, Balkanisation would perhaps serve best to sketch 
the profile of social democratic strategy in Turkey. Inasmuch as the former CHP 
leader’s charisma had thoroughly helped to amalgamate the numerous factions 
inherent within the party, social democrats were torn into pieces following the 1980 
intervention. While no repetition of the already disserted facts in this context shall 
be attempted here, attention must be drawn to the fact that divisions within social 
democracy revolved around personal conflicts, rather than major ideological 
divergences. Despite that Ecevit persistently argued for the contrary, a clear 
demarcation between the ideological orientations of the two parties, indeed, appears 
dubious, as provided before in the section on ideology.
A major divergence, nevertheless, appears in the question on secularism. As can be 
expected, the contention on secularism and Islamism has always been a dilemma in 
Turkish politics that remain salient at the wake of 2000, as well. Having been 
excluded from politics in Western Europe nearly a century before, the religious 
cleavage has been functioning at full steam in Turkey. As any thorough discussion 
on the grounds of that cleavage is limited within the scope of this research, attention 
shall be drawn merely to the fact that secularism has been among the basic tenets of 
CfiP discourse since foundation. That Party, so far, did not appear to compromise 
from the secular stand both in rhetoric and in practice. Post-1980 social democracy 
however, ran into conflicts on that issue; stemming from the attitude of the DSP
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leader. Owing to the apparent fact that Ecevit has recently been observed to adopt a 
populist strategy towards Islamists, CHP remains as the sole political party in a 
strictly secular front, at present. As shall appear in due course, Islamist values and 
beliefs appear to constitute a significant dimension within the electoral fluency 
observed between these parties.
Not undeniable, the DSP leader seems to be increasingly opting for a populist 
strategy on the question of role of Islam in public life. With this respect, EcevH’s 
sympathy towards the leader of a popular Muslim sub-sect**' has already become a 
publicised issue. A meeting held by this sub-sect in Abant in 16-19 July 1998, on 
that account, was declared to be of “importance”, by the DSP leader.*^ Indeed, one 
of the chief aides of the DSP leader. Mümtaz Soysal alleged on resignation from the 
Party on 31 July 1998 that, “a personal liaison has been established between 
Fethullah Gülen and Ecevit, that unequivocally bind the Party as well.”*^  In fact, 
deriving from populist concerns is the fact that sympathy shown towards Islamists 
by DSP stems also from the electoral fight between this party and radical left groups 
in shanty-towns. Due to the fact that Islamic values are overwhelmingly prevalent 
within the marginalised shanty-town electorate, and that these constituencies remain 
to be of critical importance in electoral terms; a strategic competition between social 
democrats and the radical left seem to be continuing particularly in the shanty-towns 
of larger metropolitan regions, as Istanbul, Izmir ox Ankara. On the other hand, CHP, 
the other key political force on the social democratic front, is alleged to have hardly 
pursued a proficient strategy to cover the wider masses in these regions.
Fethullah Gülen 
Cumhuriyet (August 1, 1998).
Mümtaz Soysal, Cumhuriyet (July 31, 1998). 
*■' Sinan Dirlik, Milliyet (August 31, 1997).
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In Deniz Baykal's view, (CHP leader), Ecevil has fallen quite short of pursuing a 
proficient strategy for merging the pre-1980 CHP cadres into one party, in the 
aftermath of the intervention. While the main impetus behind that might have been 
stemming from a desire for a fresh start that to do away with the eroded legacy of the 
pre-1980 CHP; Ecevit’s uncompromising attitude towards the union of two social 
democratic parties, nonetheless, proved fallacious.*^ Indeed, the pre-1980 centre-left 
was by no means a social democratic movement, in Algan Hacaloglu's view; who 
argued that the former CHP was but a populist catch-all party that endeavoured to 
articulate the expectations of wider masses in slogans in the 1970s. Hence, the 
genuine transformation towards social democracy is being gradually architected only 
at the present.**'
Union of social democrats has become a stalemate since the restoration of civilian 
rule in 1983. For Ecevit, the merger of CHP and DSP would by no means solve the 
social democratic problem in Turkey. In his view, those who insist on merger are 
refuting the ideological inconsistency of CHP. In case of union, absolute left votes 
would decline, on the grounds that the DSP electorate would never vote for CHP. 
Besides, CHP has disillusioned its voters in both municipal and governmental 
administration, due largely to increasing intra-party corruption.*^ The unfortunate 
pattern of the 1991-95 coalition was further undermined by the reactionary upheaval 
in Sivas, in July 1993, which resulted in 37 dead. The Deputy Prime Minister, SHP 
leader Erdal İnönü, in particular, was to lose credit on the allegations that he had not 
intervened timely and effectively in the provocative incidents in Sivas^^.
Deniz Baj’kal, Milliyet (October 22, 1996) 
Algan Hacaloğlu, Milliyet (October 16, 1996).
Bülent Ecevit, Milliyet (October 23, 1996).
The Sivas case is presently in tlie Supreme Court {Yargıtay). The Court insists on 33 executions and
imprisonments varying from 20 to 5 years. Cumhuriyet, (July 24,1998).
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Equally important, according to the DSP leader, is the twofold fact that not only 
income distribution has deteriorated at the expense of the social democratic 
electorate, but also social security institutions have become bankrupt; thereupon 
undermining the basic tenets of social democratic claims. CHP in government, as 
such, had no less responsibility than that of the centre-right, in Ecevit’s view.*  ^True, 
that though GET* (former SPiP) in government as junior coalition partner between 
1991-95, was not granted any saying in the management of the economy; the 
weighty responsibility of the incompetent performance of the coalition fell on social 
democrats, too. As given in the preceding Chapter, the highest inflation rate of the 
entire Republican Period was recorded in 1994, when a grave crisis in money, capital 
and exchange markets erupted. Furthermore to help legitimise the DSP leader’s 
allegations in this context is that clientalism and corruption have become a practice 
in SFIP/CHP municipal administrations since 1989.^°
Indeed, even in areas that they were granted Ministerial positions, social democrats 
remained subservient to the centre-right master during the coalition 1991-95. Social 
democratic strategy in government hardly went beyond that of an inferior political 
partner. While for instance, the Prime Minister Mrs. Tamu Çiller was utilising the 
issue of European Union (EU) affairs for her personal prestige; her social democratic 
deputy^' hardly saw any reason for not remaining silent. Though firm commitment to 
Turkey’s European vocation has supposedly been one of the most prestigious tenets 
of CHP strategy, performance in government proved thoroughly incapable on this 
subject. Just the thing, that establishment of a customs union in 1995 has been
Ece\ it, Milliyet (October 23, 1996). 
Milliyet, (October 20, 1996)
91 Mr. Murat Karayalçın, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time.
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marketed by Mrs Çiller as if Turkey were accepted into the Union, seemed to be 
hardly of any concern to the social democratic wing of the cabinet, may help to 
throw light upon the incompetent strategy pursued even in subjects that the latter 
claimed proficiency.^^
Following from the above is the undeniable fact that the DSP wing of the present 
coalition in Turkey seems to be performing more skilfully, at least in foreign 
relations. Having been excluded from the enlargement process leading to the 
accession of the Central and Eastern European countries to the EU at the 
Luxembourg Summit of December 1997; the Turkish government, in turn, 
suspended political dialogue with the EU side; yet without prejudice to the economic 
relations under way in the framework of the customs union between the parties. The 
suspension of political dialogue covered in particular, issues such as Cyprus, 
relations with Greece, human rights and minorities. Some diplomatic grounding to 
that critical decision was also made, by enhancing relations with the US government. 
The present coalition also resists against any fails accomplis in Cyprus that may lead 
to a political Enosis on pressure from the EU side.^‘* In a nutshell, despite the fact 
that there have also been some considerable achievements as regards the functioning 
of the customs union, the DSP side of the coalition did not attempt to utilise the EU 
issue with electoral concerns as its predecessor had done. To that end, Ecevil and his
The realisation of a customs union as of end of the transitionary period (31.12.1995) of tlie 
Association between Turkey and the EC had been foreseen in tire Ankara Agreement of 1963; 
;\ hercfrom the final stage of the Association that may lead to full membership to Üie Comminty 
has begun in accordance with tlie normal procedure. However, tJiis issue was presented by the 
go\ermnent as a “\'ictory” üiat Turke\· has attained witliin the framework of her Einopean 
vocation.
ANAP/DSP coalition founded in July 1997.
Ecevit and liis Minister of Foreign Affairs seemed to be mindful of the fact tliat, accession 
negotiations with Southern Cyprus, as declared by the EU, may well imply a practical annexation 
o f the Island to Greece.
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Foreign Minister^^ can be said to have performed as the relevant conjuncture 
required, insofar as delicate matters in foreign policy are concerned. It is also 
interesting to observe here that the particular historicity within which social 
democratic strategy has evinced from 1974 to 1998, begins with and culminates in 
Ecevit.
Table 9.
Electoral Performance of the Centre-Left in the Third Turkish Republic
(Parliamentary Elections) 96
DSP SHP/CHP
Years Votes % Seats Votes % Seats
1983 5285804 29 117
1987 2044576 5931000 24.1 99
1991 2624301 10.6 5066571 20.1 88
1995 4118025 14.6 76 İ011076 10.7 49
Source: DIE [State Institute of Statistics]
4.4. Organisation: Leadership hegemony
As of autumn 1998, DSP’s fortune appears to be of a dual nature. On the one side is 
the party’s image as the partner to a coalition, which can be said to have taken some 
concrete steps in critical areas such as education and tax r e f or m. On the other hand, 
however, is the DSP leader’s uncompromising attitude towards union or even 
electoral alliance within the social democratic front, at the wake of the forthcoming 
elections in spring 1999. There have been a number of resignations from the Party on
Minister of Foreign Affairs at present is Mr. Ismail Cem.
For 1983, HP votes are g i\en  for SHP/CHP; as HP and SODEP merged with SHP in 1985; and 
SHP with CHP in 1995. Tlie percentages of the votes w on by tire parties ha\'e been calculated on 
the basis of the ratio of the total votes cast by each part)· to the number of actual voters pro\ ided 
from the DIE.
’’ Compulsory elementary le\ el education was raised from 5 to 8 years; and a comprehensi\e ta.\ 
reform was adopted.
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the grounds that DSP is becoming a leader party instead of a genuinely democratic 
one. Most notable among the party members who abandoned DSP was Miimiaz 
Soysal, a key figure in Turkish social democracy. Resigning from DSP on 
29.7.1998, Soysal declared that the party was being perceived as the property of the 
Ecevit family, instead of having been organised as a legal personality. Severely 
criticising the organisational framework in particular; Mümtaz alleged that the party 
leadership enjoyed absolute authority over members and MPs, as well as the local 
branches; and that the administrative boards of the latter were being changed
98arbitrarily on personal demand from the leadership.
Another weighty protest stemming from organisational deficiency in social 
democracy came from СЫР. Having resigned from his party on 15 July 1997, Aydın 
Güven Gürkan ’s accusations towards his party have been of a similar nature. In fact, 
the motive behind the relinquishment of these two key politicians converged in 
essence; both alleged that there existed a leadership dictatorship in their parties, 
wherefrom they declared that left politics ought not function that way. Gürkan and 
Soysal both forcefully claimed that ways and means for intra-party democracy were 
entirely obstructed. In spite of all that, both the DSP and CHP leaders have turned 
deaf ears to these key politicians. Ecevit even declared on the day of Soysal’s 
resignation that the latter’s attempt was but an unimportant incident.
Sencer Ayata had observed with this respect that the organisational structure and 
leadership have had significant implications for the crisis of social democracy in 
Turkey. Actually, both the left and the right of centre have been suffering, since
Mümtaz Soysal, Cumliurivet. (July 30, 1998).
Mustafa Balbay, “Gündem” (The Agenda), Cumliurivet. (July 31, 1998). 
‘'^ “ Cumhuriyet, (July 29, 1998)
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long, from the rhetoric on “party for the leader”. Thereupon, in Ayata’s view, the 
hegemonic discourse on absolute obedience to the leader has given way to the 
phenomenon of raising party members, whose political activities are confined to 
serving their leader only; indeed to keep the leader in that position. In the final 
analysis, the party members are alienated from the electorate and become 
unreceptive of fresh insights.'“' Serving the interests of limited groups, therefore, 
party politics in Turkey has continuously been losing prestige, within which, 
clientelism has become a common practice.'“^  Ercan Karakat, a credible figure 
within the social democratic milieu, has also claimed that the intra-party law and 
CHP regulation have been overtly violated in the past; to which, party leaders
1 mremained silent in order to preserve their hegemonic status.
Actually, the dilemma of organisational deficiency is not a new phenomenon to 
social democracy in Turkey; which, has to be viewed from a wider perspective than 
can be attributed to the centre-left only. Instead, the general features of the 
organisational framework of political parties in Turkey are closely related to 1) the 
parties’ origins, 2) their developmental processes and 3) their status within the 
political system.'“'' A fourth dimension stems from the fact that clientelism has been 
functional for the development and expansion of party politics in Turkey.'“  ^Last but 
not least is the implication of the provisions in the Law on Political Parties.'“*’ 
Therefrom and with regard to the first aspect, Maurice Duverger’s thesis that
Sencer Ayata, Milliyet. (October 20, 1998) 
Gürsel S, Milliyet, (October 20, 1998)
Ercan Karakat, Sosyal Demokrasinin Şansı [The Chance for Social Democrac>·]. (Istanbul: 
SODE V Yayınlan, 1996).
Arsev Bekta(, Demokratiklepne Sürecinde Liderler Oligartisi, CHP ve AP (1961-1980) 
[Leaderslüp Oligarchy \^ ’ilhin the Process o f Démocratisation, CHP and AP (1961-1980)]. 
(Istanbul; Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1993),39.
Ozbudun, “The Nature o f the Kemalist”, 1981
Ergun Ozbudun , “Siyasi Partiler ve Demokrasi”. In Siyasi Partiler ve Demokrasi [Political Parties 
and Democracy], ed.TESAV, 1-26, (Hürriyet Gazetecilik A.T., Ankara:1995).
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political parties carry the legacy of their roots in foundation’®^  must also be 
reiterated in this context.
In that respect, it appears that leadership has always been the backbone of party 
organisation in Turkey. The 1923 Party Regulation of CHP had provided that in his 
capacity as the chairman of the Congress, the Party Council, the Parliamentary 
Group and the General Administrative Board {Umumi İdare Heyeti)·, the Party 
Leader enjoys the right to speak for the Party, unless stated otherwise by the 
leader.'®^ Party Regulations from 1927 to 1935 contained similar provisions. 
Hierarchical power from top to down was further reinforced in the supra-normal 
Congress of 1938 held immediately following Ato/w-yir’s death. In the 1938 Congress, 
Party regulation was amended such that İsmet İnönü was the unalterable leader of 
CHP, and that Mustafa Kemal was the spiritual leader.'®® The provision on 
unalterable leadership was abolished on the Second supra-normal Congress of May 
1946; shortly before the first multi-party elections in October that year."® Aydemir's 
view on the initial organisational framework of CHP in the single party period was 
such that;
“CHP has never been a parliamentary body founded within a multi-party 
democracy. It was not a party of members recruited from the masses, and 
one remaining with them; and continued as such till transition to multi­
party regime. Indeed, CHP was the political cadre of an authoritarian 
state order; it was a leader party, a state party.” '"
Maurice Dm erger, “Siyasi Partiler [Political Parties]” 15.
Party Regulation of 11.9,1923, Art.18; cited in: Kabasakal M, 1991, Türkiye’de Sivasal Parti 
Örgütlenmesi : 1908-1960. (Political Party Organisation in Turkey: 1908-1960); (Tekin yayınlan, 
Istanbul), 138.
Tunaya, “Türkiye 'de Siyasi Partiler”, 572-573.
"M bid.,'574-575.
Aydem ir,” İkinçLAdarn (The Second Man)”, Vol:3,132.
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With regard to the second dimension mentioned above, hegemonic status of 
leadership continued during the developmental process of the Party in the multi­
party regime. Attention must be drawn, in this respect, to the though discipline on 
the parliamentary party group; stemming from the leader’s authority to nomination 
for candidacy. Indeed, that owes to the legacy of the CHP in the single-party period; 
candidates for the parliament used to be nominated by Atatürk between 1930 and 
1946. Although party organisations, from the 1947 Congress onward were granted 
this right"^, authority of the party leaders remained salient in the organisational 
framework of the CHP. Despite the fact that the local organisational scheme of the 
party appeared to be significantly democratic, they remained limited in number and 
in scope to influence party politics; due largely to the tight control on them by the 
leadership. Local organisations were established in districts, villages, towns and 
cities, whose administrative devices used to be appointed by the party leadership in 
the single-party period.*'^ Thereupon, Aydemir has reported that ''''İsmet İnönü did 
not have a party ready for political competition that is prepared to meet the demands 
of the masses” in transition to multi-party regime; as this party was “neither founded 
nor brought up for that purpose”. In that sense, CHP was indeed, “not a party or a 
mass organisation that parliamentary system required”, in Aydemir's, view.
Insofar as the aforementioned third aspect on the status of parties within the political 
system, it has to be emphasised that the formation of central and local party 
organisations remained largely under the hegemony of the etraf and the elites since
Kabasakal, “Political Parti Organisation”, 143-145.
'' ^  Organisation o f political parties in villages and districts stretch back to the “İttihat ve Terakki ” 
period. Indeed, this organisational scheme was adopted also by the “Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti", 
yet it remained limited in scope stemming largely from tlie war-time conjuncture in Anatolia. 
Since foundation as a political party, CHP adopted tliis tradition as well. (Ibid., 225.)
Aydem ir,” İkinci Adam (The Second Man)”, Vol:3,85-86.
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the outgrowth of the Jön Türk Movement. The social background of founders and 
members oi "jtiihat ve Terakki" reveal that the Party cadres were comprised of 
mektepliler (the erudite), the bureaucratic elite and the middle classes; to which the 
etraf and the land-owners were incorporated following the expansion of the Party 
organisation in the Anatolian heartland."^ Despite the fact that newly emerging 
social groups were gradually being incorporated into political participation since 
1940s, members of elite families continued to enjoy dominance on party 
administrations.’*^ Thence, the political groupings in the Ottoman politics of the 
past century largely survived to have significant implications for the party system in 
the Republican Period; and “the role of the İttihat ve Terakki as the centralising, 
secularising and nationalistic element was now played by the CHP”.” ’ CHP’s de 
facto  status as the “State Party” was legitimised in the 1935 Congress, such that 
whereas the Minister for Interior Affairs was elected Party Secretary and member of 
the General Administrative Board; Governors (va//) were granted local Party 
leadership in their respective provinces.”  ^ While participation of members into the 
formation of party politics remained limited; local party organisations, as such, acted 
almost as a coalition of '’’'etraf and party/state elites” that remained aloof from the 
masses at large.
Transition to multi-party politics and the election defeat in 1950 constituted the main 
thrust behind the efforts at the establishment of intra-party democracy in C.HP. In 
1951, the Party Congress was granted the right of electing the party leader, the 
secretary general and the General Administrative Board. Besides, local organisations
"Mbid., 69-70.
Bektap “Liderler Oligartisi”, 39.
'' ^  Özbuduıı, “Social Change ", 41.
*'* Timaya, “Türkiye 'de Siyasi Partiler”, 572.
119 A}'ata, “CHP Örgüt ve ideoloji [CHP Organisation and Ideology]”, 74-75.
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were granted the right to nominate candidates for the Parliament. With the local 
organisations gradually acquiring more powers, some progress towards 
institutionalisation of a grass-root organisation at the expense of an elite cadre was 
observed in the 1950s and the following years. During 1960s, whilst the Party 
Leader İnönü was backed by the Parliamentary Party; Secretary General Ecevit has 
been able to recruit support largely from the provincial organisations. As such, the 
provincial branches of CHP played a significant role in mobilising support for the 
reformist group at that period. With this regard, Ecevit had promised to 
institutionalise a stronger branch system within which, intra-party democracy would 
enhance greater responsiveness of the Party Administration to the demands of the 
local branches. The démocratisation of the party organisation gained momentum 
particularly after the ideological shift of CHP under Ecevifs leadership from 1972 
onward; which implied, by and large, not only a social democratic movement but 
also an organisational change that was “operative in transforming the party
structure .120
However, the Law on Political Parties adopted in 1965 (as inspired by the 1961 
Constitution) had abolished village/district organisations. Since then, local 
organisational scheme of political parties in Turkey has been limited to provincial 
and town l e v e l . A s  propelled by the social democratic impetus given to the party 
in the 1970s; the 1974 Congress aimed at the transformation of the organisational 
scheme along with the fundamentals of that of the Swedish SAP. “Party Membership 
Registration System” {Parti Genel Kütüğü) was introduced in December 1978;
Aj-^e Giine{ Ayata, “Class and Clientelisin in Üıe Republican People’s Party”. In Turkish State, 
Turkish Society, eds., Andrew Finkel and Niikliet Sırman, 159-184. (London: Rouledge Books, 
1990), 160.
Provincial and to\\n le^’el; / /  ve İlçe Teşkilatları. Village/District Organisations: Ocak-Bucak 
Teşkilatlan
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which implied, by and large, a serious attempt at the transformation of CHP towards 
becoming a mass p a r t y . W i t h  this regard, CPiP also endeavoured to establish 
relations with trade unions, in particular with DISK^^^
Nevertheless, whereas subsidiary and affiliated organs such as youth and women 
branches existed, a genuine and an effective coordination among these and the party 
members at large could not be achieved. Party activities peaked only during election 
campaigns or Congresses; a tendency that may well be attributed to Turkish party 
politics in general. For CHP, it was still a cadre party whose local organisations were 
dependent on committees of comprising of local notables in their respective regions; 
except those of the larger metropolitan cities. As Diiverger has put it, a significant 
feature of cadre parties is that usually elites are recruited for carrying out party 
activities such as election campaigns or contacts with candidates. Quite the contrary, 
mass parties require the party members to actively participate in party activities at all
times. 125
With this regard, the social democratic CHP’s efforts towards transformation into a 
mass party in the 1970s remained partial; in that despite the establishment of Party 
Membership Registration System by the beginning of 1979, institutionalisation of 
this scheme was interrupted as the CHP was banned in 1980. Thence, regular 
membership registration and membership fees to contribute to the finances of the 
party, the two crucial aspects of mass parties as defined by Duverger, could not be 
consummated in the case of the CHP. It may be suggested therefrom that the CHP
Bektat, “Liderler Oligartisi”, 46-49.
DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları) is a trade union with centre-left affiliations. 
Bekta{, “Liderler Oligartisi”, 50.
Duverger, “Siyasi Partiler [Political Parties]” 107.
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was still a cadre party when criteria for membership was borne in mind; and that 
existence of sympathisers that vote for the party at times of elections do not 
necessarily fulfil the conditions for being a mass party,
In this framework is also the implication of clientelistic relations within party 
politics in Turkey. For a deeper understanding of clientelism in Turkish politics, a 
number of historic facts already analysed in the relevant sections of this study, have 
to briefly reiterated in this context. Among these is firstly the fact that despite the 
established tradition of party politics in Turkey, and incorporation of political parties 
into the Parliament in the Second Constitutionalist Period;'^’ wider masses, 
nevertheless, remained largely excluded from political parties. Second, is that the 
centre-periphery gap, in the form of a cultural/socio-economic polarity remained 
intact in Turkey until recently. Concurrent has been the rise of “factional leaders” 
from high status notable families; each with dominance over alliances based on 
kinship, ethnic, religious or communitarian oppositions.'^^ Third, and due to the 
prolongation of agricultural economy is that peasant problem prevailed in Turkish 
politics even in the Republican Period.
One of the significant features of the structural conjuncture briefly sketched above 
was the dominance of “rural elites” in the form of local semi-feudal lords (ağa), 
land-owners, sheiks or tribal lords {atiret reisleri) over the peasantry in the 
countryside. Due to the low degree of state and market penetration, these rural elites
'■'■'Ibid., 106-107, Bektaf, “Liderler Oligartisi", S\.
'■ Wliile a number of political mo\’ements/organisations came into existence in tlie Ottommi Empire 
since 1859; T. Z. Tunaya, in liis classical work on political parties in Turkey, holds the year 1908 
as tlie reference for emergence of modern political parties.
Sabri Sayan, “Some Notes on the Beginnings of Mass Political Participation in Turkey”. In 
Political Participation in Turkey, eds. E. Akarh, and G.Ben-Dor, 121-133. (İstanbul. Boğaziçi 
Ü nh’crsitesi Yayınlan, 1975), 123.
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used to enjoy a near monopoly over local power sources; wherefrom patron-client 
relations acquired political dimensions as electoral competition was prompted during 
the multi-party period. Most outstanding implication of political party competition 
has thus become recruitment of local patrons and followers into the party ranks. 
Along with such traditional notables was the ascent of a new. group of professionals 
such as lawyers, doctors or businessmen with sizeable clientele, most of which were 
won by party organisations in the urban centres. All in all, incorporation of both rural 
and urban patrons and clients into party politics gradually became a strategic 
instrument, at a time of rapid mass mobilisation. As parties focused more on securing 
support from faction leaders and these local patrons, “vertical networks of loyalties” 
gravitated towards hegemony in party politics in Turkey.'"^ Although clientelism 
remained dominant form of participation more in right-wing parties, it went on to 
undermine social democracy as well; as studies on CHP’s organisational framework
130may indicate.
At a time of rapid political mobilisation and mass urban migration, the locus of 
electoral competition in Turkey, therefore, lay on non-ideological issues, rather than 
class based interests. Despite the fact that cultural/territorial type of cleavages were 
gradually being replaced by functional cleavages in the Second Republic;’^ ' 
nonetheless, “vertical networks of personal followings” that were heterogenous and 
non-ideological in nature used to prevail, rather than “horizontal type of 
mobilisation” comprising of people with similar status or c l a s s . I t  may be 
suggested thereupon that vertical solidarities driven essentially by patronage
'j^lbid., 124-125.
Ay|e G. Ayata, 1990, “Class and Clientelism in tlie Republican People’s Party”, in: Finkel A. and 
Sinnan N.(eds), Turkish State, Turkish Society; Ayata, “CHP Örgüt”
Özbudun, “Social Change", 116-117.
Sa}’an, “ Beginnings of Mass Political Participation”, 126-133.
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distribution continue to undermine Turkish politics; within which social democratic 
parties may hardly constitute any exception.
Last but not least in the organisational framework of party politics in Turkey is the 
relevance of the Law on Political Pa r t i e s . I t  has been suggested that the Law not 
only contains many detailed provisions that may normally have been left to 
individual party regulations; but that it also imposes a “single-type model” of 
organisation to political parties.’ "^' Furthermore in this context is the very fact that, as 
establishment of organic relations with trade unions is banned; institutionalisation of 
an organisational framework similar to those observed in Western European social 
democratic parties becomes impossible in T u r k e y . T h e  most significant 
implication of the provisions inherent in Law No. 2820, therefore, is firstly that a 
genuine model of interlocking layers of subsidiary branches, within which, a 
regional level representing a few provincial branches to serve as a bridge between 
the Party centre and the individual province does not exist in Turkey. Second, is the 
lack of village/district {ocak-bucak) and workplace organisations that constitute the 
most outstanding dissimilarity with the Western European type of social democratic 
organisation. Last but not least in this context is that pre-election of candidates is not 
compulsory according to the Law. Political parties, thence, may nominate candidates 
either through the central organisation or may opt for election when they deem it 
necessary; that inescapably gives vent to oligarchic practices within the party.
Law No. 2820 dated: April 22, 1983 (OJ No. 18027; April 24, 1983) 
Özbudun , “Siyasi Partiler ve Demokrasi”, 1-7. 
ibid.,8. 
ibid: 13-14
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Any achievement as regards the functioning of intra-party democracy appears to be 
almost infinitesimal so far. While passing the Law on the 1999 Elections, The 
Parliament of 1998 did not opt to adopt the proposal on the amendment that would 
render the pre-elections of candidates compulsory. Seyfi Oktay, Chairman of the 
Constitutional Commission of the Parliament'^’ resigned in turn, and declared that:
“Politics in Turkey has become a device functioning under the hegemony 
of a certain group. It turned into oligarchy; into a hierarchical structure 
that is administered from top to the bottom. This situation stems from the 
anti-democratic provisions still inherent within the Law on Elections.” '·^ *
Social Democrat ic Performance in Turkey in the Multi-
Party Period
Votes (%)
^ D S P  Votes (%)  
U C H P  Votes (%)
Figure 8.
4.5. Main Profile of Social Democracy in Turkey: Elite Driven Oligarchy
The outgrowth of main political cleavages and the emergence of socialist currents in 
the Ottoman-Turkish society were structured on the legacy of a particular land tenure 
system that social organisation of production was devised upon. Whilst the 
civil/military bureaucratic elite constituted the locus of the functioning of that
Tiirkije Büyük Millet Meclisi Anayasa Komisyonu Başkanı. Seyfi Oktay is a member of Üıe 
Parliament from CHP.
Cumhuri\et. (August 1, 1998)
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distinctive socio-political order, rest of the society remained largely aloof from the 
affairs of the body politic. In this framework, an apparent centre-periphery gap 
carved the rationale of political development of the Ottoman Empire in centuries. 
The unchallenged absolute authority of the Sultan complemented the strong state 
tradition of the Ottomans.
On the other hand, an overwhelmingly agrarian economy remained intact in the 
Turkish land until recently. Accordingly, the Ottoman economy still revealed pre- 
capitalistic characteristics, by the time the Industrial Revolution in Europe had 
already been materialised. One of the notable implications of this circumstance has 
been the development of cleavages on the basis of cultural/territorial antagonisms, 
rather than conflicts stemming from the distribution of resources and benefits in the 
economy. Indeed, the politics of both the “distributional problem” and of the “grand 
affairs of the state” remained alien to the masses. The administrative apparatus has 
been functioning such that the state elites were placed at the heart of the politics of 
the Empire; whereas wider masses were excluded from that process. On the other 
hand, the minute mass of workers in the Empire was by no means in a position to 
form a cohesive political force, either.
The formative phase of modern Turkish politics was inaugurated with the emergence 
of the opposition thrust against the absolute authority of the Sultan in the nineteenth 
century. Political attempts especially within the state elites and the intelligentsia 
were increasingly getting organised for the institutionalisation of the Empire as a 
Constitutional Monarchy. Ottoman socialist thought emerged in such a conjuncture, 
among a surge of different political currents. Yet, similar to other political
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movements of that time, socialist thought remained as an “elite business” confined to 
the intellectual practices of a limited number of the “enlightened”; hence excluded 
mass participation in the society at large. An array of different attempts at socialism 
throughout xht Miidafaa-i Hukuk period also lacked a genuine mass base.
The origins of contemporary social democratic politics, on the other hand,can be 
traced in the State Party tradition that initially emerged as a resistance movement in 
Anatolia against Allied occupation. Establishment of the nation-state on a modern 
basis in the aftermath of the Miidafaa-i Hukuk Period was consummated on the 
revolutionary impetus given to the national movement by the military/civil 
bureaucratic elites. The latter not only constituted the core of the CHP, but also 
continued to form the basis of its social support in Republican Turkey. The 
outgrowth of modern social democratic efforts in Turkish politics was framed on the 
basis of the ideological and strategic transformation of CHP towards the left of 
centre during the Second Republic. The reformist group that attempted at the 
transformation had directed its effors at the revival of the revolutionary thrust of the 
Kemalist principles.and argued for the incorporation of fresh insights into them. The 
development of social democratic politics thenceforward, appeared to be located in 
the interplay of basic social democratic values and Kemalist themes. Thereupon, the 
relevant structural conjuncture and the prevalent ideological contentions during the 
emergence of social democracy in Turkey have become clear.
In terms of ideology, the chronicle of socialism in Turkey can be stretched back to 
the Second Constitutionalist Period. The relevant ideologies were founded on the 
principles of utopian socialism rather than those of revolutionary political socialism;
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and to some extent on the basic tenets of liberal thought. They also tended to 
preserve basic Muslim motifs within their ideological stances. Indeed, the adjacent 
socialist currents that emerged during the National Liberation Movement in Anatolia 
followed a similar ideological path in terms of their fundamentals such as emphasis 
on economic deprivation, social injustice and exploitation by capital owners; as well 
as claims for a fairer distributional policy and preservation of Islamist values. Yet, as 
these currents lacked a genuine mass base, they did not appear to be of significance 
within the emergence of social democracy in the Second Republic. Rather, social 
democracy in Turkey was to be framed on the legacy of the CHP.
Fundamentals of CHP ideology in the single-party years were put forth as 
republicanism, étatism, nationalism, secularism, populism and revolutionism. In the 
aftermath of the transformation towards the centre-left, CHP refuted any 
identification with Marxist origins and largely discredited class politics. Instead, 
basic motifs within CHP ideology have been the preservation of Kemalisi values, 
enhancement of social justice, fairer distribution of wealth and supervision of 
economic activity by the state. Although the division of the social democratic front 
from 1980 onwards did not tend to imply fundamental contentions on ideology; a 
demarcation between the programs of the two parties of the centre-left, nevertheless, 
can be drawn with regard to the role of markets. Whereas a more prudential attitude 
towards laissez-fairé prevails in the DSP program; CHP seems to placing emphasis 
on the markets and on globalisation of the economy. As for commitment to 
secularism and other Kemalist values, the approach of both parties, by and large, 
tend to converge. Thereupon, the essentials of the competition between these two
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social democratic parties of the Third Republic fall on personal conflicts, instead of 
fundamental ideological divergences.
The strategy of social democratic politics accompanied to a large extent the process 
in which it developed. Before the ideological transformation towards the centre-left, 
CHP strategy in the single-party period was devised upon the structural conditions 
prevalent in the young Republic. Therefrom, rapid industrialisation of the agrarian 
Turkish economy, the creation of a sizeable public sector in most of the economic 
activities, maintenance of balanced budgets remained as one of the essentials of CHP 
strategy in this context. For social strategy, CHP attempted to disseminate Kemalist 
ideology within the masses, as became clear throughout the analysis.
Insofar as the critical transformation towards the left of centre is concerned, the 
analysis reveals that it has been a strategic choice directed at the institutionalisation 
of CHP as a mass party on social democratic motifs. In this context, the actor- 
oriented approach seems to be useful for the explanation of the transformation 
towards social democracy, as the strategic shift for transformation was devised on 
the organisational capability for the mobilisation of the intra-party reformist faction. 
However, it becomes evident on the other hand, that the fortune of social democratic 
governments was largely undermined on structural constraints stemming from the 
unfavourable domestic and foreign conditions at that period.
Most notable aspects of social democratic strategy in the Third Republic have been 
personal conflicts on one hand and the divergence on the question of secularism, on 
the other. With respect to the former issue, whilst the personal charisma of the pre-
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1980 CHP leader had been instrumental in holding the contending intra-party 
factions; the social democratic front was divided into fractures in the aftermath of the 
interregnum in 1980. For secularism, as Islamist discourse tended to rise in the 
politics of the Third Republic, the social democratic front ran into conflicts on the 
extent of the compromise given with regard to the secular basis of the state device. 
Whereas CHP seems to have adopted an unreconciled attitude on this issue; the 
lower overtones of the DSP strategy towards the Islamists are, by and large, prone to 
criticism by those in the secular milieu. As shall be reiterated below, this strategic 
divergence on this issue tends to imply some elaborate shifts within the social basis 
of the support for these parties.
With regard to the social basis of support, it has to be re-emphasised here that the 
cleavage system which gave the impetus for the outgro^vth of the social basis of 
support for political parties in Turkey was founded on the prolongation of an elite- 
mass gap, rather than functional conflicts. The social composition of support for 
CHP in the single-party years used to be the bureaucratic elite, the etraf and the big 
land-owners; founded on the legacy of the particular circumstance of the Miidafaa-i 
Hnkuk years. As that alliance was broken in the multi-party period; the state elites 
continued to constitute the core of CHP support until the electoral re-alignments 
observed during the Second Republic. Collateral was the fact that CHP support from 
the urban centres in the more developed regions became distinguishable,during this 
period.
Social basis of support underw'ent some considerable changes in the Third Republic. 
Foremost among these is the evident fact that the centre-left has absolutely lost
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support from 1989 onwards. Another notable aspect of the social base is such that 
whereas the SHP/CHP support is centred more on white-collar jobs, civil servants, 
students and employers; electoral basis of DSP seems higher among blue-collar 
workers. Accordingly, whilst the support of blue-collar electorate for both parties 
tend to remain stable, that of the civil servants are observed to be increasing. 
Furthermore, centre-left support appears to be higher among those with better 
education; when compared especially to the support given to the right. In this 
respect, SHP votes in particular are observed to be correlated to higher levels of 
education. Last but not least is the increasing volatility and the descent of centre-left 
votes in urban centres in the 1990s. In this context, the crucial uncertainty whether 
CHP support owes to the legacy of Kemalism, and that of DSP to the personal 
charisma of its leader, remains unsettled so far.
Organisational structure is the final key to the completion of the main framework of 
Turkish social democracy. Indeed, while writing for more than eighty years ago on 
political parties, Robert Michels might well have been elaborating on how political 
parties functioned in Turkey in the 1990s. Michels was arguing in 1911 that the 
intrinsic deficiencies of modern democracy, especially domination by the leadership 
over the masses, was not necessarily stemming from underdevelopment, lower levels 
of education or capitalistic power control on society at large; but rather from the 
oligarchic tendencies inherent within any complex system. Oligarchy, the control of 
a society or an organisation by those at the top, was characteristic of a bureaucratic 
or a large-scale social organisation at any given time or place. Endeavouring to 
illustrate, in essence, the incompatibilities of representative democracy with the 
notion of “general will”; Michels went on to demonstrate the ironically oligarchic
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structures of the trade unions and socialist parties of his time that had been fighting 
for the consolidation of democratic order since long.
What exhibits relevance for Turkey inMc/re/’s work is particularly the argument put 
forth with regard to the “stability of leadership” and “identification of the party with 
the leader”. Insofar as the former is concerned, it has been emphasised that 
attachment to tradition and personal considerations, in particular, are likely to 
preserve long tenure of office; that in turn, impedes logical application of democratic 
principles, thence involving dangers for d e m o c r a c y . I t  becomes possible, 
therefore, that the re-election of leaders is taken as a matter of course, and that even a 
certain pressure is exercised in order to secure their re-election; although in theory, 
every elector is free to vote. Thereupon, the certain rights enjoyed by the leadership 
usually grants them a privilege of an essentially oligarchic in nature; depriving the 
individuals within a political party of their fundamental liberty for action. Another 
oligarchic practice, in this framework, stems from the habit of nepotism. As 
nomination of candidates depends upon cliques of local leaders and their aides that 
usually suggest suitable names to the rank and file; the constituency, many times, 
comes to be regarded as a “family property”.'"'* As stated hy Michels:
“It is in this manner that the leaders of an eminently democratic party, 
nominated by indirect suffrage, prolong throughout their lives the powers 
with which they have once been invested. The re-election demanded by 
the rules becomes a pure formality. The temporary commission becomes 
a permanent one, and the tenure of office an established right. The 
democratic leaders are firmly established in their seats than ever were the 
leaders of an aristocratic body...
' Robert Michels, "Political Parties, A Sociological Study o f the Oligarchical Tendencies o f Modern 
Democracy", Irans. Eden and Cedar Paul. The Crowell-Collier Publisliing Company, 1962. 
Reprint. New York: The Free Press, 1968.
Michels, "Oligarchical Tendencies'" , 120-121.
Ibid., 127-128.
Ibid., 122.
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Collateral with the above, it has been suggested for the “identification of the party 
with the leader” that the hegemony of the leaders do not necessarily stem from a 
severe greed for power or from unrestrained egoism, but is often the consequence of 
an actual persuasion of their own eminence and of the services which they have 
rendered to their party. As such, all objective criticism of the party is taken by the 
leader as a personal attack; and personal criticism as aimed at the party as a whole.
Bearing in mind the fundamentals of the organisational framework of Turkish social 
democracy in the Third Republic, it may be suggested that the case of Turkey is a 
telling example in many ways. As stated in the foregoing analysis on organisation; 
the rhetoric on “party for the leader” has been functioning at full steam in Turkish 
politics. In the aftermath of the single-party period within which, the leaders held 
nearly a monopolistic status, hegemony of leadership remained salient in the multi­
party regime as well; paving the way for the institutionalisation of almost 
unconditional obedience to the leader, instead of democratic practices within the 
party. On that account, and due largely to the prevailing clientelism in Turkish 
politics, the development of mass mobilisation driven essentially by horizontal 
solidarities, and enhancement of intra-party democracy could not have been 
consummated so far.
Mass political participation in Turkey, beyond any doubt, is a new phenomenon to 
Turkish politics, due in large part to the prolongation of the elite-mass gap for 
centuries. As mass mobilisation was prompted with transition to multi-party regime, 
the wider sections of the society, especially the peasantry that had remained outside 
the political game, was abruptly incorporated into competitive politics from 1946 
onward. That indeed, stood in sharp contrast with Western Europe in which the
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institutionalisation of mass political participation has been a gradual process with the 
active participation of especially the social democratic forces. Besides, the peasant 
question had all but been eliminated from national politics of many countries in 
Europe, before mass political enfranchisement. That implied, in essence, the 
introgression of new actors in national politics of Turkey; most of which were drawn 
from clientelist networks of alliances; rather than functional solidarities as in Europe. 
As put forth by Sabri Saywi:
“The division of many rural communities into two political groups, each 
supporting one of the two major parties, proved to be highly significant 
in the formation of national-local links and the crystallisation of voter 
alignments. Factional oppositions and alliances based on kinship, ethnic, 
religious or community-oriented cleavages reflected the segmentary 
aspect of the social structure at the local level.”
Thence, political competition in Turkey have been revolving, in large part, either 
around personalistic considerations or benefit allocations of a clientelist nature; 
rather than ideological or pragrammatic demarcations as in the West. Despite the fact 
that patronage distribution remained relatively limited within CHP during the single­
party period, due largely to the elitist and bureaucratic approach that it inherited from 
its “state-party” years;''Nevertheless, vertical alliances within a clientelist structure 
remains intact in Turkish politics. Therefrom, protrudes the fact that whereas social 
democratic politics ought to be a horizontal mass movement, as seems to be the case 
in Western Europe; in Turkey, it developed as an elite-driven bureaucratic 
endeavour, practised and supported by loyalties of vertical type.
In the final analysis, it becomes clear that social democracy in Turkey did not 
develop on functional cleavages confined to conflicts over the question of resource
' Sayan, “ Beginnings o f Mass Political Participation”, 123. 
'"Mbid., 131.
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allocation, as observed in the Western settings. As Turkey’s transition to 
industrialisation was retarded for almost a century, there came into existence no 
substantially organised worker movements that in turn, were to organise into a 
cohesive political force to give impetus to the emergence of social democracy in that 
polity. Building upon that is also the deficiency of social democracy in Turkey in 
terms of solidarity with the working classes and its institutions; unlike the Western 
European tradition that rests on organic links with trade-unions. Thence, rather than 
stemming from class concerns and their projection into ideological movements; 
Turkish social democracy grounded on non-flmctional issues such as cultural or 
peripheral controversies.
Traditionally, left politics in Turkey remained largely confined to the intelligentsia 
and failed to evolve into a mass movement with a sound social base. Autocratic and 
clientelistic practices also impeded the outgrowth of a social democratic politics as 
observed in Europe. Instead, the apparently social democratic values adopted by the 
CHP during the Kemalist period seem to have been pursued on purely pragmatic 
grounds, rather than an ideological orientation. Nonetheless, the historic ties between 
the former CHP and the intellectuals seem to be prevailing in Turkish politics, when 
the observed relationship between support for social democratic parties and the level 
of education is borne in mind. Yet, social democrats so far, largely failed to develop 
a fresh discourse that is prepared to meet the challenges of the decade. Instead, they 
still seem to be depending either on personal charisma or on the prevailing credit of 
Kewalist values in Turkish society. In that respect, the ideological bankruptcy of the 
social democratic front tends to further undermine its support among the electorate, 
which, already appears as highly volatile for the time being.
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CHAPTER V
THE COiMPARATIVE SETTING
Inasmuch as human beings carry the traces of childhood all their lives long, 
similarly, political parties are deeply affected from their roots, says Maurice 
Duverger in his analysis on political parties'. Not unexpectedly, development of 
political parties has been, in large part, inseparable from the historical process 
leading to the extension of political franchise and to the widening of the powers of 
the parliament; thereupon to democratic development in general. As Lipset and 
Rokkan have also shown, “historicity of the party alternatives is of crucial 
importance not only in the study of differences and similarities across nations but 
also within nations”.^  Though bulk of political parties in Continental Europe 
originated from intra-parliamentary groups from 1789 onward, the coming into 
existence of many parties somehow revealed divergences from this tendency; in that 
the latter were observed to be born outside parliaments. Owing to that, w'hile left and 
right parties were already formed within the 1848 Constituent Assemblies in France 
and in Germany; a number of socialist parties were born from trade unions, to 
constitute in turn, the political branches of the former in national parliaments, as in *
' Maurice Du\'erger, Siyasi Partiler [Political Parlies], trans. Ergun Ozbudun.4'^' ed. (Ankara; Bilgi 
Yayınevi, 1993), 15.
* Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Stnictmes, Party Sjstems, and Voter 
Alignments; An Introduction”. In Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National 
Perspectives, eds. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 1-64.(New York; The Free Press, 
1967),53.
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Britain. The extra-parliamentary organisations that historically impelled party 
formation in Europe were trade unions, intellectual clubs, churches, various leagues, 
industrial or commercial interest groups such as banks and large entrepreneurs, 
cartels, and at times, illegal movements. Whatever their roots had been, the political 
parties that emerged outside the parliaments revealed entirely different patterns than 
those born from intra-parliamentary groups.^
As shown in Chapter Three, CHP in the First Turkish Republic was born from a 
national resistance movement. Emerging as a legitimate, yet an illegal movement 
organised by Ottoman Army officers, the MHC {Miidafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) became 
a political group in the First National Parliament of 1920-23. Therefore, the very 
roots of one of the contemporary social democratic parties in Turkey differed sharply 
from those in Western Europe; in view of the developmental patterns accounted for 
before in the same Chapter. Besides, a number of historical circumstances in Turkey 
have helped social democracy to ground on an entirely dissimilar conjuncture when 
compared to Europe, as elaborated in detail in the preceding sections.
The structural anlyses carried out in this dissertation reveal that the Industrial 
Revolution, one of the key factors that contributed to the formation of modern 
political cleavages in Europe, did not take place in the Ottoman/Turkish polity. The 
Ottoman economy still revealed pre-capitalistic features by the time the two 
industrial revolutions had already taken place in the Western World. The Turks, 
therefore, remained as later-comers in terms of industrialisation. Implications of this 
economic delay have been paramount, both socially and politically. The cleavage
Duverger, "Siyasi Partiler", 17-28.
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system that shaped Turkish politics grounded on cultural and territorial oppositions 
rather than functional cleavages committed to class and collective interests as in the 
Western settings. Rather, structuration of the cleavage system in the Ottoman- 
Turkish polity owes largely to the legacy of absolutist state tradition, in addition to 
the particular land tenure system that the relations of production was framed on. 
Thereupon was the emergence of a cultural-territorial cleavage in the Turkish 
society, which was by no means comparable to the functional cleavage between the 
urban pre-bourgeoisie and the feudal landowners in the West.
Whereas socio-economic development within European capitalism was materialised 
so as to place the bourgeoisie into the upper hand in the social organisation of 
production and in politics; the prevalence of a provisionist'* economic structure in the 
Ottoman Empire implied that the wider masses remained largely aloof from politics. 
Divided between a ruling class {askeri) and a ruled {reayci), the locus of basic 
antagonisms in the Ottoman society fell on the dichotomy between the “centre” and 
the “periphery”. This fundamental cleavage remained intact to carve the rationale of 
Turkish politics till the dissolution of the classical land tenure system and the 
corresponding weakening of the centre in the nineteenth century.
Quite dissimilar in Western Europe at that time, the fundamental shifts in. production 
patterns and the accompanying societal changes propelled by the steam revolution 
were further accelerated throughout the Second Industrial Revolution. The collateral 
increase of capital and the continuous increase in the number of wage labourers 
resulted in conflicts between the landed interests and the rising class of entrepreneurs
Commodity production and money transactions remain limited in pro\’isionist economies, in contrast 
to mercantilism.
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in Europe. The procedure was complemented with the cleavage between owners and 
employers on the one side; and tenants, labourers and workers on the other. As such, 
functional cleavages in the form of “conflicts over short or long term allocation of 
resources, products and benefits in the economy” ,^ have been functioning forcefully 
in the industrialised countries in the late 1800s. Political implications of these 
contentions have been such that they were projected into ideological movements, on 
which the European left/right continuum was devised.
Without any comparable framework, fundamental controversies in Turkish politics 
of that time were revolving around the dichotomy between the secularisation 
attempts of a modernising bureaucracy and the reaction of the periphery to that. The 
peripheral forces were to ally, in turn, with the Islamists in the centre. In that respect, 
the cleavage structure in the Turkish society seemed to fit in the conception of 
territorial-cultural type set forth in the structural analysis suggested by Lipset and 
Rokkan. They have conceptualised such type of cleavage structure as “local 
oppositions to encroachments of centralising, standardising and rationalising 
machinery of the nation state”, or as “direct struggles among competing elites for 
central power”.*" The Turkish case also seemed to comply with their suggestion that 
“central nation builders and peripheral resistance will invariably be opposed, never 
in any joint alliance”; and that the “nation builders has to decide” on an alliance 
either with the religious or the economic forces in that country. In Turkey at the 
wake of nation state building, the alternative has been the latter; literally the etraf
 ^Lipset and Rokkaji, “CIea\ age Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”, 10. 
® Ibid., 10.
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and the landowners that “controlled a substantial share of the total primary 
production of the national territory.”’
In the light of the structural analysis, therefore, it becomes possible to conclude 
firstly that social democracy in Western Europe originated from functional cleavages 
based on the relations of particular social strata vis-a-vis the means of economic 
production. In other words, whilst Western European social democracy has been the 
outcome of the industrial revolution and the collateral horizontal political 
mobilisation of the working class; its counterpart in Turkey had to ground on an 
entirely different soil. It must be reiterated that, seeking to improve their lot, the 
wage labourers in a wide range of industrial activity in Europe steadily grew in 
number and organised in trade unions. They were at the same time, politically 
mobilised by the dominant communitarian views of society and in particular by 
political socialism of Marx and Engels.
Second, and stemming from the delay in industrialisation in Turkey is the evident 
fact that the working classes of Europe and Turkey were as comparable as Colossus 
is to a Lilliputian. By the time the millions of European workers had already formed 
a potential for a cohesive political force, the total number of workers in Turkey 
remained around some 14 thousand only. Even the sole fact that the size of workers 
in Germany, Britain, France and Sweden had reached approximately to 10, 9, 4 and a 
half million respectively by the turn of the twentieth century, may suffice to throw 
light upon the apparent disparity between the two cases. In that respect, a parallelism 
can also be drawn in Western Europe, when founding dates of socialist parties in
’ Ibid., 36-37.
219
these countries are taken into account. SPD was founded in 1869, which was 
followed by PS in 1879, SAP in 1889 and LP in 1893. As noted elsewhere in this 
study, though a socialist party was also founded in Turkey in 1910, it remained as an 
elite attempt without a social base, rather than evolving into a mass party.
Third, and associated with the above is that socialist politics in Turkey emerged as 
an elite-drive, in contrast to the West, where the working class became the founding 
father of social democracy. The main thrust behind the opposition tradition in the 
Ottoman Empire came from intellectuals of an often middle-class origin, and the 
actuality of “elite-drive”, by and large, tended to remain salient throughout the 
formative years of modern Turkish politics. The emergence of socialist politics has 
been no exception to that. Having been largely excluded from political participation, 
the wider masses in Turkey remained outside the “game of socialist politics” that 
was inaugurated by the İstanbul elites. Accordingly, an array of political parties 
founded both during the Second Constitutionalist Period and the Miidafaa-i Hukuk 
years emerged to be socialist or social democratic parties without a “social base”. 
The erudite also formed the basis of the Turkish Revolution and its political wing 
MHC/CHP. As such, while rise of socialism in Western Europe has been an integral 
part of political development and démocratisation process during and after 
industrialisation, left-wing politics remained confined to the intellectual practices of 
a handful of “enlightened” in Turkey. In the final analysis, it may be concluded that 
inasmuch as Western social democrats have become both contributors to and 
participants of democratic development, that role in Turkey had to be played by the 
enlightened state elites at least until transition to multi-party politics in 1945.
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The dominant political paradigm of the post-1945 Europe was based on the 
competition between Christian democracy on the centre-right and social democracy 
on the left of centre, which owes to a tradition of more than a century. Although the 
outset of social democracy in Western Europe had been the revolutionary political 
socialism of the past century; an evolutionary procedure from orthodox Marxism to 
Keynesianism, nevertheless, was successfully materialised so as to elevate social 
democracy to a prestigious status in the post-war liberal political order in Western 
Europe.
In the political socialism oiMarx and Engels, historical class conflicts were placed at 
the heart of ideology; wherefrom the ultimate goal emerged to be the forceful 
overthrow of capitalism by the proletariat. Radically critical of the existing 
oppression of wage labourers within bourgeoisie society, Marxism held that all 
means of exploitation were to be done away with, once private property and its 
device (the state) was abolished through revolutionary action; and once all forces of 
production were taken under collective ownership. Nonetheless, as political 
enfranchisement in Europe was gradually being extended, the dilemma facing the 
Marxists came out to be “whether or not” to participate in the electoral game. 
Divisions on the desirability of a reformist strategy instead of necessarily a 
revolutionary one, therefore, erupted within the socialist milieu of the late nineteenth 
century. All in all, by the virtue of the fact that socio-economic development in 
Europe was not being materialised in the way ihzXMarx had predicted, the reformists 
won over orthodox Marxists, in the inter-war period in Europe. During the same
5.1. Ideological D ivergences and Strategy
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period, the British econormsi John Maynard Keynes provided the reformist socialists 
with the theoretical tools for the “social democratic management” of the economy. 
Thereupon, contemporary social democracy was firmly anchored in the 
industrialised/monetised capitalist state; yet with egalitarian and distributive insights 
within that system.
The ideological path of Turkish social democracy did not develop within such an 
evolutionary process as above. In Turkey, the emergence of socialist politics had 
been collateral with the penetration of Western thought into the Ottoman/Turkish 
society during modernisation. Whilst the wide range of working masses in Europe 
were effectively incorporated into class politics as propelled by the scientific 
socialism of Marx and Engels', an array of socialist attempts in Ottoman politics at 
that time remained within the intellectual milieu in Isianbul, without any solid mass 
base. These currents were given further impetus by the ideological impact of the 
Bolshevik Revolution, and tended to continue in Anatolia. Relations between the 
Revolutionary government in Ankara and Leninist Russia have also been influential 
for development of these movements throughout the Miidafaa-i Huhik Period. The 
ideological stand of such efforts appeared to be an interaction between utopian and 
scientific socialism, Islamist values or to some extent, liberal ideas.
In the First Turkish Republic, CHP ideology remained confined to the consolidation 
of the nation-state on a modern, secular basis. In the early Republican period, efforts 
were put forth for the absorption of Western values by the Turkish society, and for 
the institutionalisation of Western codes and norms within the state device. 
Furthermore, the creation of a sizeable public sector became an imperative for the
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rapid industrialisation of the agrarian Turkish economy. In this framework, 
establishment of a comprehensive social security system, and fairer distribution of 
wealth appeared as the locus of CHP strategy in this period; which, came out to be 
highly oriented towards basic social democratic values. Nonetheless, the main thrust 
behind this strategy has been pragmatism stemming from the necessities of the 
young Republic; rather than ideological concerns.
In the Second Republic, efforts were put forth by CHP elites for the 
institutionalisation of a centre-left ideological stance on the basis o iKemalist values. 
On the other hand, indeed, have been both the confrontation between the 
conservative and reformist wings of '''Atatiirk's Party”, and the rise of Türkiye İşçi 
Partisi: TİP that posed an electoral challenge to CHP. In a highly volatile political 
conjuncture as such, establishment of a “Turkish social democracy” was realised 
through the strategic transformation of the ‘'''Kemalist State Party” towards the left of 
centre. Nevertheless, the CHP leader Ecevit meticulously refuted any identification 
with TİP or Marxist roots, taking into account the conservative nature of the Turkish 
electorate. All in all, it becomes evident that the outgrowth of social democracy in 
Turkey was framed on the prevailing socio-political conjuncture of the Second 
Republic. Thence, both the existing pattern of party competition and the relevant 
ideological legacy become explanatory factors in the analysis of the outset of 
Turkish social democracy.
Insofar as strategy is concerned, analysis of Western European social democratic 
parties suggests that strategic formulation is among the key factors that contibuted to 
the performance of these parties. Timely adaptation to the ever-arising conjunctural
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challenges has been a prominent virtue of social democratic parties in the West. In 
this respect, novel strategies based on electoral alliances necessiated by the rise of 
laissez-faire and left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation in the eighties and ninetees 
was largely substantiated through the organisational capacity for strategic decision­
making. Nevertheless, the intra-party capability for devising of new strategies was 
contingent upon the extent that structural opportunities have been favourable. The 
dominant ideologies prevailing in each country have shaped the strategy of parties in 
that respect. The social democratic parties in Britain, Sweden and France have faced 
more difficulties in the incorporation of new-left themes into their strategic appeals 
when compred to Germany; as left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation has been a more 
decisive factor in the latter. In France, for instance, the new-left was largely viewed 
as the adversary of the dominant etatist and traditional socialist ideologies in that 
polity. On the other hand, as class used to be a more propelling factor, and as 
traditional socialist and liberal ideologies have been more prevalent; strategic 
adaptation to new-left values were observed later in Sweden and in Britain.
In Turkey, social democratic strategy was confined to the transformation of CHP’s 
image into a party on the left of centre. This strategic shift, indeed, was structured on 
the intra-party capability for the mobilisation of reformist movement during the 
seventies. However, consolidation of this strategic turn was notably circumvented by 
structural constraints such as the unfavourable economic conjuncture, rising 
radicalism, electoral volatility and the impacts of the military interventions.
Social democrats came to power for the first time in the troubled coalition with Milli 
Selamet Partisi: MSP (The National Salvation Party) from January to September
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1974. Not unexpectedly, the uneasy alliance of the social democratic CHP and the 
Islamist MSP could not surv'ive much. Indeed, 1974 was the year of a global crisis 
propelled by trans-national oil cartels following the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971. It was, at the same time, the beginning of social democratic decline 
in North-Western Europe, stemming largely from the inappropriateness of Keynesian 
macro-economic management to the emerging deadlock in world markets. Building 
upon that, burst out the second oil crisis in 1979, to duly undermine in turn, the 
maintenance of high public expenditures throughout Western Europe. The second 
social democratic experience in government in Turkey was realised in such a 
conjuncture, by transferring eleven members of the Parliament from the centre-right 
AP to CHP. The minority cabinet continued from January 1978 to October 1979, 
with many allegations on corruption and incompetent performance; thence with an 
eroded legacy of CHP, lurking behind.
As stated above, whereas Western European social democracy was successfully 
reactivated through ideological and strategic adaptation to new left themes and fresh 
dynamics of the 1990s, Turkish social democrats remained highly fractionalised 
during the Third Republic. Indeed, hardly any left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation 
is being observed in Turkish politics. Rather, dividedness seems to prevail 
especially around personal conflicts instead of any ideological divergences. That 
appears to have prompted the electoral volatility among the social democratic bloc 
further. Allegations on corruption in SHR municipal administrations, and the 
coalition with the centre-right from 1991 to 1995 exacerbated the support of social 
democrats among the electorate; as the highest inflation rate of the entire Republican 
period was recorded in 1994. Despite the fact that the economic apparatus was run
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by the right wing of the coalition cabinets in that period; the growing unpopularity of 
social democrats was registered in 1995 general elections. In July 1997, the DSP 
wing of the social democrats came to government as junior partner to the centre-right 
ANAP, following the fall of the right bloc coalition founded by the radical Islamists 
and the other centre-right. Throughout this period, personalised factionalism 
continued to remain salient within the social democratic front in Turkey.
5.2. Social Base and Organisation
The social democratic parties in Western Europe and Turkey reveal significant 
divergences with regard to their social bases of support. As explored extensively 
throughout the analysis, working class has traditionally formed the core constituency 
of social democracy in Europe. Historically, the number of workers voting for the 
left gradually evolved from 1900 onward, in correspondence with the increase in the 
size of the blue-collar electorate. Congruent with the extension of political 
enfranchisement since early 1900s, workers were progressively integrated into the 
social democratic electorate until the seventies. While some considerable and rather 
elaborate shifts have been observed within the consistency of the electoral support 
for social democracy in the 1980s and the 1990s; workers tended to preserve their 
status, by and large, as the traditional supporters of social democracy in Europe. 
Besides, although class voting throughout Europe has been declining since the 
eighties, social democrats have been able to recruit support from the middle-classes 
as well; due largely to the strategic adaptation to the rising new cleavage 
mobilisation, rather than a solely class based appeal to the electorate.
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As becomes clear in this study, political alignments in the Ottoman/Turkish polity 
developed on an elite-mass gap rather than on class base. Due largely to the 
particular circumstances of the National Revolution and after, CHP used to be 
supported by the national bureaucratic elite, eU-qf and the big landowners until the 
1940s, This framework underwent some considerable changes during the multi-party 
regime. Whereas CHP support among the etraf and the landowners eroded 
significantly, it tended to remain intact within the civil-militaiy bureaucracy. On the 
other hand, the peasantry’s affiliation to the state-party has not been firmly 
grounded, as the penetration of the Kemalist discourse into the masses in the 
countryside remained limited. With the gradual process of electoral re-alignment and 
the collateral replacement of the elite-mass gap with functional cleavages during the 
Second Republic, CHP support started to increase in urban centres. Tendency 
towards this party became more visible among the better-educated electorate within 
the middle and upper middle classes, especially from 1965 onward. Status of the 
“centre-left CHP” as the party of the urban centres in developed regions, was almost 
registered by 1973 elections.
However, division of the social democrats in the Third Republic largely undermined 
the cohesion of the centre-left electorate observed the seventies. It appears that at 
present, not only an electoral fluency between the two parties of the social 
democratic front is prevailing; but that DSP’s social base is gradually becoming 
more distinct from that of the SHP/CHP. In this respect, whereas the latter tends to 
preserve its status among the bureaucratic elite and the relatively better educated 
strata with middle class origin; support for the former seems to be centred more on 
blue collar workers, the retired and the unemployed. As has been shown in the
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Fourth Chapter, the relationship between education and SHP/CHP support seems to 
be grounded on the traditional ties between the former CHP and intellectuals, 
teachers, bureaucrats; in general, the erudite.* It becomes clear therefore, that the 
social basis of support for social democratic parties in Turkey is considerably 
different than those in the West. In this connection, the question whether or not 
CHP’s support owes to the legacy of Kemalism\ and that of the DSP to the personal 
credit of Ecevit, remains open so far.
Findings of the foregoing Chapter also reveal significant divergences between the 
organisational structures of Turkish and Western European social democratic parties. 
The four social democratic parties covered in this study divulge, by and large, firmly 
institutionalised organisational schemes. Traditionally, the social democratic parties of 
Western Europe have been in organic relationship with trade unions in their respective 
countries, hence established well-organised political links with the leaders of the 
working masses. In Britain and in Sweden, grass-root organisation has particularly been 
a long established tradition since the turn of the twentieth century. Affiliated and 
subsidiary organisations such as women and youth branches have been a common 
phenomenon of these parties. Whilst the German and French social democratic parties 
reveal a slightly more hierarchical organisational structure when compared to those in 
Britain and in Sweden; nonetheless, intra-party democracy and proper functioning of 
affiliated branches have been entrenched as the integral parts of the party mechanism in 
these polities. *
* Yılmaz Esmer, “Parties and the Electorate; A Comparative Analysis o f Voter Profiles o f Turkish 
Political Parties”. In Turkey: Political, Social and economic Challenges in the 1990s, eds.. Çiğdem 
Balım and et al., 74-89. (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J.Brill, 1995), 79-80.
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In Turkey, social democrats have not been able to institutionalise their party structures 
within such a framework, due largely to the already disserted structural divergences in 
the origins. Foremost in this context is the fact that a genuine tradition of solidarity with 
the working class and its institutions has never developed in Turkey. Hence, any 
organic relationship with trade unions, as it has been the case in the West, has not been 
observed for Turkish social democracy. Furthermore is the apparent organisational 
deficiency. Indeed, the organisational scheme of the pre-1980 CHP appeared to be 
notably more democratic, in the form of institutionalisation from districts, to villages, 
towns and cities. There was the respect that directed the organisational capability of 
CHP at the intra-party mobilisation in favour of the reformist group in the seventies. 
The personal charisma of the reformist leader has also contributed to this strategic shift, 
as the other decisive factor. On the other hand, however, the leadership used to hold a 
monopolistic status in party politics since foundation. Especially in the Third Republic, 
the very fact that the organisational scheme in both social democratic parties remain 
subservient to the absolute hegemony of leadership, remains salient. With this regard, 
local party branches and subsidiary bodies such as women and youth organisations do 
not seem to have much saying within the intra-party decision making procedure.
Rather, it has traditionally been clientelist practices that seem to have dominated party 
politics in Turkey. This is observed to be stemming largely from the fact that at a time 
of rapid mass mobilisation, party politics in Turkey was institutionalised on vertical 
solidarities driven mostly by patron-client relations, rather than horizontal alliances 
based on socio-economic status. Thence, a prominent feature of party organisation in 
Turkey has become the recruitment of local notables and allies into the party. In that
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respect, party membership does not seem to function in the way that it does in Western 
European social democratic parties.
Besides, party administration and candidates to the Parliament in Turkey are not elected 
but appointed by the party leader in practice. In Western Europe however, the 
procedure of nomination candidates takes place, by and large, within the 
institutionalised democratic structure of the party apparatus; yet with some differences 
stemming from organisational structures and election systems. In Turkey on the other 
hand, the relevant legislative framework adopted in the Third Republic does not seem 
to provide for any enhancement as regards democratic functioning of political parties. 
In the final analysis, so far, a veiled oligarchy seems to be functioning at flill steam 
within the organisational framework of the social democratic front in Turkey.
In the final analysis, it becomes evident that the emergence, development and 
functioning of social democracy in Turkey reveal significant divergences when 
Western Europe is borne in mind. Due largely to the structural dissimilitude in the 
origins, the outset of Turkish social democracy grounded on the ideological and 
strategic movement from Kemalism towards the left of centre in the Second Turkish 
Republic. By the virtue of the fact that social democracy in Turkey did not develop 
on class base as in Europe, some elaborate shifts in its social basis of support 
manifested itself throughout the Second and Third Republics. Collateral has been the 
transformation of bureaucratic elitism into mass appeal. However, due to the 
prevailing factionalism, oligarchic practices and clientelism; efforts at the 
institutionalisation of a Turkish social democratic volkspartei similar to the sister 
parties in Western Europe, appear to be considerably undermined at present.
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CONCLUSION
The main objective of this dissertation was to study social democracy in Turkey, 
while retaining the Western European case as the reference point. In order to achieve 
that end, this study has undertaken a systematic comparative approach for indicating 
the convergences and divergences between the two cases. In the light of the analysis 
carried throughout the dissertation, it has become possible to draw several 
conclusions pertaining to the origins, development and functioning of Turkish social 
democracy, as well as its essential features. These findings are hoped to be of interest 
to researchers of Turkish politics, the social democratic intelligentsia, political elites 
and the electorate in Turkey. Besides, a systematic study of Turkish social 
democracy has significance especially when the electoral volatility in Turkey and the 
revival of social democracy in Western Europe are borne in mind.
Despite the fact that “ the end of ideology” was declared final in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Bloc, predictions over the future of left-wing politics in 
Europe largely failed to come true. It became clear in late 1990s that the left in 
Western Europe was “alive and kicking”. Of the fifteen member states of the EU, 
social democrats are in government with the exception of Spain and Ireland, as of 
autumn 1998. In Germany, France, Britain and Sweden, social democrats have 
successfully adapted themselves to the fresh dynamics of the 1990s. They came to 
power in these polities largely by the incorporation of much of the libertarian values
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of the decade into their programs, and by tactical appeal to the wider masses, in 
addition to their core constituencies. Whether the re-activation of social democracy 
shall constitute a durable alternative to the centre-right remains dubious so far; yet 
the left comes to view as the viable option for the electorate in Western Europe, at 
least for the time being.
The picture seems to be quite the reverse for Turkey. The apparent fractures, 
personalised factionalism and ideological draining in the centre-left have duly 
undermined the credit of social democratic politics in Turkey so far. Rather, ascent 
of Islamism at the expense of social democracy is being perceived within the present 
electoral volatility in Turkish politics. Whether radicalism shall grow to fill the 
vacuum as the anti-thesis to the hegemony of the centre-right remains highly 
speculative. Yet, one thing is plain that the uncompromising attitude of social 
democrats on alliance with the “other centre-left” is likely to further undermine the 
status of social democracy as a viable option in the political centre. With this regard, 
the findings of this study are expected to be of value in the present political 
conjuncture.
This research has yielded the key features of social democratic politics in Turkey to 
be considerably divergent from those of Western Europe. The framework of 
analysis devised in the First Chapter has been illustrative not only for the 
dissimilarities between the two cases, but also for the reasons behind them. Foremost 
is the fact that structural reasons have come to surface as the most significant thrust 
behind the divergence of Western European and Turkish experience in social 
democracy. Equally important is the dissimilitude between Turkey and Western
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Europe, which was observed to be correlating to each of the analytical tools 
employed in the research. Hence, inasmuch as the case of Western Europe is held as 
the reference, notable dissipations in terms of ideology, strategy, social base and 
organisation have been connoted in this dissertation.
In this respect, findings of the Second Chapter clearly indicated that social 
democracy in Western Europe has been the outcome of the worker movements 
prompted by the Industrial Revolution. It became evident, therefore, that the political 
mobilisation of the working masses and the side-by-side rise of social democracy in 
Western Europe were devised upon class politics. In this context, it has also been 
possible to observe horizontal type of political solidarities comprising of people with 
similar socio-economic status. Thereupon, it is shown in the research that cleavages 
of functional type as conceptualised by Upset and Rokkan constituted the main thmst 
behind the emergence and evolution of social democratic politics in Western Europe.
These external factors have helped to elucidate the structural dissimilarities between 
the chronicles of Western European and Turkish social democracies, As indicated 
throughout Chapter Three, industrialisation that was consummated in the past 
century in Europe, has been a gradual process in Turkey propelled after the 
Proclamation of the Republic. Due to the prolongation of an overwhelmingly 
agrarian economy and to the apparent delay in industrialisation, the minute mass of 
workers in Turkey was by no means in a position to become a cohesive political 
force; by the time workers in Europe were already organising into trade unions and 
political parties. Therefrom, whilst a mass mobilisation of the working people into 
class-based politics was commencing in Europe in mid 1800s; an elite-mass division
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has been prevailing in the Ottoman/Turkish society; without the means for the 
institutionalisation of mass political participation in that polity, until transition to 
multi-party regime in 1946, Rather, political participation in the formative years of 
modern Turkish politics remained confined to the intelligentsia, often with middle- 
class or bureaucratic origins. Inasmuch as social democracy has its origins in the 
working-class movements of the Industrial Revolution in Europe therefore, it has 
been an elite-driven endeavour within the modernisation process in Turkey; on the 
grounds that the centre-periphery gap had persisted for many centuries in the 
Ottoman society.
On that account, it can be suggested that class-based political mobilisation hardly 
occurred to the masses in Turkey; at least until the realignment of the traditional 
cleavage structures during the Second Republic. Instead, basic polarisation in the 
Turkish society has been revolving around conflicts of a cultural/territorial nature, 
rather than ideological contentions based on cleavages of functional type. Findings 
of the Chapters Three and Four have shown these to be correlated with the 
aforementioned centre-periphery division inherent within the particular land tenure 
system of the absolutist Ottoman polity. Furthermore is the phenomenon of vertical 
networks of alliances that were observed to be heterogenous and non-ideological in 
essence. As typified by Sabh Sayan, these solidarities were forged among people 
drawn from differing social strata, that in turn prepared the grounds for the 
institutionalisation of clientelist practices in Turkish politics.
Due largely to these structural divergences, it became possible to confirm the first 
hypothesis deriving from the typification of Upset and Rokkan. “Forasmuch as
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social democratic movement in Western Europe was built upon functional cleavages 
in the form of conflicts over short or long term allocation of resources, products and 
benefits in the economy, along with their projection into ideological movements; 
social democracy in Turkey was to develop on the residues of territorial/cultural 
cleavages still prevalent in the aftermath of the National Revolution”. Furthermore 
is the phenomenon of “vertical networks of alliances” in Turkey that are 
heterogenous and non-ideological in nature; whereas “horizontal type of political 
solidarities” comprising of people with similar social status or class-base have been 
functioning to carve the rationale of the “Left-Right” continuum in Western Europe.
Ascribable to the above, the main features of social democracy in Turkey appeared 
to be notably divergent from those in the Western settings. Stemming from the 
essential dissimilitude in the origins, ideological formation and the concomitant 
strategic development of Turkish social democracy were cast in a different mould in 
that polity. Ideologically, insofar as the case of Western Europe divulged an 
evolution from Marxism to left-libertarianism; Turkish social democracy was 
unveiled to be a transformation from Kemalism to the left of centre, without any 
identification with Marxist roots. Strategically, social democrats in Western Europe 
pursued a progressive stand from a class-based appeal towards becoming mass 
parties, and they successfully allied with Greens in the 1990s. Turkish social 
democrats, on the other hand, had to rely on the means for transformation from 
bureaucratic elitism towards mass appeal during the Second Republic and onwards. 
Although highly fragmented, there appears hardly any possibility of alliance even 
within the social democratic front itself
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For social base, whilst the working class has traditionally formed the core 
constituency of social democracy in Europe; this role had to be played by the 
national bureaucratic elite in Turkey. As voter re-alignments were commencing in 
both Western Europe and in Turkey during the 1970s, their implications also 
diverged in the two cases. Forasmuch as the former managed to recruit mass support 
from the rising new middle-classes, the better-educated urban electorate often with 
middle and upper-class origins constituted the basis of social democratic support in 
the latter. Thereupon, it became clear that social democratic support in Turkey 
reveals a notable relevance with educational status, which might be ascribed to the 
traditional ties between Kemalist values and the intelligentsia”. In this context, it can 
also be suggested that non-functional issues such as the conflict between Kemalism 
and Islamism are still prevalent in Turkey, rather than a left/right continuum as in the 
Western settings.
With regard to the organisational framework, contrasts speak for themselves. 
Whereas fundamentals of social democratic organisation in the West lay open as 
grass-root structure, highly institutionalised intra-party democracy and established 
relations with trade unions; leadership hegemony and clientelism come to the surface 
in its counterpart in Turkey. In the final analysis therefore, it becomes evident that 
social democratic politics in Turkey, which followed hardly any similar evolutionary 
path as in the West, has been functioning in an entirely different setting. Thence, the 
second and the core hypothesis of this research becomes entrenched as well. “Social 
democracy in Turkey seems to represent a dissimilar trajectory insofar as Western 
Europe is held as the reference”.
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The main objective of this dissertation has been to study social democracy in Turkey, 
with reference to Western Europe. Structural explanations have been complementary 
to the systematic study carried out with regard to the main tools of analysis 
employed in this reserach. This study, to the best knowledge of its author, is 
foremost the only attempt so far, to study social democracy in Turkey within the 
framework devised in this work. Nevertheless, it is of no controversy that further 
analyses shall be complementary to it.
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ANNEX
EXTRACTS FROM THE 1935 CHP PROGRAM
Preamble:
d-Etatism:
Art. 7: Our etatism stems from the commitment to raise the life standard of our 
nation to contemporary level, and to develop rapidly the national economy as a 
whole.
We deem it necessary to increase the efficiency of national activities by 
equipping each branch of the economy with high technology; and to enhance 
the utilisation of national capital in useful fields.
Art. 8: With a view to attain the goals above, and to serve public interests in 
national economy, while purveying at the same time, public services and 
national defence, the State is entrusted with the task of directly enterprising in 
areas that it deems necessary.
These areas comprise of large-scale undertakings such as mining, power 
generation, heavy industry, defence industry and civil works, and of public 
services such as transportation, communication and postal services.
Art 9: Our party acknowledges the importance of private enterprises, and 
supports their promotion by the State.
With a view to comply with national requirements and to enhance full 
security in the activities carried out by the private sector, our party presumes it 
necessary that the State indicates, via plans and programs, the extent, location 
and timing of these activities.
The State may directly undertake in areas where the private sector can not, 
or does not wish to enterprise.
Section VI: Financial Policy:
Art 77: We shall improve the taxation system according to progressive rates on 
real incomes, and with a view to purveying social justice and efficiency.
Art 78: We intend to decrease indirect taxes on basic vital commodities, as a 
measure to protect the citizens with low level incomes; and endeavour to 
maintain the balance between direct and indirect taxes.
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M L  Social Policy;
Art. 84: Labour (emek) is the essential component within the national product, 
which is to be preserved and to be dependent on.
Our party regards it essential to preserve the right to, and freedom of 
work; to safeguard physical and mental labour from being exploited, while 
reserving, on the other hand, the rights of employers; and to improve the 
legislation on labour according to democratic legal principles.
Art 87: We shall provide for the necessary precautions against accidents in 
work-places, improve the health conditions of work-places, protect child 
workers, and conserve the rights of female workers in the case of motherhood.
Art 89: With a view to safeguarding the right of the working people to be 
protected in cases of accident, illness, professional diseases, disability, old age, 
labor, motherhood and death, our Party adopts the development of social 
security system as a duty.
Art 94: Protection of orphans and of socially deprived children by the State is 
among the fundamentals of our social policy.
We deem it among our essential duties to establish the institutions for the 
purpose stated above.
IX. Section: Health Policy
Art. I l l :  Our Party treats the right for health as among basic human rights, 
and assigns the State the task of preserving and improving its citizens’ health. 
We, therefore, deem it necessary to raise the life standards of our citizens in 
cities, towns and villages to prosperity levels; to disseminate information on 
the preservation of health, to extend and improve preventive medical services, 
to prevent child death and finally to enhance bringing up healthy children, 
while combating, at the same time, all kinds of contagious and fatal diseases.
Art 112: We shall increase the number of hospitals and health stations, and 
shall improve the existing ones, with a view to meet the growing demand. We 
shall increase also the number of expert hospitals on gynaecology and 
obstetrics {dogximevleri). We aim at providing our economically deprived 
citizens with the right for child birth at no cost, and at establishing a health- 
security system.
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